Peter G. Bawden

The 14-year-old accused pleaded guilty to second-degree murder for shooting a victim during a coordinated attack on an apartment complex.

The Crown sought a conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the killing was planned and deliberate.

The court found that while the overall shooting was planned, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused planned and deliberated the specific murder of the randomly encountered victim.

The brief timeframe, the accused's youth, and the chaotic circumstances left a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The accused were arrested following a drug trafficking investigation where a youth sold fentanyl to an undercover officer.

Orgen Dorjee was found in the driver's seat of a vehicle with a large quantity of drugs, while Tenzin Dorjee was in the back seat next to a loaded firearm.

The Crown alleged they were engaged in a joint drug trafficking enterprise and were in constructive possession of each other's illicit items.

The court found Tenzin Dorjee guilty of possessing the loaded firearm, as it was in plain view and he fled from police.

However, the court found the evidence insufficient to prove a joint enterprise beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, Orgen Dorjee was acquitted of the firearm charges, and Tenzin Dorjee was acquitted of the drug charges.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder after shooting the deceased in the head following a confrontation at a gas station and a subsequent car chase.

The dispute originated from the deceased's rap lyrics disrespecting the accused's deceased friends.

The accused admitted to manslaughter but denied intent to kill, claiming the gun was fired accidentally as a warning and raising the partial defence of provocation.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding the shooting was intentional and that the elements of provocation were not met.

The accused was convicted of second-degree murder.

The defendants, two highly paid executives, were convicted of fraud arising from the public procurement process for a $300 million renovation to St. Michael's Hospital.

They engaged in secret communications and concealed conflicts of interest, causing significant financial and reputational harm to the hospital, other bidders, and the public procurement system.

The court found the fraud exceeded $1 million, triggering a mandatory minimum sentence.

Aquino, who orchestrated the scheme and destroyed evidence, was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment.

Georgiou, who breached his position of trust but may have misguidedly believed his actions benefited the hospital, was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment.

The defendants, having been found guilty of two counts of fraud over $5,000 in relation to a public hospital procurement process, applied to re-open their trial prior to sentencing.

They argued that the Crown failed to provide notice of the alleged deprivation, failed to prove causation, and that the court erred in its factual and legal findings regarding intangible deprivation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the defendants were fully aware of the case to meet, the factual findings were supported by circumstantial evidence, and intangible losses such as risk to market integrity constitute valid deprivation in fraud.

The court concluded that no exceptional circumstances existed to justify the extraordinary step of re-opening the trial, and any alleged errors should be pursued at the Court of Appeal.

The applicant, sought for extradition to the United States on charges related to money laundering for a violent drug trafficking organization, applied for a publication ban on the identities and identifying information of his proposed sureties prior to his bail hearing.

The Attorney General opposed the ban on names, occupations, and relationships to the accused, arguing it infringed the open court principle.

The court applied the Sherman Estate test and found that the applicant established a serious risk to the safety of the sureties and the public interest in ensuring safe participation in the justice system.

The court granted the publication ban, subject to review upon the conclusion of the bail hearing.

The defendants were charged with first-degree murder for allegedly assisting two unidentified shooters in killing the victim at a social club.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including cell phone records, GPS data, and surveillance video, to prove the defendants helped position the getaway vehicle and locate the victim.

The court found that while the defendants knowingly assisted in a plan targeting the victim, there was a reasonable doubt as to whether they knew the perpetrators intended to commit murder.

However, applying section 21(2) of the Criminal Code, the court concluded the defendants knew or ought to have known that a probable consequence of their common unlawful purpose was an inherently dangerous act.

Both defendants were found guilty of manslaughter as an included offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting breath sample evidence obtained in breach of his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights.

The trial judge had found the roadside breath demand violated the appellant's Charter rights because the officer lacked objectively reasonable suspicion, but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter applying the R. v. Grant framework.

On appeal, the sole issue was whether the trial judge erred in finding the first stage of the Grant test favoured admission.

The appeal court found the trial judge did not improperly equate the officer's conduct with good faith, but rather assessed the totality of police conduct including respectful treatment and diligence in facilitating s. 10(b) rights, and upheld the s. 24(2) analysis as reasonable and well-supported.

The decision concerns the conviction of Kayani As-Sadiq for assault, threatening death, aggravated assault, and related offences against his former wife, Marie-Lyne Toussaint.

The court found the complainant credible and her account corroborated by independent evidence and post-offence conduct.

The court rejected the accused’s alibi and alternative explanations, finding them improbable and unsupported by the evidence.

The court acquitted the accused of attempted murder, finding a reasonable doubt as to intent to kill, but convicted him of the included offence of aggravated assault.

The court sentenced Ibrahim Khiar for manslaughter and aggravated assault after he fired eight shots at Marcel Teme, killing him, and injuring three bystanders.

The Crown sought a life sentence or, alternatively, 20 years’ incarceration with delayed parole eligibility.

The defence sought 15 years.

The court imposed 18 years, to be served concurrently with a prior sentence, and declined to delay parole eligibility.

The decision reviews the facts, aggravating and mitigating factors, the impact of systemic racism, and relevant case law on sentencing for manslaughter with a firearm.

The court considered whether Mohamed Siad should be designated a dangerous offender following a series of violent offences, primarily against intimate partners and family members.

