A. Khoorshed

The Crown sought a ruling permitting use, in direct examination of the complainant, of materials disclosed by the defence during an in camera application for directions under the Criminal Code s. 278.93 framework.

The court held the materials were not “records” under s. 278.1 and had already been ruled outside the s. 278.93 regime.

It rejected the Crown’s reliance on R. v. J.J., finding that decision did not create a general disclosure obligation requiring advance defence disclosure of such material for trial use by the Crown.

The court emphasized that criminal disclosure obligations are not symmetrical and that penalizing defence counsel for responsibly seeking directions would be imprudent.

The Crown was prohibited from using the disclosed materials in direct examination, without affecting Crown re-examination at trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving and failing to stop for police, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his identification as the driver.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge mistakenly attributed evidence to an independent witness who had not actually identified the driver, but argued there was no substantial wrong.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found that the remaining identification evidence was not overwhelming and, given the frailties of eye-witness identification, the error was significant.

The appeal was granted and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for driving over 80mg, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding no breach of section 8 of the Charter and in concluding that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The summary conviction appeal court found that the trial judge made no error in concluding that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion for the roadside demand and reasonable grounds for the breath demand.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable, despite a delay caused by the police facilitating contact with duty counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal to trial on a charge of defamatory libel.

The charge arose from a poster the applicant displayed publicly, which alleged that the managers of a teen band had engaged in 'abuse' and 'inappropriate behaviour' towards his son, and had misappropriated charity funds.

The reviewing judge found that the statements in the poster were expressions of opinion and value judgments based on a private dispute, rather than false statements of fact.

As there was no evidence of a 'calculated falsehood' or knowledge of falsity, the preliminary hearing judge exceeded her jurisdiction.

The application was allowed and the committal was quashed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of driving 'over 80'.

The trial judge had excluded breathalyzer readings under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding s. 8 and s. 9 breaches because the Approved Screening Device (ASD) used by the police officer was two days past its calibration date.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court upheld the finding of the Charter breaches but found the trial judge erred in his s. 24(2) analysis, particularly regarding the impact of the breach.

The appeal court admitted the evidence, set aside the acquittal, and entered a conviction.

The accused was charged with break and enter, robbery, uttering threats, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose following a home invasion.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including a cellphone belonging to the accused found at the scene, and eyewitness identification by the complainant.

The court rejected the eyewitness identification as unreliable but found the accused's explanation for his cellphone being at the scene to be implausible.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's testimony and found that the circumstantial evidence established his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for the break and enter, robbery, and weapons charges.

The accused was acquitted of uttering threats due to insufficient evidence regarding which perpetrator made the threat.

During a trial for second degree murder, the Crown brought a motion to admit a bloodstain pattern analysis expert report as an exhibit to go to the jury.

The accused opposed the admission, arguing it would be prejudicial and redundant.

The court balanced the probative value and prejudicial effect, concluding that the report should not be filed as an exhibit because it only captured the expert's examination-in-chief, contained unaddressed photographs, and risked over-emphasizing the expert's opinion.

However, the court permitted the glossary from the report to be admitted.

The Crown brought a motion to determine the admissibility of crime scene and autopsy photographs in a second degree murder trial.

The defence objected to several photographs on the basis of relevance, redundancy, and prejudicial effect.

The court applied the test of whether the probative value of the photographs outweighed their prejudicial effect.

The court admitted most of the photographs, finding them probative of the deceased's position, the extent of her injuries, and the amount of blood, but required the Crown to edit certain photographs to protect the deceased's dignity and minimize prejudice.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to adduce hearsay statements made by the deceased to a co-worker shortly before her death.

The deceased allegedly stated her intention to end her relationship with the accused.

The court ruled the statements admissible for their truth under both the 'present intentions/state of mind' exception to the hearsay rule and the principled approach to hearsay, finding them relevant to motive and self-defence, and sufficiently reliable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving 'over 80'.

At trial, the evidence showed a 33-minute unexplained gap between the conclusion of the appellant's call to duty counsel and the taking of his first breath sample.

The trial judge held this gap did not defeat the 'as soon as practicable' requirement under s. 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Superior Court found that because there was no evidence or judicial findings explaining the 33-minute delay—which constituted one-third of the total time from the traffic stop to the first sample—the Crown failed to prove the police acted reasonably and promptly.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample.

He argued the trial judge made several errors, including shifting the burden of proof on a section 8 Charter application, misapprehending evidence regarding the officer's grounds for the demand, misapplying the W.(D.) test for credibility, relying on hearsay, and failing to prove he operated a vehicle within the preceding three hours.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors, properly assessed credibility, and reasonably concluded that the officer had the requisite grounds to make the demand.

