Joanne Prince

An application was brought by eight young persons to vary a previous court order to explicitly prevent media from disseminating their identifying information, including through private social media messages, in relation to charges of second-degree murder.

The court found that a reporter's actions of contacting individuals on social media and disclosing a young person's name and charges contravened the spirit of the Youth Criminal Justice Act's publication ban under section 110, even if not an intentional breach of the specific prior order.

The court clarified that "publication" under the YCJA includes indiscriminate communication on social media that risks making information known to the general public.

The accused, Krishyanth Kugarajah, was sentenced for two counts of sexual assault, forcible entry, assault, threatening death, and forcible confinement against a vulnerable international student.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victim's vulnerability, repeated assaults, threats of deportation, and the assaults occurring in her home.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record and mental health concerns, though the latter were not found to be causally linked to the offences.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, imposing a global sentence of 7 years' incarceration, reduced to 6 years and 10 months after pre-sentence custody credit.

Ancillary orders included DNA samples, a weapons prohibition, a communication ban with the victim, and Sex Offender Registry inclusion.

The accused, Krishyanth Kugarajah, was charged with two counts of sexual assault, and one count each of assault, forcible entry, forcible confinement, and uttering a death threat.

The complainant, P.K., testified about repeated acts of sexual and physical violence.

The court found P.K.'s testimony credible and reliable, supported by DNA evidence and an independent witness.

The accused's testimony was found illogical and inconsistent.

The court rejected the defence's arguments regarding the definition of "real property" for forcible entry and the sufficiency of confinement for forcible confinement.

Kugarajah was found guilty on all counts.

J.J., a young person, was found guilty of sexual assault with a weapon and being a party to sexual assault.

The court considered sentencing principles under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), including the diminished moral blameworthiness of young persons and the goal of rehabilitation.

Despite J.J. turning 20 and thus serving any custodial sentence in an adult facility, which presented challenges for programming and rehabilitation, the court imposed a 12-month custody and supervision order followed by 12 months of probation.

The court emphasized that the adult facility must adhere to YCJA principles and set a future sentence review date to monitor J.J.'s rehabilitation progress, acknowledging the potential for collateral consequences due to adult incarceration and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving his two nieces.

The Crown relied on similar fact evidence from both complainants, whose accounts of separate incidents were admitted at trial.

The trial judge found concerns regarding the circumstances of disclosure, including potential suggestive questioning by parents and the possibility of collusion or tainting between the complainants.

Despite finding both complainants credible and articulate, the judge determined that the Crown had not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the defendant on all charges.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault on the basis that he struck the complainant with a beer glass, causing multiple lacerations to the face and neck.

The appellant claimed self-defence, asserting that the complainant attacked him first.

The trial judge applied the amended self-defence provisions of the Criminal Code retrospectively and instructed the jury accordingly.

The Crown argued that if the appellant struck first, self-defence was not available.

The trial judge failed to correct this legal misstatement.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's assertion was legally incorrect, as self-defence can apply even if the accused struck the first blow, provided the accused reasonably believed force or a threat of force was being used against them.

The trial judge's failure to correct this error rendered the verdict unsafe.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of assault against her five-year-old daughter and one count of assault with intent to resist arrest, as well as the concurrent suspended sentence.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge's reasons for judgment were insufficient regarding the analysis of the appellant's evidence and its impact on reasonable doubt for the assault counts against her daughter (counts one and two).

Consequently, the appeals for these two convictions were allowed, and a new trial was ordered before a different judge.

The appeal against the conviction and sentence for assault with intent to resist arrest (count three) was dismissed, as the trial judge's reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence on that count were sufficient, and the sentence imposed was not demonstrably unfit.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on three fraud-related charges, where the critical issue at trial was identity.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding reasonable doubt based primarily on a visual comparison of a Money Mart photo with the accused in court.

The Crown alleged the trial judge erred by failing to consider other material circumstantial evidence of identity, such as matching names, dates of birth, and addresses between the sworn Information and Money Mart records.

The appellate court found that the trial judge's failure to refer to this material circumstantial evidence constituted a misapprehension of evidence and rendered the reasons insufficient for effective appellate review.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered before a different judge.

A preliminary inquiry into charges of human trafficking, forcible confinement, dangerous driving, and related offences.

The Crown sought committal on all counts.

The court committed the accused on counts relating to trafficking in persons, material benefit, dangerous driving (both counts), forcible confinement, and failure to comply with undertaking.

The court discharged the accused on counts of escape from lawful custody and failure to stop for police, finding insufficient evidence on the essential elements.

The court also granted bail with stringent conditions, finding that a suitable supervision plan could manage the risk of reoffending.