After reviewing Siad’s history of escalating violence, repeated breaches of court orders, failed attempts at rehabilitation, and psychiatric evidence, the court found that Siad’s conduct was intractable and that he posed a high risk of future violence.

The court designated Siad a dangerous offender and imposed a global sentence of five years’ incarceration (after credit for pretrial custody), followed by a seven-year long-term supervision order, with ancillary orders including DNA and weapons prohibitions.

The applicants, charged with fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in relation to a bid-rigging scheme, brought an application for the disclosure or third-party production of investigative files held by counsel for cooperating witnesses.

The cooperating witnesses had received immunity or leniency under the Competition Bureau's programs.

The applicants argued that the witnesses' lawyers acted as state agents when interviewing their clients and that solicitor-client privilege over those interview notes was waived.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the lawyers were not acting as state agents, the communications remained protected by solicitor-client privilege, and the privilege was never waived.

Consequently, the materials were not within the Crown's control for Stinchcombe disclosure and could not be produced as third-party records.

The applicant, charged with two counts of murder, brought a Charter motion to exclude evidence extracted from an iPhone seized upon his arrest.

The applicant argued that the search warrant was overly broad, the police ignored its limitations, the affiant misled the issuing justice, and the police failed to file reports to a justice and lost a USB key containing the extracted data.

The court found that the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the stolen phone and that the failure to file reports and the loss of the USB key violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

However, applying the Grant test, the court concluded that the evidence was highly reliable and crucial to the Crown's case, and its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The applicants sought to quash charges of fraud on the public and conspiracy to defraud the public, arguing that the evidence identified 38 specific corporate victims, thus requiring individual naming in the indictment.

The Crown contended that the charges were properly framed against the public due to the impossibility of identifying all victims (e.g., individual condominium owners affected by increased fees) and the broad interpretation of "public" in the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the charges were appropriately framed as offenses against the public, consistent with recent jurisprudence where a segment of the community or a regulated industry can constitute "the public" and where a ripple effect on unidentifiable parties exists.

This decision addresses multiple mid-trial applications in a first-degree murder trial.

The court dismissed the defence's application for a mistrial, finding that while the Crown's officer erred in interviewing a witness under cross-examination, the accused's right to a fair trial was not impaired.

The court also denied the defence's request to exclude a key witness's evidence, despite witness misconduct, deeming it a misunderstanding rather than an intent to obstruct justice.

Furthermore, the court allowed the Crown to introduce detailed pathology evidence and evidence of the accused's failure to disclose litigation in bankruptcy, finding their probative value outweighed potential prejudice.

The defence's application to compel the Crown to call a witness whose testimony might exculpate the accused was denied due to reliability concerns.

Finally, the court found the defence breached the rule in Browne and Dunn by not confronting Crown witnesses with anticipated defence evidence and allowed the Crown to call significant reply evidence to counter the accused's claims of English comprehension issues regarding her motive.

The accused, Osman, applied for a directed verdict on a charge of accessory after the fact to murder.

Osman had assisted the principal offender in escaping after a shooting, but the victim did not die until three days later.

The Crown conceded the accused could not be convicted of the charged offence since the victim was alive at the time of assistance, but argued for a conviction on the included offence of accessory after the fact to attempt murder.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments, finding that accessory after the fact to attempt murder is not an included offence under s. 662(1) and cannot be applied via s. 660 in these circumstances.

The application was granted and a directed verdict of acquittal was entered.

The offender was convicted of second degree murder and manslaughter following a public shooting outside a nightclub.

The offender, who was involved in drug trafficking and habitually carried a firearm, shot and killed an innocent peacemaker and then shot and killed a second victim who attempted to prevent his escape.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with an 18-year period of parole ineligibility for the second degree murder, and a concurrent 15-year sentence for the manslaughter, emphasizing denunciation and the aggravating factor of the offender's involvement in the drug trade.

The accused, Tanade Mohamed, shot and killed two men in a nightclub parking lot following a minor altercation.

He claimed self-defence and provocation for the first victim, and accident for the second.

The co-accused, Abdirisaq Ali, drove the getaway vehicle and was charged as a party to the offences.

The court rejected Mohamed's claims of self-defence and provocation, finding him guilty of second-degree murder for the first victim.

However, the court found a reasonable doubt regarding his intent to kill the second victim, resulting in a manslaughter conviction.

The co-accused was acquitted of all charges, as the court found a reasonable doubt regarding his prior knowledge of the shooter's intentions.

The applicant, charged with second degree murder following a home-invasion robbery, applied for bail under s. 522 of the Criminal Code based on a material change in circumstances since her initial detention order.

The court found that the COVID-19 pandemic and the availability of a new, highly reliable surety constituted material changes.

The court concluded that the applicant met her onus on the secondary and tertiary grounds, noting the stringent release plan involving house arrest, electronic monitoring, and substantial sureties.

The applicant was granted judicial interim release.

The applicant was arrested for possession of a Schedule I substance after a drug transaction was observed.

A search of his vehicle revealed cocaine and fentanyl.

At the police station, the applicant was strip searched before being given the opportunity to consult with counsel.

The applicant brought a Charter application to exclude the drugs found in his car, alleging breaches of his s. 8 and s. 10(b) rights.

The court found no s. 8 breach, as there were reasonable grounds for the strip search.

The court found a s. 10(b) breach because the police failed to allow the applicant to consult with counsel before the strip search.

However, the court concluded that the drugs were not obtained in a manner that breached s. 10(b), and even if they were, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2).