Corrie Langdon

Dwight Dequilla was sentenced for multiple offences including attempted murder, assault (intimate partner violence), mischief, and numerous breaches of court orders.

The offences stemmed from a campaign of harassment and abuse against his former partner, Melanie Cruz, and culminated in the attempted murder of Neil Virtucio, whom Dequilla believed was having an affair with Ms. Cruz.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for intimate partner violence and witness intimidation, imposing a global sentence of 10 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh detention conditions.

Cody Rodgers pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault and being unlawfully in a dwelling-house with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The victim, Ms. A.C., was violently assaulted and sexually assaulted in her own apartment, suffering severe physical and psychological injuries.

The court considered aggravating factors including the brutal nature of the assault, the home invasion aspect, and the fact that the offender was on a release order for another sexual assault at the time.

Mitigating factors included his youth, early guilty plea, and rehabilitative efforts in custody.

The court also addressed Gladue principles and mental health/substance abuse as potential mitigating factors, ultimately finding limited applicability given the severity of the crime and lack of a direct causal link.

The judge imposed a sentence of 9 years' incarceration, which, after credit for pre-sentence custody (including adjustments for time served on another sentence and lockdown conditions), resulted in a net sentence of 5 years and 318 days, along with various ancillary orders.

This decision addresses multiple mid-trial applications in a first-degree murder trial.

The court dismissed the defence's application for a mistrial, finding that while the Crown's officer erred in interviewing a witness under cross-examination, the accused's right to a fair trial was not impaired.

The court also denied the defence's request to exclude a key witness's evidence, despite witness misconduct, deeming it a misunderstanding rather than an intent to obstruct justice.

Furthermore, the court allowed the Crown to introduce detailed pathology evidence and evidence of the accused's failure to disclose litigation in bankruptcy, finding their probative value outweighed potential prejudice.

The defence's application to compel the Crown to call a witness whose testimony might exculpate the accused was denied due to reliability concerns.

Finally, the court found the defence breached the rule in Browne and Dunn by not confronting Crown witnesses with anticipated defence evidence and allowed the Crown to call significant reply evidence to counter the accused's claims of English comprehension issues regarding her motive.

The applicant, Anh Chiem, charged with first-degree murder, sought to quash a production order compelling the Law Society of Ontario (LSO) to disclose her complaints against the deceased lawyer.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant lacked standing under s. 487.0193 of the Criminal Code, as only the party ordered to produce (the LSO) could initiate such a challenge.

The court also held that the Criminal Code provisions for production orders operate independently of the Law Society Act's disclosure criteria, and that issues of privilege or incrimination are addressed within the Code's framework or at the admissibility stage.

The accused, charged with multiple unprovoked violent and sexual assaults, underwent a mandatory 90-day bail review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the accused was not in a time-served position, had caused the delays by repeatedly firing his counsel, and lacked an adequate release plan.

Given his extensive criminal record and the nature of the allegations, the court concluded there was a substantial likelihood he would re-offend.

The continued detention of the accused was held to be justified on the secondary ground.

The accused, Krishyanth Kugarajah, was sentenced for two counts of sexual assault, forcible entry, assault, threatening death, and forcible confinement against a vulnerable international student.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victim's vulnerability, repeated assaults, threats of deportation, and the assaults occurring in her home.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record and mental health concerns, though the latter were not found to be causally linked to the offences.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, imposing a global sentence of 7 years' incarceration, reduced to 6 years and 10 months after pre-sentence custody credit.

Ancillary orders included DNA samples, a weapons prohibition, a communication ban with the victim, and Sex Offender Registry inclusion.

The accused, Krishyanth Kugarajah, was charged with two counts of sexual assault, and one count each of assault, forcible entry, forcible confinement, and uttering a death threat.

The complainant, P.K., testified about repeated acts of sexual and physical violence.

The court found P.K.'s testimony credible and reliable, supported by DNA evidence and an independent witness.

The accused's testimony was found illogical and inconsistent.

The court rejected the defence's arguments regarding the definition of "real property" for forcible entry and the sufficiency of confinement for forcible confinement.

Kugarajah was found guilty on all counts.

The applicant, an Aboriginal man with a lengthy criminal record and mental health issues, sought a review of his detention order under ss. 520 and 525 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the justice of the peace erred in rejecting a proposed surety's credibility based on unproven information.

Conducting a de novo review, the court provided a detailed analysis of the newly enacted s. 493.2 of the Criminal Code, which requires particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal and vulnerable accused.

Applying these principles contextually to the applicant's history of breaches and the proposed release plan, the court concluded that detention was not necessary on the secondary or tertiary grounds and ordered the applicant's release on strict conditions, including electronic monitoring.

The Crown brought an application to designate the accused as a dangerous offender following his conviction on multiple offences including two counts of human trafficking.

