CITATION: R. v. Aquino and Georgiou, 2026 ONSC 984

COURT FILE NO.: CR-23-00000359-0000

DATE: 20260218

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

JOHN AQUINO and VASOS GEORGIOU

Defendants

1. )

Ellen Weis and Ben Lerer, for the Crown

Peter Brauti and Alexa Banister-Thompson for Georgiou; Alan Gold and Ellen Williams for Aquino, for the Defendants

HEARD: February 4, 2026

JUSTICE PETER BAWDEN

I. OVERVIEW

1Vas Georgiou and John Aquino have been convicted of fraud arising from the public procurement process for a $300 million renovation to St. Michael’s Hospital. The victims identified in the indictment are the Hospital, Infrastructure Ontario, and the companies that were denied a fair chance to win the procurement. In a broader sense, however, the offence risked harm to every person in the Province of Ontario.

2The accused were highly paid executives who corrupted a public procurement for urgently needed improvements to a major hospital. Their conduct caused the direct loss of at least $2.5 million and has resulted in untold millions of dollars being directed to litigation to determine liability for the harm caused by the defendants’ actions.

3The disclosure of this fraud has also undermined public confidence in the integrity of the procurement system. The defendants’ actions illustrate that even a carefully regulated and closely monitored procurement can be corrupted by unethical executives. This reality poses a significant risk to the presumption of integrity and fair dealing upon which the economy of this Province depends. The potential harm caused by these offences is exceptionally far reaching.

4The Crown seeks a sentence of 7 years in prison for both Aquino and Georgiou. It also seeks a Victim Fine Surcharge of $1,000 and a DNA order for each offender.

5Defence counsel maintain that they cannot provide a sentencing range because the findings of guilt in this case are unprecedented, and the quantum of loss associated with the accused’s conduct is uncertain. Nonetheless, the Defence does not accept that the quantum of the fraud exceeds $1 million. Accordingly, the Court should consider imposing a sentence of less than two years.

II. THE FACTS OF THE OFFENCE

A. The Fraudulent Conduct of the Offenders

6St. Michael’s Hospital (“the Hospital” or “SMH”) is a major hospital in downtown Toronto. Beginning around 2002, the Hospital’s administrators and staff undertook significant planning and fundraising for a much‑needed redevelopment. This redevelopment became known as “SMH 3.0.”

7In 2011, the Ontario government authorized Infrastructure Ontario (“IO”) and St. Michael’s Hospital to proceed with a procurement process for SMH 3.0. The Project was structured as a Public‑Private Partnership (“P3”). Although public funds would ultimately pay for the Project, a consortium of private companies would be selected to design the facility, construct it, and finance the construction until completion.

8In December 2012, SMH hired Vas Georgiou as its Chief Administrative Officer. Georgiou had worked at Infrastructure Ontario from 2006 to 2012 and had extensive experience in healthcare construction. He was well acquainted with many industry participants, which the Hospital viewed as an important asset. One of his main responsibilities as CAO was to oversee the successful completion of the SMH 3.0 project.

9At the time of his hiring, the Hospital was unaware that Georgiou had close personal and financial ties to John Aquino, the vice‑president of Bondfield Construction and Bondfield’s Proponent Representative for the SMH procurement. Bondfield had carried out substantial renovations on Georgiou’s home while Georgiou was still employed at Infrastructure Ontario. Georgiou and Aquino were also co‑investors in a closely held company, OTEC. In addition, Georgiou had participated in the purchase and management of a commercial property on Gervais Drive in Toronto, in which Mr. Aquino owned a one-half interest. After Georgiou left Infrastructure Ontario in February 2012, he advised Aquino on various Bondfield ventures, including the SMH 3.0 procurement. The Hospital was unaware of these connections because neither Georgiou nor Aquino disclosed them.

10The first step in the procurement process was the Request for Qualifications (“RFQ”). Interested construction firms were invited to submit their qualifications to conduct the SMH 3.0 project. SMH appointed Georgiou as one of its two representatives on the committee responsible for evaluating the five prospective proponents. Georgiou signed conflict‑of‑interest and disclosure forms stating that he had no financial or other relationships with any bidder that could constitute a real or potential conflict. Mr. Aquino signed similar declarations on behalf of Bondfield.

11Three companies—Bondfield, PCL, and EllisDon—were selected to proceed to the Request for Proposals stage (“RFP”). The procurement rules governing contact between a Sponsor’s employee and a Proponent were clear: once the RFP began, any communication concerning the procurement was prohibited unless it occurred through approved channels. Even an attempt by a Proponent’s representative to contact a Sponsor outside those channels could result in disqualification.

