Jill Prenger

The accused brought pre-trial motions challenging the admissibility of a firearm seized pursuant to a telewarrant and utterances made to police during the search.

The court upheld the search warrant, finding the confidential informant's tip was sufficiently compelling, credible, and corroborated to justify the warrant, resulting in no section 8 Charter breach.

Regarding the utterances, the court found statements made to one officer were voluntary and admissible, but statements made to another officer were obtained in violation of the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights because the officer failed to advise him of the availability of duty counsel via a toll-free number.

The latter statements were excluded under section 24(2).

During a jury trial for second degree murder arising from the death of a young child, the defence sought to call a kinesiologist as a forensic expert to testify that the child’s fatal injuries could have resulted from a series of accidental falls.

Applying the admissibility framework for expert evidence set out in Mohan and Abbey, the court found the proposed witness was not properly qualified and that the proposed field of "forensic kinesiology" was not a recognized scientific discipline.

The court also found the proposed opinion relied on limited anecdotal factual foundations and reflected an advocacy-driven approach rather than objective expertise.

The probative value of the evidence was minimal and its prejudicial effect significant because it purported to address the ultimate issue of accident versus homicide.

The application to admit the expert evidence was dismissed.

The accused was convicted by a jury of manslaughter in the death of her three‑year‑old child following a prolonged pattern of physical abuse.

Medical evidence established multiple blunt‑force injuries of varying ages, including skull fractures and internal bleeding, culminating in a fatal head injury inflicted while the child was in the accused’s sole care.

The court rejected the accused’s explanation that earlier injuries resulted from an accidental bookcase incident and found beyond a reasonable doubt that she had inflicted numerous prior assaults over weeks or months.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence in cases involving violence against vulnerable children and abuse of parental trust, the court imposed a substantial penitentiary term.

Immigration consequences were considered but given only modest weight.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder following the death of her three-year-old child from blunt force head trauma, applied for a directed verdict on both second-degree murder and manslaughter.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and expert medical testimony indicating the child suffered multiple inflicted injuries of varying ages while in the exclusive care of the accused.

The court applied the Sheppard test and found sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude the accused committed an unlawful act causing death, and that she had the requisite intent for murder.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

During a trial for second-degree murder involving the death of a three-year-old child, the Crown sought to introduce graphic autopsy photographs.

The accused objected, arguing the photographs were highly prejudicial and would alienate the jury.

The court ruled the photographs admissible, finding they were necessary to demonstrate the nature and extent of the injuries, which was critical to the Crown's theory that the injuries were inflicted deliberately rather than accidentally.

The court concluded the probative value of the photographs outweighed their prejudicial effect, subject to limiting instructions to the jury.

The accused applied under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code to sever an indictment charging multiple assaults against his children and assaults and sexual assaults against his former spouse.

The court considered the interests of justice test articulated in R. v. Last, balancing potential prejudice to the accused from a combined trial against the public interest in efficient proceedings and minimizing repeated testimony by child witnesses.

The court found a significant risk of propensity reasoning if all counts were tried together but also recognized the burden of requiring the children to testify in multiple trials.

As a compromise, the court ordered severance only of the sexual assault counts relating to the spouse, while leaving the remaining counts to proceed together.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault and mischief.

The Crown sought to introduce statements she made to police.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary due to an atmosphere of oppression and sought their exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to a conceded breach of her s. 10(b) right to counsel.

The court found the statements were voluntary.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the police failure to ensure the highly intoxicated accused understood her rights to counsel was a serious breach that significantly impacted her Charter-protected interests.

The statements were excluded under s. 24(2).

The accused brought an application to vary his bail conditions following a charge of assault against his spouse.

The existing recognizance required him to reside with a surety and have no direct contact with the complainant.

Evidence was presented that the complainant, through a social worker and interpreter, expressed that she did not fear for her safety and wanted the accused to return to the matrimonial home while she was hospitalized following a mental health crisis.

Despite Crown opposition citing concerns about the relationship history and the pending trial, the court concluded that resolving the bail conditions would facilitate family planning and that appropriate safeguards remained through hospital discharge decisions and potential sentencing conditions.

The court amended the recognizance to remove several conditions, allowing the accused to return to the matrimonial home pending trial.