CITATION: R. v. T.J., 2026 4235 ONSC 4235

COURT FILE NO.: YC-25-500000009

DATE: 20260731

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

T.J.

Defendant

James Frost and Ellen An, for the Crown

Tania Bariteau and Deepak Vadera, for the Defendant

HEARD: May 11-13, 20, 21, 2026

JUSTICE PETER BAWDEN

Pursuant to s. 110 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1, no person shall publish the name of the young person referred to in these proceedings, or any information related to the young person that would identify them as a young person dealt with under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

I. OVERVIEW

1Near midnight on June 24, 2024, a stolen Acura sedan drove around three apartment buildings on Falstaff Avenue in North York. While circling the complex, it passed near a group of residents gathered in a gazebo at the centre of the property.

2The Acura then made a second circuit around the complex. This time, it stopped in a position that allowed a clear view of the gazebo which was approximately 75 metres away. Less than a minute later, four men simultaneously exited the vehicle. They were masked, wearing gloves, and armed with handguns. They ran toward the gazebo and began to fire shots. The people in the gazebo fled.

3The accused, T.J., was one of the four shooters. He exited from the front passenger seat and ran ahead of the others. While the other three shooters stopped within a short distance of the car and quickly returned when the occupants of the gazebo had dispersed, T.J. continued to run forward into the complex. As he ran past the first of the three buildings, he saw the victim, Ajay Simpson, riding a scooter on a nearby pathway. T.J. immediately changed direction and ran toward him, firing. Simpson did not initially react, apparently unaware of his peril. Once he realized he was being targeted, he threw down the scooter and ran for his life.

4T.J. chased Simpson across the courtyard which separated the three buildings. When it appeared that he might escape, T.J. slowed, took aim, and fired. Simpson was struck in the leg and fell. T.J. approached and, while Simpson lay helpless on the ground, fired five shots at close range. With his gun now emptied of bullets, T.J. ran back to the waiting Acura and escaped with the other shooters.

5T.J. has pleaded guilty to second degree murder. The Crown rejects that plea and seeks a conviction for first degree murder, alleging that the killing was planned and deliberate. T.J. admits through his counsel that he took part in a planned shooting intended to intimidate residents of the Falstaff complex but argues that the evidence does not establish that the murder of Ajay Simpson was part of that plan. The defence submits that the circumstances leave open a reasonable possibility that the murder was a spontaneous act committed in a heightened emotional state. T.J. was only 14 years old at the time of the murder.

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR JUDGMENT

A. Proof Based on Circumstantial Evidence

6There is no direct evidence that the killing was planned and deliberate. The Crown’s position rests entirely on circumstantial evidence and the inferences that it says should be drawn from that evidence. The principles concerning proof based solely on circumstantial evidence were summarized in R. v. Lights, 2020 ONCA 128 at paragraphs 36-38:

36When the Crown’s case consists wholly or substantially of circumstantial evidence, the standard of proof requires the trier of fact be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s guilt is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence as a whole: R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, at para. 20.

37To determine if the circumstantial evidence meets the required standard of proof, the trier of fact must keep in mind that it is the evidence, assessed as a whole, that must meet this standard of proof, not each individual piece of evidence that is but a link in the chain of proof: R. v. Smith, 2016 ONCA 25.

38Inferences consistent with innocence need not arise from proven facts. Rather, they may arise from a lack of evidence: Villaroman, at para. 35. Accordingly, a trier of fact must consider other plausible theories and other reasonable possibilities inconsistent with guilt so long as these theories and possibilities are grounded on logic and experience. They must not amount to fevered imaginings or speculation. While the Crown must negate these reasonable possibilities, it need not negate every possible conjecture, no matter how irrational or fanciful, which might be consistent with an accused's innocence: Villaroman, at paras. 37-38.

7While a reasonable doubt may arise from an absence of evidence, a finding of guilt must be based on facts that are grounded in the evidence: R. v. Ali, 2021 ONCA 362 at para. 97

B. Planning and Deliberation

8In R. v. Nygard, 1989 CanLII 6 (SCC), [1989] S.C.J. No. 110, the Supreme Court of Canada approved the classic definition of planning and deliberation established in the 1961 decision of R. v. Widdifield:

I think that in the Code "planned" is to be assigned, I think, its natural meaning of a calculated scheme or design which has been carefully thought out, and the nature and consequences of which have been considered and weighed. But that does not mean, of course, to say that the plan need be a complicated one. It may be a very simple one, and the simpler it is perhaps the easier it is to formulate.