12Georgiou was again appointed as the Hospital’s representative on the Executive Committee responsible for reviewing the Proponents’ bids. He signed declarations confirming that he would not discuss any aspect of the evaluation with a Proponent representative and that all evaluation‑related information was confidential. He again stated that he had no potential conflict of interest. Mr. Aquino filed similar declarations, including an acknowledgment that Bondfield could be excluded from the competition if it had a conflict of interest or if its submission contained false or misleading information.

13Shortly after the RFP began, Mr. Aquino provided Mr. Georgiou with a Blackberry phone registered to Bondfield’s corporate account. The phone accessed an email account, BCCLDevelopment@bondfield.com, which had been set up so that it would not appear in Bondfield’s internal directory. Mr. Aquino and Mr. Georgiou used this Blackberry throughout the RFP to communicate secretly about key aspects of the procurement.

14Four months into the RFP, an anonymous informant gave information to the Ministry of Health that led the Hospital to investigate Mr. Georgiou. Investigators questioned him closely about any potential conflicts of interest. He denied having any conflicts and provided misleading answers to questions that might have disclosed his ties to Mr. Aquino. He said nothing about the secret Blackberry.

15Infrastructure Ontario officials later made similar inquiries of Georgiou when it was proposed that he sit on the RFP Executive Committee. He again denied any conflicts and withheld information that would have revealed his connection to Mr. Aquino.

16Final bids were due on May 21, 2014. On May 17, Mr. Aquino emailed Mr. Georgiou at the BCCLDevelopment address to complain that Infrastructure Ontario had not responded to Bondfield’s Requests for Information about cash allowances, and he asked for details regarding services the Hospital received from Honeywell and Cisco. While vacationing in England, Mr. Georgiou replied using the Blackberry phone with advice on how Bondfield should structure its bid, stating: “this may be a chance to bid as low as you can and fight later in negotiations (when) we are No. 1.” In total, eleven emails were exchanged in which Mr. Aquino sought information about existing Hospital systems and sought guidance concerning his strategy to lower Bondfield’s bid. Mr. Georgiou provided detailed responses. Mr. Georgiou never expressed any surprise or concern that Mr. Aquino had contacted him regarding matters which were clearly confidential and related to the procurement. After returning to Canada, he telephoned Mr. Aquino using the secret Blackberry, and they spoke for eighteen minutes. Bondfield submitted its bid the next day.

17Mr. Aquino personally signed the declarations which accompanied Bondfield’s final submission. He certified that: (1) Bondfield had not received any confidential information of strategic or material relevance; (2) Bondfield had not obtained any unfair competitive advantage; and (3) Bondfield had not engaged in any unethical conduct during the SMH 3.0 procurement. Each of these statements was false. Mr. Georgiou knew they were false, yet, despite his own declaration that he would uphold the highest ethical standards as a member of the Executive Committee, he remained silent.

18The rules of the procurement dictated a minimum score for the design element of a proponent’s bid. EllisDon’s proposed design did not meet the minimum score and it was eliminated from the competition. PCL’s design met the standard without difficulty. Bondfield’s design score barely met the minimum threshold, and its acceptance was the subject of heated debate within the Executive Committee. When the Committee was unable to reach a consensus, independent experts were retained to assess the viability of Bondfield’s design. They concluded that the design was acceptable and could be built within the project budget. Bondfield’s base bid was $301 million, substantially lower than PCL’s bid of $537 million. Bondfield was designated the First Negotiating Proponent and subsequently reached a contract with the Sponsors to carry out the renovation. Construction began in March 2015.

19On September 9, 2015, a reporter from The Globe and Mail informed the Hospital of evidence showing some of the undisclosed connections between Mr. Aquino and Mr. Georgiou. The Hospital immediately placed Mr. Georgiou on leave. On September 15, The Globe published articles concerning Mr. Georgiou. That same day, Mr. Aquino directed a Bondfield employee to delete all emails containing Mr. Georgiou’s name or the term “BCCLDevelopment” from Bondfield’s servers and computers.

20In mid‑2018, Bondfield became unable to pay its debts as they came due. Mr. Aquino left the company on October 15, 2018. By April 3, 2019, Bondfield had entered a Court‑supervised restructuring process and a Court‑appointed monitor assumed oversight of its operations. After that date, Bondfield continued work on its ongoing construction projects with financial support from its primary insurer, Zurich Insurance Company.

21In March 2020, printed copies of the eleven emails exchanged between Mr. Aquino and Mr. Georgiou in May 2014 were discovered in Mr. Aquino’s former office. An investigation followed, and the defendants were criminally charged with fraud. I found both defendants guilty of fraud against the Sponsors of the procurement and the two other proponents which had participated in the RFP.