The accused sought to prohibit the Crown from calling viva voce evidence relating to findings of guilt from 1999 on the grounds of issue estoppel.

The court dismissed the application, finding that issue estoppel did not apply because there was no evidence that the sentencing judge from 1999 made findings of fact in favour of the accused, nor was there evidence that such findings were logically necessary to the convictions and sentence imposed.

The destruction of the audio recording and transcript from the 1999 proceedings prevented the court from determining what facts were admitted or found.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence for the respondent convicted of human trafficking, receiving material benefits from trafficking, withholding documents, exercising control, and obstructing justice.

The court found the respondent posed a high risk to reoffend but declined the dangerous offender designation due to insufficient evidence of the requisite pattern of repetitive behaviour under section 753(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

However, the court designated the respondent as a Long Term Offender under section 753.1(2) and imposed a sentence of 10½ years incarceration (reduced by pre-sentence custody credit to 2 years 7 months remaining) followed by a maximum 10-year Long Term Supervision Order.

The offender, Matthew Cosmo Deiaco, pleaded guilty to several human trafficking and related offences, including trafficking in persons, receiving material benefit from an offence, confinement, assault causing bodily harm, and using an imitation firearm.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 9 years, while the defence proposed 6 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 8 years, less credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a remaining sentence of 4 years, 4.5 months.

The judge considered aggravating factors such as the victim's vulnerability, the extensive control exercised by the offender, the violence used during the victim's escape, and the offender's significant criminal record and lack of insight.

Mitigating factors included a difficult upbringing, sexual abuse, and a guilty plea that saved court time and spared victims from testifying.

However, enhanced credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions was denied due to a lack of evidence regarding negative impact and the offender's record of misconduct while incarcerated.

A lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order for life were also imposed.

The Crown applied for an order requiring the offender to be assessed by a psychiatrist to determine whether he should be declared a dangerous offender or long-term offender following his conviction for human trafficking, exercising control over persons, receiving material benefit from trafficking, withholding passports, and obstructing justice.

The court found that the offence of human trafficking constituted a serious personal injury offence and that there were reasonable grounds to believe the offender might be found to be a dangerous offender based on a pattern of repetitive sexual exploitation of female victims.

The court ordered a psychiatric assessment.

The court determined whether the offence of human trafficking, as committed by the accused against two young women, constitutes a serious personal injury offence (SPIO) under section 752 of the Criminal Code.

The accused was convicted of exercising control over the victims, trafficking in persons, receiving material benefit from trafficking, withholding passports, and obstructing justice.

The court found that the trafficking offence met the SPIO definition through implied threats of violence and severe psychological harm, though the court declined to find that human trafficking inherently constitutes an SPIO in all cases.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood-alcohol level exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The central issue was whether a valid approved instrument demand was made by the arresting officer.

The officer inadvertently read the wrong breath demand—repeating the approved screening device demand instead of making the approved instrument demand.

Although the accused pointed out the error and the officer provided a loose explanation about going to the police station for a numerical reading, the court found this explanation insufficient to constitute a valid approved instrument demand.

The court applied strict compliance principles and dismissed the charge due to the inadmissibility of the Certificate of Analysis.

The accused was convicted by a jury of assault causing bodily harm and assault arising from a violent attack on a vulnerable sex trade worker after she refused to continue a sexual act.

The assault involved choking, stomping, and dragging the complainant, causing bodily harm but no permanent injuries.

At sentencing, the court considered aggravating factors including the brutality of the assault and the complainant’s vulnerability, as well as mitigating factors including the accused’s lack of criminal record, age, disability, language barriers, and social isolation.

The court concluded that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors and that specific deterrence was not a significant concern.

A suspended sentence with probation was imposed instead of incarceration.

The defendant, charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm for allegedly transmitting genital herpes to the complainant, brought a preliminary application under section 276 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant sought to adduce evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity to challenge causation and whether her consent was vitiated by fraud.

The court granted the application in part, finding that the evidence was relevant to the live issues at trial and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice.

The court permitted cross-examination on specific instances of the complainant's sexual history within a defined timeframe to allow the defendant to make full answer and defence.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm and criminal negligence causing bodily harm arising from the alleged transmission of genital herpes (HSV-2) to the complainant.

The defendant brought a section 276 application seeking to adduce evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity to support two defences: (1) that the defendant was not the source of the infection (causation), and (2) that the complainant would have consented to unprotected sexual activity even if informed of the defendant's positive viral status (negating fraud-based vitiation of consent).

The court granted the application in part, permitting limited cross-examination of the complainant regarding her sexual history within a defined timeframe and scope, while excluding evidence that would invoke the "twin myths" that prior sexual activity makes consent more likely or credibility less worthy.