The important element, it seems to me, so far as time is concerned, is the time involved in developing the plan, not the time between the development of the plan and the doing of the act. One can carefully prepare a plan and immediately it is prepared set out to do the planned act, or, alternatively, you can wait an appreciable time to do it once it has been formed.

As far as the word "deliberate" is concerned, I think that the Code means that it should also carry its natural meaning of "considered," "not impulsive," "slow in deciding," "cautious," implying that the accused must take time to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of his intended action.

9Although the Widdifield definition of planning and deliberation is settled, its application has proven difficult in practice for both trial judges and juries. The challenges inherent in applying the test are illustrated by three recent decisions from our Court of Appeal: R. v. Robinson, 2017 ONCA 645, R. v. Campbell, 2020 ONCA 221, and R. v. Nnane, 2024 ONCA 841.

10In Robinson, the accused was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder based on planning and deliberation. The accused was an alcoholic who suffered from significant mental illness. The deceased was visiting his apartment on the night of the killing and tensions arose between the two men. The accused left the living room, went downstairs to the furnace area, and deliberately selected a weapon (a hollow aluminum pipe), modified it by wrapping one end in a towel, and returned to the living room. He approached the victim from behind and struck him in the head with the padded end of the pipe. The victim began to get up and the accused struck him again with the pipe, hitting the head and shoulder area. The victim died shortly after the second blow. The Crown argued at trial that the appellant had formed a plan to make a pre‑emptive attack on the victim and had several minutes to reflect on and decide to carry out that plan before attacking the victim. The Court of Appeal found that the conviction on first degree murder was unreasonable and ordered a new trial.

11In Campbell and David, there was evidence of animosity between Campbell and the deceased. Campbell and David were friends, and one of them brought a firearm to the scene. Shortly before the shooting, Campbell stated that he was “locked and loaded.” The two met behind the victim’s vehicle, where the Crown alleged that Campbell handed the gun to David and instructed him to carry out the murder. After a brief interval, David approached the victim and killed him in what was described as a coordinated manner. Neither accused showed surprise or alarm after the shooting.

12The trial judge dismissed a defence motion for a directed verdict on the charge of first-degree murder, and the jury convicted both accused of that offence. The Court of Appeal found there was no evidence from which the jury could conclude that there was a carefully considered plan involving time to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the act. The court held that the conviction was unreasonable.

13In Nnane, the accused was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder based on planning and deliberation. The accused encountered the victims unexpectedly inside an LCBO store. He left the store without making a purchase and returned to his vehicle. Although he had been driving the car when it arrived at the LCBO, the accused arranged for another person to take the wheel while he waited for the victims to exit the store. He waited until his own associate had returned to his car, then ran to the victims’ vehicle and fired several shots at close range, killing two victims.

14On appeal, the accused argued that the first-degree murder conviction was unreasonable. There was no evidence he knew the victims would be at the LCBO, and only four minutes passed between first seeing them inside the store and the shooting. Relying on Robinson and Campbell, he argued that this was insufficient time to carefully weigh the decision to kill.

15The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, noting that a short period of time does not preclude a finding of planning and deliberation. While a brief interval may suggest impulsive conduct, it does not require that conclusion. Planning and deliberation can occur quickly, and even a simple plan may be formed and carried out within a short time.

16These recent cases illustrate that there can be significant differences of opinion, even among experienced judges, as to what evidence is sufficient to establish planning and deliberation. A broader review of the case law shows many instances in which trial judges have left the issue of planning and deliberation with juries, only for appellate courts to later conclude that there was no evidence to support a conviction.

17There is little value in attempting to reconcile these cases, as each depends on its own facts. What I take from the authorities is that trial judges must take care not to confuse evidence of an intent to kill with evidence of planning and deliberation. All murders involve an intent to kill, and some degree of thought is inherent in forming and carrying out that intent. However, the planning and deliberation required for first degree murder goes well beyond the minimal thought needed to commit an intentional killing.

18To guard against this error, I will focus on the aspects of the Widdifield test that are most relevant here and apply the burden of proof carefully to each. The Crown must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that:

• T.J. carefully thought out a plan to commit the murder.