B. Deprivation or Risk of Deprivation to the Victims

22I found that the Crown had proven deprivation or risk of deprivation to IO and the Hospital in six respects:

a. Costs of Reviewing the Bondfield Bid: The defendants concealed their improper communications beginning in August 2013. Had the Sponsors known of this misconduct, Bondfield would have been disqualified, and the Sponsors would not have incurred any of the subsequent costs of reviewing its bid.

b. Harm to IO’s Market‑Integrity Investment: The defendants’ actions undermined IO’s investment in maintaining a fair and competitive marketplace for public procurement.

c. Loss of the Right to a Rule‑Based Selection Process: The defendants deprived the Sponsors of their right to select the successful proponent according to the established procurement rules. Those rules were intended to insulate the Sponsors from any potential litigation arising from the procurement. As a result of the fraudulent conduct of the accused, the Sponsors now face hundreds of millions of dollars in potential liability in two major actions: one brought by the lenders who financed the Project (BMO et al.), and another by Zurich, the surety that agreed to step in if Bondfield failed to complete the work.

d. Loss of Market Feedback: One of the Sponsors’ objectives in conducting a public procurement was to obtain reliable, market-based information regarding the true cost of conducting the renovation of SMH. The dishonest conduct of the defendants deprived the Sponsors of valuable information which they would have obtained if all three Proponents complied with the procurement rules.

e. Risk to Public Donations: Mr. Georgiou’s fraudulent conduct created a risk that members of the public would be less willing in the future to donate to the Hospital.

f. Improper Bonus Payment: Mr. Georgiou deceived the Hospital into paying him a $40,000 bonus in May 2014 that he would not have received had the Hospital been aware of the ongoing fraud.

23I found that the Crown had proven deprivation or risk of deprivation to the public in two respects:

a. Loss to PCL of Opportunity to Negotiate a Contract: If the fraudulent conduct of Aquino had been disclosed, Bondfield would have been disqualified from the procurement and PCL would have been named the First Negotiating Proponent. PCL was deprived of the chance to negotiate a contract with the Sponsors which risked loss not only to the company but to all of the subcontractors who had committed themselves to the PCL bid.

b. Loss of PCL and Ellis Don of Chance to Win: Aquino began to receive confidential information from Georgiou over the Blackberry phone at the outset of the RFP. This created a risk of deprivation to both PCL and EllisDon, both of whom invested significant resources into preparing their bids based on the belief that all their competitors were abiding by the rules of the procurement.

24Some of the losses identified in this case have a clear monetary value. These include the costs incurred by the Sponsors in reviewing the Bondfield bid, the bonus paid by the Hospital to Mr. Georgiou, and the investments that PCL and EllisDon made in preparing their final bids. It may also be possible to estimate PCL’s lost opportunity to be named the First Negotiating Proponent. Other deprivations, however, cannot be readily quantified. It is not realistically possible to assign a precise dollar value to IO’s loss relating to its efforts to foster a competitive marketplace for P3 projects in Ontario. The same difficulty applies to the loss of market‑based feedback on the SMH 3.0 Project costs, the Sponsors’ loss of their right to select the successful proponent in accordance with their own rules, and the risk of diminished charitable donations to the Hospital.

25Perhaps the greatest loss is the intangible harm to public confidence in the integrity of the marketplace for P3 projects. Canadians are, by nature, trusting. It is not uncommon for public projects to experience delays, cost overruns, or poor outcomes. Most Canadians assume that such difficulties arise from unforeseen circumstances or poor planning; they don’t assume fraud or corruption. Trust in the integrity of public‑private partnerships carries significant economic and social value. The actions of the accused at least jeopardized, and quite possibly diminished, that trust. While the loss cannot be measured in dollars, in my view, it is profound.

III. THE VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE

St. Michael’s Hospital

26The Hospital indicates in its victim impact statement that the defendants’ conduct damaged its hard‑earned reputation in the community and eroded public confidence in its stewardship of charitable donations. Donors, community partners, and volunteers have continued to express concern and disappointment that a person in a position of trust at the Hospital abused his position for personal gain. Rebuilding public confidence has taken considerable time and the fraud has adversely affected donations, which are essential for renewing infrastructure and supporting programs for the Hospital’s most vulnerable patients. For years, St. Michael’s Hospital has been required to divert significant time and resources from its core mandate of patient care to address the consequences of this fraud. The harm to its reputation and community confidence is profound and lasting.

