B. Greenspan

During a dangerous offender hearing, the Crown sought to abandon reliance on a court-ordered psychiatrist whose evidence was challenged in cross-examination, and instead tender the evidence of a new psychiatrist.

The defence brought an abuse of process motion under s. 7 of the Charter, arguing the Crown was seeking an improper litigation advantage.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the Crown was attempting to provide the court with as much information as possible to assess the offender's risk, rather than acting for an oblique motive.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The proceedings spanned over 19 years, involving three trials, an appeal, and a dangerous offender application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the net pre-verdict delay was below the Jordan ceiling after deducting significant periods of defence delay—including the accused absconding and repeatedly changing counsel—and exceptional circumstances such as a mistrial.

The court also found the post-verdict delay reasonable, as it was justified by the complexity of the dangerous offender application, further defence delays, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The three accused were charged with importing cocaine after returning from a vacation in Jamaica.

Border Services Officers found approximately half a kilo of cocaine hidden inside cocoa powder cans in each of their checked suitcases.

The accused immediately disavowed knowledge of the drugs, claiming they were planted by unknown persons.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that 'Occam's Razor' proved guilt and found that the accused's immediate disavowals and testimony raised a reasonable doubt regarding their knowledge of the drugs.

All three accused were found not guilty.

The accused pleaded guilty to obstructing justice by destroying evidence of a crime.

The Crown and defence presented a joint submission, supported by the victim's family, proposing a sentence of one day in custody after accounting for pre-trial custody and house arrest.

The court accepted the joint submission, noting the guilty plea as a significant mitigating factor and applying credit for four months of pre-trial custody and 2.3 years of house arrest.

A DNA order was also imposed.

Following the dismissal of a motion for leave to appeal, the successful responding parties sought costs.

They submitted a joint draft bill of costs reflecting fees, disbursements, and HST, with a reduction applied for duplication of work between two law firms.

The court found the respondents entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis and held that the draft bill appropriately reflected the Rule 57.01 factors, including the complexity of the proceeding and late amendments to the grounds of appeal.

The moving party accepted the claimed amount but requested a deduction to account for an outstanding prior costs order.

The court fixed costs accordingly after deducting the outstanding amount.

The Attorney General of Ontario sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing a motion for the interim preservation of over $4 million under the Civil Remedies Act.

The funds were the proceeds of the sale of a commercial property previously housing an illegal marijuana grow operation and later leased to a company involved in a stock fraud scheme.

The court found no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's finding that there were no reasonable grounds to believe the property was an instrument of unlawful activity.

Leave to appeal was denied.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion under the Civil Remedies Act for an order to preserve over $4 million, representing the sale proceeds of a commercial property.

The property had previously housed a massive, concealed marijuana grow operation run by tenants, and was later leased to a company involved in a U.S. stock fraud scheme.

The court found no issue estoppel from prior unsuccessful federal criminal forfeiture proceedings against the property owner.

While the court found reasonable grounds to believe the property was an instrument of unlawful activity due to the grow operation, it ultimately dismissed the preservation motion.

The court concluded that preserving the funds would clearly not be in the interests of justice, as the owner had no knowledge of or participation in the unlawful activities, making a preservation order manifestly harsh and draconian.

The applicant, charged with child pornography offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging breaches of his rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter.

The court found no breach of ss. 8 or 10, as the police questioning at his home did not constitute a search or psychological detention.

However, the court found breaches of s. 9, due to an arbitrary three-day detention based on faulty police information, and s. 7, due to mistreatment in custody including the denial of medication for his obsessive-compulsive disorder.

Despite these breaches, the court dismissed the application for a stay, concluding that the prejudice could be adequately addressed through other remedies, such as a sentence reduction if convicted.

The applicant corporation brought an application concerning a restraint order affecting property.

It was uncontested that neither the corporation nor its sole shareholder, officer, and director had been charged with any criminal offence related to the restraint order or the property.

The respondent did not dispute these facts and there was no cross‑examination on the supporting affidavit.

The court issued a supplementary endorsement confirming that these uncontested facts informed the earlier decision dismissing the application.

The applicant sought to vary an ex parte restraint order under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to allow the sale of a property that had been used as a commercial marijuana grow operation.

The applicant wanted to use the sale proceeds to pay out a first mortgage held by a credit union before remitting the balance to the Attorney General.

The Attorney General opposed the payout, arguing that the mortgagee's innocence had not been established and should be determined at a forfeiture hearing.

The court dismissed the application, finding that it would be premature to allow the payout before a full hearing under s. 20 of the CDSA.