Marco Giuseppe Forte

The young person was serving the community supervision portion of a youth sentence for manslaughter when he was arrested and charged with trafficking heroin and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

His conditional supervision order was suspended, and the matter was referred to the youth justice court under s. 108 of the YCJA.

The court reviewed the suspension under s. 109 of the YCJA.

Acknowledging the young person's progress in education and employment, but emphasizing the seriousness of the deliberate and repeated breaches involving drug trafficking, the court ordered the suspension of the conditional supervision to be continued for four months, after which the young person may be released on the original conditions.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the police entry onto her property.

The officer attended at the accused's residence in response to a dispatch report of a possible impaired driver.

The property was secured by a motorized metal gate at the end of a 200-metre driveway, with intercom and security camera systems.

The officer entered the property by following a security guard through the gate without explicit permission.

The court found two Charter breaches: an unlawful entry onto the property in violation of section 8 rights, and an arrest without reasonable and probable grounds.

The court excluded all evidence obtained after the officer passed through the gate, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown sought certiorari with mandamus in aid after a preliminary inquiry judge discharged the respondents on break and enter and related charges arising from a bank vault robbery.

The reviewing court held that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by impermissibly weighing exculpatory against inculpatory inferences in a circumstantial case and by failing to consider the cumulative inculpatory inferences available to the Crown.

Applying the committal test under s. 548(1) of the Criminal Code and the governing authorities on preliminary inquiries, the court found committal inevitable on the break and enter counts for both respondents and on the possession of break-in instruments count for one respondent only.

Certiorari with mandamus in aid was granted accordingly.

The accused was tried on a charge of conspiracy to traffic in weapons under s. 465(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, with the alleged unlawful object being weapons trafficking under s. 99.

The Crown relied on intercepted communications, police surveillance, and formal admissions to prove an agreement and the accused’s participation in a weapons trafficking scheme.

The court accepted that a weapons trafficking conspiracy existed between others and that the accused may have agreed to purchase weapons or ammunition, but held the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused shared a common design to re-sell or further distribute the weapons.

Because the circumstantial evidence supported a reasonable inference of personal use, the accused was acquitted.

In a judge-alone criminal trial for conspiracy to commit weapons trafficking, the court ruled mid-trial on the admissibility of intercepted communications.

The court held that the traditional co-conspirator exception had been supplemented by the principled hearsay approach and applied the necessity and reliability criteria from Khan.

Communications during the alleged conspiracy period, together with earlier communications that provided meaningful context and were capable of showing acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, were admitted.

More cryptic earlier communications with negligible probative value were excluded unless the Crown called a witness to explain them.

The accused brought a pre-trial application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained from his cell phone following his arrest for possession of stolen property.

Police arrested the accused after discovering a stolen vehicle near a group of individuals, despite minimal evidence connecting him to the vehicle.

The court held that the arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds and that the accused’s detention and seizure of his phone were unlawful.

Police further breached the accused’s Charter rights by retaining the phone after his unconditional release to continue investigating a suspected robbery conspiracy.

Applying the s. 24(2) framework from Grant, the court found the Charter breaches serious and excluded the phone evidence and all derivative evidence.

Youth sentencing decision following convictions for manslaughter, aggravated assault, careless use of a firearm, and possession of a firearm without a licence arising from a shooting in an apartment building lobby.

The young person fired a handgun at individuals who had just assaulted him with a baseball bat, killing one person and grazing another while they fled.

The court considered significant mitigating factors including elements of self-defence and provocation, cognitive developmental delays affecting decision-making, remorse, and substantial rehabilitative progress during lengthy pre‑trial custody.

Applying the principles of proportionality and least restrictive sanction under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, and accounting for 22 months of pre‑trial custody, the court imposed a 2.5‑year custody and supervision order with one day of custody and the balance under community supervision.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to commit the accused to trial on charges of break and enter, possession of break-in tools, and mischief arising from a sophisticated bank theft at a TD Bank in Burlington.

The accused were found hiding in a field shortly after the theft, in close proximity to admitted perpetrators and stolen property.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence including concrete dust and drywall particles found on the accused's clothing and tools in the accused Hickey's van.

The court discharged the accused on all counts, finding that the Crown's evidence was equivocal and speculative, failing to establish the essential elements of the offences beyond what a reasonable jury properly instructed could convict upon.

Two young persons were charged with sexual assault and gang sexual assault, as well as robbery with violence, arising from an incident on September 20, 2009, in Toronto.

The complainant, a sex worker, engaged in sexual activity with four young men in a stolen red Honda vehicle and was subsequently beaten and robbed.

The court found that while the defendants participated in the robbery, the Crown failed to prove sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court determined that although the complainant may have had subjective misgivings about the sexual activity, her outward conduct and words were consistent with consent, and the defendants could have held an honest but mistaken belief in her consent.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that consent was vitiated by fraud or the subsequent robbery.

A young person was tried for second degree murder, attempted murder, discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life, careless use of a firearm, and unlawful possession of a firearm following a lobby shooting that resulted in a death and injury.

The accused admitted firing the gun but asserted self‑defence after being struck on the head with a baseball bat during a group attack.

The court found the accused had a reasonable belief of a threat and a defensive purpose, but concluded that firing multiple shots at retreating attackers was objectively unreasonable.

The court held the Crown failed to prove the intent required for murder or attempted murder.

The accused was convicted of manslaughter, aggravated assault, careless use of a firearm, and possession of a firearm without a licence.

The accused brought an application to stay the proceeding pursuant to Section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for an alleged breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under Section 11(b) of the Charter.

The charge was laid on October 26, 2010, and the trial date was set for March 28, 2012, representing a delay of approximately 17 months.

The court analyzed the delay using the framework established in R. v. Morin, considering the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice.

The court found that the operative delay was 8 months (6 months institutional delay plus 2 months Crown delay), which fell within the acceptable guideline of 8-10 months.

The application was dismissed.

In CCAA restructuring proceedings involving a retail apparel company, the monitor sought approval of an asset sale agreement for the debtor’s Costa Blanca business and the debtor sought an extension of the stay of proceedings.

The court considered the criteria under ss. 36(3) and (4) of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act and found the sale process had been conducted fairly and transparently and that the proposed transaction provided the best available consideration to creditors, notwithstanding that the purchaser was related to the debtor.

Approval of the sale was granted subject to a condition requiring the transaction to close by a specified deadline, failing which the debtor and monitor were required to seek further court directions.

The court also granted the debtor’s request to extend the stay of proceedings, approve liquidation of certain store inventory and fixtures, continue a key employee retention plan, and authorize repayment of secured loans.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80.

The trial concluded 14 months after the information was sworn.

The delay was exacerbated by the police's failure to swear the initial information, prepare a Crown brief, and provide timely disclosure, including late disclosure of police notes on the first day of trial.

The court found the delay unreasonable under s. 11(b) of the Charter, noting actual prejudice to the accused and attributing significant portions of the delay to the Crown.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that his continued detention after a lawful traffic stop was arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter, and that the breathalyzer technician's observations of his impairment should have been excluded under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the initial detention was lawful under s. 216(1) of the Highway Traffic Act and the continued detention was justified to investigate his dangerous driving.

The court held that the technician's observations were not conscriptive evidence and did not arise from a Charter violation.