EllisDon Construction Company

27EllisDon states that the defendants’ conduct not only deprived it of a fair opportunity in the procurement process, but seriously breached the trust on which all general contractors rely when participating in procurements for Ontario’s public infrastructure. EllisDon emphasizes that its business depends on strictly regulated public procurement mechanisms, and that offences of this nature make participation seem futile. Employees who take pride in their work have been demoralized by the realization that their efforts may be rendered meaningless by dishonesty and corruption at senior levels of public procurement. When fairness and proper procedure are disregarded, the integrity of public procurement is compromised, discouraging contractor participation, weakening competition, and ultimately harming Ontarians.

PCL Construction Company

28PCL’s victim impact statement explains that the fraud damaged the reputation of the construction industry in Ontario and heightened existing concerns about ethical practices in the sector. As a result, owners have implemented more stringent RFQ and RFP requirements, including costly certifications and compliance measures that were not previously required. PCL states that it submitted a bid that accurately reflected the specified work and that, had it been invited, it would have engaged in negotiations aimed at reaching an acceptable contract price and scope with St. Michael’s. It was deprived of the opportunity to participate in that process by the fraudulent conduct of Aquino and Georgiou.

Infrastructure Ontario

29The Victim Impact Statement filed by Infrastructure Ontario describes the conduct of Mr. Georgiou and Mr. Aquino as a serious breach of trust and a blatant violation of procurement rules. IO had implemented a procurement process for the hospital redevelopment project that was considered an industry gold standard. Despite these strong safeguards, IO was deceived by the defendants who intentionally disregarded the rules and their obligations. As a result, IO has had to divert significant time and resources from its core mandate to manage claims and litigation stemming directly from this misconduct. Staff who should have been working on other important provincial infrastructure projects have been reassigned to address the ongoing needs of the hospital project. These events have caused disruption, strain, and distress for IO employees and stakeholders. Most significantly, the misconduct has damaged IO’s reputation, undermining public and industry confidence and requiring additional effort to restore its standing as a leading public procurement agency.

Zurich Insurance Company

To protect the Hospital and Bondfield’s subcontractors from losses if Bondfield failed to meet its obligations, Bondfield secured surety bonds from Zurich Insurance Company. When Bondfield became insolvent in 2018, Zurich was required to honour those bonds, ultimately paying out approximately $70 million. After the fraud was discovered, Zurich sued the Hospital and the defendants, seeking to be released from its bond obligations and to recover the money it had paid. Zurich’s legal and investigative expenses alone exceed $5 million, and it is also defending a separate lawsuit brought by the Lenders. In total, Zurich’s potential financial exposure now exceeds $298 million. Zurich reports that the fraud has also damaged its reputation as a surety provider. Zurich observes that misconduct of this kind, particularly in a major public procurement process, has weakened confidence in public procurement both within the construction industry and among the general public.

The Bank of Montreal on Behalf of Lenders

30Under the P3 model, the successful proponent was required to finance the construction project until completion. Bondfield entered into a credit agreement with several lenders in January 2015, which permitted it to draw approximately $230 million while acting as the contractor. Bondfield defaulted on these loans in 2018 when it became insolvent. In 2022, the lenders commenced an action seeking repayment of the $230 million from the Hospital, IO, Mr. Aquino, and Mr. Georgiou. They allege that Mr. Georgiou’s senior position at the Hospital renders the Hospital vicariously liable for his fraud, and they seek to hold IO and the accused responsible as well. The lenders assert that, had the fraud been known, no lending would have occurred. The Lenders report they have suffered losses of a minimum of $230 million.

IV. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDERS

A. John Aquino

31Mr. Aquino is 53 years old. He holds a Bachelor of Applied Science in Civil Engineering from the University of Toronto which he obtained in 1994. After graduating, he worked as a Project Manager at his family’s company, Bondfield Construction, eventually becoming its Vice‑President and General Manager. In 2013, he became President of Bondfield and remained in that role until leaving the company in the fall of 2018. He is currently unemployed. His licence to practise engineering in Ontario has been revoked by Professional Engineers Ontario as a result of his arrest in this matter.

32Mr. Aquino has two children. Defence counsel advise that his arrest and the negative publicity surrounding the case have affected them at school and in their daily lives. Mr. Aquino also suffers from serious health issues, the details of which he has chosen not to disclose. It is not suggested that these conditions are medically linked to the charges before this court. He has been under considerable stress since leaving Bondfield in 2018. He has had significant multi‑million‑dollar judgments entered against him in unrelated civil proceedings, and in those matters he has been petitioned into bankruptcy.

33No character letters have been filed in support of Mr. Aquino.