• The plan to commit the murder was not spontaneously developed but rather required some time.

• T.J. considered the consequences of acting on his plan.

• T.J. took time to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of committing the murder.

III. THE EVIDENCE

A. The Falstaff Complex

19Exhibit 2(a) is a map of the Falstaff complex:

B. The Acura’s First Circuit Around the Complex

20The Acura was first seen travelling north on Jane Street. At 11:51 p.m., it turned east onto Falstaff Avenue and then north into the driveway that circles the three apartment buildings. The car proceeded slowly around the complex, passing other vehicles and at least one pedestrian. After completing the approximately 400‑metre loop, the Acura exited onto Falstaff Avenue at 11:53 p.m. and travelled back west toward Jane Street.

21As it proceeded along Falstaff Avenue, the vehicle stopped at a stop sign located near the middle of the complex. This position was about 25 metres south of a gazebo situated between 30 and 40 Falstaff. The occupants of the Acura had a clear, unobstructed view of a small group of people gathered in the gazebo. At that time, at least five people were present, including Ajay Simpson. He had just received a scooter from another male who had been riding it on the concrete pathways which weave around the southern portion of the Falstaff complex.

C. The Acura’s Second Circuit Around the Complex

22After stopping at the stop sign, the Acura continued west on Falstaff Avenue and then back north onto the driveway which encircled the complex. Ajay Simpson was still in the gazebo when the Acura commenced its second trip around the complex. He left the gazebo at 11:54:15 p.m. and began to ride in an undirected fashion around the complex. There is no indication that he was aware of the white Acura or had any concern for his safety.

23The Acura drove around the three apartment buildings as it had on its first circuit, but now stopped at the side of the roadway just south of 40 Falstaff. The occupants of the vehicle had a clear line of sight from this position to the gazebo, which was approximately 75 m away. There was no visible movement in the vehicle for the next 44 seconds.

D. The Initial Stage of the Shooting

24At 11:56:18 p.m., all four occupants exited the Acura simultaneously. Each had his face covered and had taken steps to conceal his hands, either by wearing blue latex gloves or by pulling his sleeves over his hands. All four were armed with loaded handguns. They ran west along the south wall of 40 Falstaff and fired shots toward the gazebo. The people in the gazebo began to flee as the shooting began.

25T.J. had been sitting in the front passenger seat and was the second shooter to emerge from the car. He was wearing a mask and a blue latex glove on his left hand. His right hand, which was holding a gun, appeared to be bare. T.J. was pointing his gun towards the ground when he emerged from the car and for his first few steps towards the gazebo. Based on the location of spent cartridge cases which were determined to have been fired from T.J.’s gun, it appears that he fired one shot as he ran alongside the south wall of 40 Falstaff and a second shot when he was close to the southwest corner of 40 Falstaff.

26T.J. ran ahead of his accomplices and was in their line of fire as he headed towards the gazebo. The video shows bullets striking the ground near him as he ran.

27The three other shooters did not go beyond the west wall of 40 Falstaff. They stopped firing within 10 seconds of leaving the Acura and all three were back in the vehicle within 33 seconds of having exited. The front passenger door of the car remained open, awaiting T.J.’s return. Despite the door being open, the vehicle began to move forward, suggesting the others were anxious to leave and contemplating doing so without him. The accomplices had to wait another 18 seconds until T.J. returned to the car and then fled the scene at high speed.

E. The Murder of Ajay Simpson

28In the 15 seconds before the shooters left the Acura, Simpson rode aimlessly through the courtyard on his scooter. He passed through the gazebo and continued along the pathway as it led east toward 40 Falstaff and then turned north along the west side of that building. Simpson had just moved out of view from the occupants of the Acura when the shooters exited the vehicle. He was facing away from the gazebo when the shooting began and did not see the occupants of the gazebo running. He was just beginning to turn west towards 30 Falstaff when T.J. reached the southwest corner of 40 Falstaff. In my view, this is the moment when T.J. first noticed Simpson.

