Rhianna Woodward

A 17-year-old youth was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting a taxi driver multiple times without apparent motive, and of firearm offences related to a shooting incident three weeks prior.

The Crown sought an adult sentence.

The sentencing judge applied the two-stage test under s. 72(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act as clarified by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. I.M. and R. v. S.B. At stage one, the judge found the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the offender's intellectual disability in the mild range, complex trauma, disadvantaged background, impulsivity, and demonstrated capacity for rehabilitation while in custody.

At stage two, the judge imposed the maximum youth sentence of seven years custody followed by conditional supervision under an Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision order, with concurrent one-year sentences for the firearm offences.

The court sentenced Tutshuma (Paul) Munda for eight firearm-related offences, including possession of a loaded restricted firearm and breaches of weapons prohibition orders.

The decision reviews the circumstances of the offences, Mr. Munda’s background, the parties’ sentencing positions, and applicable case law.

The court imposed a global sentence of 5.5 years, after reductions for Charter breaches and harsh pre-sentence custody, with further credit for pre-sentence custody.

The decision discusses the sentencing range for prohibited firearm recidivists, the impact of systemic discrimination, and the application of the “jump principle.”

This decision addresses Charter applications by Tutshuma (Paul) Munda and Ade Munda, who were charged with firearms offences following a police search.

The court found that police used excessive force against Paul Munda when he was kicked in the face while handcuffed, breaching his s. 7 Charter rights, and that there was a 22-minute unreasonable delay in facilitating his right to counsel, breaching s. 10(b).

However, the evidence was not excluded, though a sentencing reduction was ordered if convicted.

The court dismissed all Charter claims by Ade Munda, finding the police use of force and delay in providing rights to counsel reasonable, and that inaccuracies in a police synopsis did not materially affect his bail hearing.

The accused, I.T., a young Black youth charged with second-degree murder, brought a Corbett application to exclude or sanitize parts of his youth record for the purpose of assessing his credibility if he were to testify.

The court considered the traditional Corbett factors (nature, remoteness, similarity of convictions, and attack on Crown witness credibility) and, significantly, extended the consideration of systemic anti-Black racism, drawing on principles from R. v. King and R. v. Morris.

The application was allowed in part: a conviction for assault peace officer was excluded, firearm possession convictions were sanitized to "possession of a restricted weapon" and "possession of a restricted weapon contrary to a prohibition order", and a robbery conviction was substituted with "assault and theft".

The court found that these modifications balanced the probative value of the record against the heightened prejudicial effect due to racial stereotypes and the risk of improper propensity reasoning.

This is a pre-trial ruling in a murder trial concerning the admissibility of two types of evidence: lay recognition opinion testimony (video and voice) and prior discreditable conduct of the accused.

The court admitted the recognition evidence from two youth detention center staff members, finding they had sufficient familiarity with the accused to offer valuable identifying information, including unique mannerisms and gait.

The court also admitted evidence of the accused's prior possession and discharge of the alleged murder weapon three weeks before the killing, and possession of another handgun three days before, balancing its high probative value for identity and means/opportunity against its moral prejudice.

The court imposed limitations on how the relationship evidence between the accused and the staff witnesses could be presented to mitigate prejudice related to the accused's detention history.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence obtained from his cell phone, arguing the search warrant lacked reasonable and probable grounds and the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained misleading information.

The court found that the ITO contained significant errors and omissions, which were not minor or made in good faith, and that without the excised information, the ITO did not establish reasonable and probable grounds for the search of the applicant's cell phone.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that the serious nature of the Charter breach and the high expectation of privacy in cell phone data outweighed society's interest in the admission of the evidence, leading to its exclusion.

This is a sentencing decision following the conviction of S.S. for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and making sexually explicit material available to a child, involving his biological daughter.

The offences occurred over approximately three years when the victim was between five and eight years old, constituting an extreme breach of trust.

The Crown sought an eight-year global sentence, while the Defence proposed three to four years.

The court imposed a global sentence of seven years, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence due to the severity and duration of the abuse and the profound impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included the offender's first-time offender status, young age at the time of the offences, and family support, but these were balanced against the lack of remorse.