The appellant appealed her summary convictions for dangerous driving and failing to remain at the scene of an accident, as well as her sentence.

The trial judge found the appellant deliberately used her vehicle to strike a victim who had sued her in Small Claims Court.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decisions to allow an amendment to the information, deny an adjournment, refuse evidence of a prior mistrial, and handle a memory-refreshing objection.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed in part because the trial judge exceeded the Crown's sentencing position without providing an opportunity for further submissions and improperly treated a lack of remorse as an aggravating factor.

The sentence for failing to remain was varied to a concurrent sentence of time served plus one day.

The Crown brought a s. 521 bail review application to vacate a release order made by a Justice of the Peace.

The Justice of the Peace had released the accused without a bail hearing because the original signed information was not physically present in court, despite a signed warrant being before the court.

The Superior Court held that the Justice of the Peace erred in principle and acted in excess of jurisdiction, as the existence of a signed warrant compels the conclusion that a signed information exists.

The release order was vacated.

Conducting a new bail hearing, the court released the accused on a $5,000 recognizance with a surety and conditions, noting the complainant had recanted.

The offender was found guilty of assault causing bodily harm and three counts of breach of probation after attacking his cellmate in a correctional centre over a dispute about food.

The victim suffered fractured ribs, cuts requiring stitches, and bruising.

The court found the custodial setting to be an aggravating factor, as the victim was defenceless in a confined space.

The offender was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment for the assault, less 2.5 months of pre-sentence credit, and concurrent 6-month sentences for the breaches, followed by three years of probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make an arrest and breath demand.

The appellant contended the officer only had a 'suspicion' of impairment.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court reviewed the trial judge's findings, which relied on the severe unexplained collision, the appellant's disorientation, unsteadiness, odour of alcohol, and admission of consumption.

The court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the officer possessed both a subjective belief and objective grounds for impairment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for criminal harassment.

He argued the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to call reply evidence on a collateral issue regarding how he obtained an invitation to the complainant's dinner party.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that the reply evidence was admissible because the issue took on new significance during the defence case.

The court also found the sentence, which included a suspended sentence and three years' probation, was not clearly unreasonable given the persistent nature of the harassment.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

Two offenders were sentenced following convictions for fraud over $5,000 under s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code arising from a scheme that defrauded victims of $100,000 through a purported land development investment.

The court considered aggravating factors including the significant planning of the fraud, the vulnerability of the victims, and the serious financial and emotional harm caused.

While the Crown sought penitentiary terms of three to four years, the court concluded that the case fell below the range of large‑scale fraud and that conditional sentences could adequately satisfy denunciation and deterrence.

Both offenders were sentenced to conditional sentences of two years less a day with strict house arrest conditions, followed by probation.

The court also imposed fines in lieu of forfeiture and a joint and several restitution order of $100,000 in favour of the victims.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for refusing to provide a breath sample and breach of probation.

The sole ground pursued on appeal was that the trial judge improperly amended the Information before any evidence was heard.

The appeal court accepted that such an amendment would normally require consent or supporting evidence but found that defence counsel effectively consented to the amendment during the trial discussion.

Alternatively, the court held that even if the amendment was premature, no prejudice or miscarriage of justice resulted because the amendment merely corrected the wording to reflect the proper roadside demand offence.

The curative proviso under the Criminal Code therefore applied and the convictions were upheld.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving following a guilty plea, arguing the plea was involuntary and that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

The court found the guilty plea was voluntary because the appellant understood jail was not a possible sentence regardless of the plea.

However, defence counsel failed to review all Crown disclosure, including videotape evidence showing the appellant in a police station washroom, which could have raised potential Charter s. 8 privacy issues.

The court held that failing to review the disclosure before advising the appellant constituted conduct falling below the standard expected of defence counsel.

Because proper review and advice could reasonably have affected the outcome, the court found a miscarriage of justice and set aside the guilty plea.

The accused were tried for fraud over $5,000 arising from a $100,000 loan obtained from private lenders under representations that the funds would be invested in a New Jersey land subdivision project through a corporation.

Evidence showed the investors relied on representations that both accused were partners or officers of the company and that the funds would be invested as described.

The court found the money was not invested as represented and that the accused misrepresented their roles and diverted funds from the corporate account without the investors’ knowledge.

The court rejected the defence of intoxication raised by one accused and found the investors suffered economic deprivation exceeding $5,000.

Both accused were convicted of fraud under s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.