29The video in Exhibits 3 and 4 shows T.J. leaving the Acura and running on the pathway in a straight line toward the gazebo. The first shot was fired by the driver almost immediately after he emerged from the car and the occupants of the gazebo were already running away by the time that T.J. reached the southwest corner of 40 Falstaff. T.J. likely realized then that he would not be able to catch any of them. As he passed the southwest corner of the building, however, he caught sight of Ajay Simpson who was less than 25 metres away. T.J. immediately veered off the pathway and began to run directly towards Simpson.

30When Simpson realized that he was being pursued, he jumped off the scooter and began to run. T.J. gave chase, but Simpson was opening distance between them. At that point, T.J. slowed, took careful aim, and fired three shots at Simpson. One of the shots struck Simpson in the leg, causing him to fall to the ground. T.J. ran to Simpson and fired his last five bullets at point blank range. T.J. then ran back to the Acura and escaped from the scene.

31Exhibit 17 provides an ICAD diagram depicting the location where officers found the cartridge cases fired from T.J.’s gun. The location of a cartridge case does not precisely establish the location of the shooter at the time that the shot was fired, but inferences can often be drawn from a pattern of cases and that is the case here. T.J.’ first shot (marker #14) was fired as he ran west from the Acura towards the gazebo. His second shot (marker #20) was fired when he was near the southwest corner of 40 Falstaff. The third shot (marker #21) was fired when he was chasing Ajay Simpson across the courtyard towards 30 Falstaff. T.J. fired three shots (markers 25, 26, and 9799-2) at the point in the case when he paused to take aim and brought Simpson to the ground. The final five shots (markers 27, 28, 29, 30, 31) were fired while Simpson lay on the ground beside the south wall of 30 Falstaff.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The Crown Theory

32The Crown’s theory of planning and deliberation is as follows:

a. The accused, together with the three other occupants of the Acura, agreed to “shoot up” the Falstaff complex. This involved driving to the area, selecting a group of residents, and firing at them to frighten those individuals and the broader community.

b. The shooting involved significant planning. The group obtained a stolen vehicle, four functioning firearms, ammunition, masks, and latex gloves. They first drove around the complex to ensure there were no police in the area and to identify potential targets for the shooting.

c. While stopped at the stop sign on Falstaff Avenue, T.J. saw Ajay Simpson standing in the gazebo. Although Simpson was unknown to him, T.J. began to form a plan to kill him. He considered how he would commit the murder over the next 2 ½ minutes as the Acura circled the complex and stopped near 40 Falstaff. T.J. saw Simpson riding his scooter toward the parked Acura from his vantage point in the front passenger seat.

d. When T.J. exited the Acura, he did not expend his ammunition by firing towards the gazebo. His firearm was initially pointed downward and he discharged no more than two shots in the direction of the gazebo. The Crown submits that T.J. was intentionally conserving his ammunition because he planned to use the remainder to kill Simpson.

e. T.J.’s actions after leaving the Acura demonstrate focus and purpose. As he was chasing Simpson through the courtyard, he held his pants up with his left hand to maximize his mobility. When he recognized that Simpson was likely to escape, he paused, took aim, and brought Simpson to the ground. Having incapacitated his victim, T.J. calmly approached him and fired his remaining bullets in a deliberate and methodical manner.

f. There is no sign that T.J. was ever in a state of panic or excitement during these events. His highly directed actions indicate that the murder was carried out according to a plan rather than as a spontaneous act.

g. The only reasonable inference which can be drawn from these circumstances is that T.J. identified the victim, planned how he would carry out the murder, then deliberated on the consequences of executing his plan as he waited with his accomplices to commence the shooting. It is not reasonably possible that T.J. only intended to participate in a neighbourhood shooting and spontaneously decided to commit a murder.

33The Crown acknowledges that T.J. was almost certainly acting independently of his accomplices when he formed the plan to commit a murder. None of the other shooters pursued Simpson or any other prospective victim. They exited from the Acura, ran a short distance, fired shots towards the distant gazebo, and then ran back to the car. The accomplices were ready to leave the scene immediately after firing shots and there were signs they were impatient for T.J.’s return. There is no evidence that T.J. ever communicated his intention to commit a murder to his accomplices.

B. Analysis of Crown Theory

34I agree with parts of the Crown’s theory. In particular, I accept that the neighbourhood shooting involved a significant degree of planning. The vehicle used in the shooting had been stolen ten days earlier, and some effort would have been required to obtain four functioning handguns and a substantial quantity of ammunition. Such preparations are consistent with planning and deliberation for the commission of a murder.