Ancillary orders, including DNA, weapons prohibition, SOIRA registration, communication bans, and a tailored s. 161 order, were also imposed.

This 5-day judge-alone criminal trial concerned charges against the accused, S.S., for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and making sexually explicit material available to his biological daughter, B, when she was between 5 and 8 years old.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming B fabricated them to spend more time with her mother, and that her knowledge of sexual acts came from accidentally observing him masturbating or viewing pornography on his phone.

The court found the complainant's testimony compelling, logical, and detailed, noting that piecemeal disclosure did not undermine her credibility.

The court disbelieved the accused's testimony, finding his explanations improbable and inconsistent.

S.S. was found guilty on all three counts.

The applicant, charged with two counts of murder, brought a Charter motion to exclude evidence extracted from an iPhone seized upon his arrest.

The applicant argued that the search warrant was overly broad, the police ignored its limitations, the affiant misled the issuing justice, and the police failed to file reports to a justice and lost a USB key containing the extracted data.

The court found that the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the stolen phone and that the failure to file reports and the loss of the USB key violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

However, applying the Grant test, the court concluded that the evidence was highly reliable and crucial to the Crown's case, and its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexual assault with a weapon, assault, forcible confinement, and choking, arising from an incident at his apartment involving his former partner.

The Crown relied heavily on text messages sent between the parties after the incident, arguing the accused's failure to deny the complainant's accusations constituted adoptive admissions by silence.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible, corroborated by the text messages and photographs of her injuries and torn clothing.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault with a weapon, assault, forcible confinement, and choking.

The accused, Navindra Balgobin, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance, operating a conveyance with an excess blood alcohol level, and failing to remain at the scene of an accident following a motor vehicle collision.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver and failed to remain at the scene.

The court also found that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds for arrest and that the breath samples were taken pursuant to a lawful demand, curing an initial defect.

The accused's Charter rights under s. 10(b) regarding re-advisement and counsel of choice were found not to have been violated.

Ultimately, the court found the accused guilty on all three counts.

The accused, facing charges of criminal harassment and breach of recognizance, was detained on the secondary ground and later found unfit to stand trial.

After treatment, he was detained in hospital on a keep fit order under s. 672.29 of the Criminal Code.

On a 90-day detention review under s. 525, a preliminary issue arose regarding the Superior Court's jurisdiction to hear the review given the concurrent keep fit order.

The court held that it has jurisdiction to conduct the s. 525 review, but any decision to release under s. 525 would not affect the continuing validity of the separate s. 672.29 detention order.

The court ultimately dismissed the s. 525 review, finding detention continued to be justified.

The offender was found guilty of aggravated assault and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose after attacking a friend with a meat cleaver.

The court considered the offender's severe PTSD from the Sri Lankan civil war and his alcoholism, alongside the unprovoked and vicious nature of the attack.

The court imposed a 4-year sentence for the aggravated assault, but granted 11 months of credit for onerous pre-sentence release conditions (Downes credit) and 10 months and 20 days for pre-sentence custody (Summers credit), resulting in a net sentence of 26 months and 10 days.

Michael Haughton, 47, sought a second bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, citing the availability of electronic monitoring as a material change in circumstances.

This followed a previous dismissal of his bail application where the Crown met its onus on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found electronic monitoring to be a material change but ultimately dismissed the application, concluding that the proposed release plan, even with electronic monitoring, was insufficient to address the substantial likelihood of re-offending due to Haughton's extensive criminal record, history of non-compliance, and severe crack cocaine addiction.

The court also found that confidence in the administration of justice would be seriously eroded by his release.

Michael Haughton, charged with numerous break and enter offences and breaches of court orders, sought a bail review based on a material change in circumstances, including delays due to COVID-19 and his asthma.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found the Crown's case strong and the proposed surety plan inadequate.

Despite the increased risk of COVID-19 in custody and the applicant's asthma, the court determined that the risk to public safety and the need to maintain confidence in the administration of justice outweighed these concerns, dismissing the bail review application.