35However, those same preparations are equally consistent with an intention to carry out a reckless shooting. The evidence suggests that this was the objective shared by all of the occupants of the Acura, with the exception of T.J. While T.J. may have relied on those preparations when he killed Mr. Simpson, there is no evidence that he had formed an intention to commit murder when those preparations were made.

36Indeed, on the Crown’s own theory, T.J. did not begin to plan Mr. Simpson’s murder until he saw him at the gazebo at 11:53:50 p.m. As a result, the preparations involving the stolen vehicle, firearms, ammunition, masks, and gloves do not assist the Crown in proving that the murder itself was planned and deliberate.

37The Crown submits that T.J. saw Mr. Simpson from the front passenger seat of the Acura while the vehicle was stopped on Falstaff Avenue and that he began planning to kill him at that point. While that is a possible inference, I am unable to find any evidence that supports it. At the time, there were at least four other individuals in the gazebo. Apart from his scooter, there was nothing to distinguish Mr. Simpson from the others.

38T.J. had no way of knowing whether Mr. Simpson would leave the gazebo or, if he did, which direction he would travel. It was entirely a matter of chance that Mr. Simpson left the gazebo and rode toward the area where the Acura eventually stopped. There was no way for T.J. to know in advance that Mr. Simpson would come within range when he exited the vehicle.

39It is, of course, possible that T.J.’s plan was simply to kill whoever happened to be available when the opportunity arose. However, I am not satisfied that he began planning to kill Mr. Simpson when he first saw him at the gazebo. At most, the evidence establishes that T.J. observed a group of potential victims at approximately 11:53:50 p.m. and, roughly two and a half minutes later, murdered one of them.

40Common sense might suggest that some thought was given to his actions during that interval. However, common sense is an uncertain guide when attempting to determine the thought process of a 14-year-old who was carrying a loaded handgun and had already embarked on a plan to shoot at unsuspecting strangers.

41I accept that T.J. may have been able to see Mr. Simpson riding toward 40 Falstaff during the 44 seconds that the Acura was parked. However, I cannot find that he actually did. As I have already noted, the video evidence satisfies me that T.J. was unaware that Mr. Simpson was on the west side of 40 Falstaff when he exited the vehicle.

42I find that T.J. first saw Mr. Simpson after he turned around the southwest corner of 40 Falstaff. Upon seeing him on the scooter, T.J. immediately changed direction and ran toward him. Had T.J. seen Mr. Simpson earlier and already formed a plan to kill him, it is likely that he would have taken a more direct route toward him as he approached the southwest corner of the building.

43I am satisfied that, when T.J. rounded the corner of the building, he saw Mr. Simpson and concluded that he was the closest person and likely the only one he could catch. In my view, this is the most likely explanation for why T.J. selected Mr. Simpson as his victim.

44The Crown points out that T.J. did not use all of his ammunition when he first exited the Acura and fired toward the gazebo. It submits that this supports an inference that he was preserving ammunition to carry out a planned murder. While that is a possible inference, I do not find it to be a compelling one.

45Before reaching the southwest corner of 40 Falstaff, T.J. fired two shots. Those shots cannot be connected to a plan to kill Mr. Simpson. More importantly, there is no evidence concerning the overall plan for the neighbourhood shooting or the specific role that T.J. was expected to play in it.

46The video evidence reasonably supports the inference that T.J.’s role was not to remain in one location and fire toward the gazebo, as the others did, but instead to move closer to it. This provides an alternative explanation for why he did not immediately discharge all of his ammunition upon leaving the vehicle. The inference urged by the Crown is only one of several reasonable inferences available on the evidence.

47It is well established that a person can plan and deliberate the murder of a stranger. The absence of a clear motive does not prevent a finding of planning or deliberation: see R. v. Nnane, 2024 ONCA 841 at para. 66. In this case, however, the absence of any clear motive or explanation forms an important part of the overall context. The accused was 14 years old and became involved in a plan to carry out a shooting in a rival neighbourhood. T.J.’s decision to kill a randomly selected victim came as a surprise even to his accomplices. The killing delayed the group’s escape and significantly increased their potential criminal liability. It is difficult to understand how such a disruptive and dangerous act could have been the result of careful thought, or how it reflects a process in which the accused weighed the advantages and disadvantages of committing the murder. If T.J. was planning and deliberating to commit a murder while sitting in the Acura, one might expect that he would at least have communicated that intention to his associates.

48The Crown submits that the manner in which the murder occurred supports a finding of planning and deliberation. Specifically, T.J. changed direction to pursue Simpson and, as Simpson was on the verge of escaping, slowed to take aim and bring him to the ground. Once having successfully stopped his target, he quickly approached and completed the murder. There is no doubt that these actions provide compelling evidence of an intent to kill. However, evidence of a calculated intent to kill is not synonymous with evidence of planning and deliberation.

49The random and chaotic nature of the offence is, in my view, difficult to reconcile with the elements of a planned and deliberate murder.

C. Diminished Capacity to Exercise Moral Judgment

50The fact that the accused was only 14 years old at the time of the offence is an inescapable part of the factual matrix. The law has long recognized that young people have a reduced capacity for moral judgment: see R. v. I.M., 2025 SCC 23 at paras. 109 and 112. An important element of deliberation is the process of reflection and consideration that accompanies the weighing of the consequences of a decision to kill. There is no direct evidence of T.J.’ developmental age but there is evidence that he was acting impulsively and failing to exercise judgement at the time of the offence:

a. As he ran toward the gazebo, T.J. placed himself directly in the line of fire of his three associates. Bullet strikes are visible in the ground near him as he ran, yet there is no indication that he reacted to or avoided this obvious danger.

b. Although he had taken the precaution of wearing a latex glove to prevent leaving any trace evidence, T.J. nevertheless held the firearm in his bare right hand, a fact which suggests that he was not paying attention to detail.

c. There is no evidence that T.J. informed his accomplices of his intention to commit a murder. His actions delayed their escape and potentially exposed them to liability for a murder. The failure to alert his accomplices of his intentions could have had serious repercussions with the group and indicates at the very least poor decision-making.

51These indications of poor judgement and lack of awareness of his surroundings are relevant to whether the Crown has proven planning and deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt. Although T.J.’s youth alone would not raise a reasonable doubt, when considered together with other evidence suggesting an absence of thought or consideration lends support to the defence position that the killing might reasonably have been spontaneous and the product of immature thinking.

52On the Crown’s theory, T.J. had approximately 2½ minutes to deliberate on the murder from the time when he first saw Simpson at the gazebo until he exited the vehicle. Even for a fully mature adult, this would fall at the lower end of what has been accepted as sufficient time for deliberation in cases of first-degree murder. Here, the offender was a 14-year-old, armed with a loaded firearm, in the company of three others, and contemplating a shooting in a public place. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that a youth would be highly excited and energized, and therefore less likely to be capable of the considered deliberation required by Widdifield.

V. CONCLUSION

53The Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that T.J. took time to plan the murder, considered the consequences of that plan, and weighed the advantages and disadvantages before acting. There is no doubt that these facts can be inferred from the circumstantial evidence. The issue is whether they are the only reasonable inferences available on the evidence.

54Although I am satisfied that T.J. intended to shoot at the occupants of the gazebo and was likely prepared to kill any of those individuals if the opportunity presented itself, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he deliberated upon that plan in the sense of carefully weighing whether to carry it out. The time available for any deliberation was brief, and the surrounding circumstances were not conducive to meaningful reflection or careful thought. In my view, a reasonable alternative inference is that T.J. encountered Simpson unexpectedly after turning the corner of 40 Falstaff, immediately decided to pursue him, and formed the intent to kill during that pursuit.

55Having considered all of the evidence, including the brief timeframe, the absence of any apparent motive, the spontaneous selection of the victim, and the lack of evidence that T.J. communicated any murder plan to his accomplices, I am left with a reasonable doubt that the murder was planned and deliberate. Accordingly, the Crown has failed to prove first degree murder. Based on his plea and the evidence adduced at this hearing, T.J. is guilty of second-degree murder.

Justice Peter Bawden

Released: July 31, 2026

CITATION: R. v. T.J., 2026 4235 ONSC 4235

COURT FILE NO.: YC-25-500000009

DATE: 20260731

BETWEEN:

Pursuant to s. 110 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1, no person shall publish the name of the young person referred to in these proceedings, or any information related to the young person that would identify them as a young person dealt with under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.