B. Vas Georgiou

34Mr. Georgiou is 61 years old with no criminal record. He was born in Cyprus and immigrated to Canada with his family when he was two years old. In 2003, Mr. Georgiou married his wife, Helen. They have four children between the ages of 14 and 20. The two younger children are in high school, while the two older children are in university.

35Mr. Georgiou obtained his Bachelor of Technology in Architectural Science in 1988 and in the same year, was hired by Markham Stouffville Hospital as project manager for the construction of a new hospital. This was the start of a long career in project management which was primarily focused on healthcare facilities. Mr. Georgiou was hired for project management at Sick Children’s Hospital, East York General Hospital, and St. Joseph’s Hospital.

36Mr. Georgiou was recruited by Infrastructure Ontario in 2006 to serve as Vice President of Project Delivery. He was promoted to Senior Vice President in 2007, assuming direct responsibility for the delivery of five hospital projects. In 2011, he was appointed Chief Administrative Officer of IO. Mr. Georgiou participated in approximately twenty public procurements during his tenure at IO, fifteen of which involved healthcare facilities.

37Mr. Georgiou left IO on February 14, 2012, and began work as Chief Administrative Officer at St. Michael’s Hospital on December 14, 2012. He was very well compensated in that position. His base salary was $315,000, with eligibility for an annual performance bonus of up to 20%. He also received a one‑time payment of $95,000 to buy back his previous pension, which effectively operated as a signing bonus. In July 2014, he was awarded another bonus of $40,000.

38The Hospital placed Mr. Georgiou on leave on September 9, 2015 after The Globe and Mail published a series of articles which disclosed his connections to Mr. Aquino. His employment at the Hospital ended two months later. In 2018, he returned to work at Saddlebrook Management Consultants Inc. That employment ended in March 2023, when he was charged with these offences. He has not been employed since then.

39There is no doubt that these charges and the events surrounding the SMH 3.0 procurement have had a significant impact on Mr. Georgiou and his family. Defence counsel advise that his children have experienced bullying because of the publicity surrounding the case. Mr. Georgiou is also a named defendant in a $55‑million lawsuit commenced by Zurich Insurance Company in 2020. These circumstances have caused him considerable stress, which may have contributed to various health issues including weight gain, high blood pressure, and an enlarged prostate.

V. FACTORS ON SENTENCING

A. Aggravating Circumstances

40Section 380.1(1) of the Criminal Code identifies seven aggravating circumstances in sentencing for fraud:

(a) The magnitude, complexity, duration or degree of planning of the fraud committed was significant;

(b) The offence adversely affected, or had the potential to adversely affect, the stability of the Canadian economy or financial system or any financial market in Canada or investor confidence in such a financial market;

(c) The offence involved a large number of victims;

(c.1) The offence had a significant impact on the victims given their personal circumstances including their age, health and financial situation;

(d) In committing the offence, the offender took advantage of the high regard in which the offender was held in the community;

(e) the offender did not comply with a licensing requirement, or professional standard, that is normally applicable to the activity or conduct that forms the subject-matter of the offence; and

(f) The offender concealed or destroyed records related to the fraud or to the disbursement of the proceeds of the fraud.

41At least five of these factors apply to Mr. Aquino and Mr. Georgiou:

• Magnitude, Duration and Planning: The indictment covers the period from January 1, 2013 to January 31, 2015. Throughout this time, the offenders repeatedly denied having any conflict of interest. Mr. Georgiou obstructed the Sponsors’ efforts to uncover such conflicts by giving false information to investigators. In August 2013, Mr. Georgiou received the Blackberry phone from Mr. Aquino, and they used it for improper communications throughout the RFP process. The fraud lasted for at least two years, required significant planning and related to a public procurement valued at approximately $301 million.

• Harm to Multiple Victims: The fraud had a broad impact on many victims. The Hospital’s victim impact statement describes its effects on hospital staff, patients, and the wider community. The fraud also caused direct financial harm to employees of EllisDon, PCL, and the many subcontractors who supported their bids for the SMH Project. The losses sustained by Zurich and the lenders in connection with the Project will ultimately be borne by all Canadians through increased insurance and lending costs.

• Significant Impact on Victims: The fraud has imposed an ongoing operational and financial strain on St. Michael’s Hospital, requiring it to divert time and resources away from caring for patients. It has also caused significant loss to the many employees of PCL, EllisDon, and their subcontractors who were deprived of the opportunity for sustained employment on a project of this scale.

• Offenders Took Advantage of Reputation: Mr. Georgiou relied heavily on his experience as a Vice‑President at Infrastructure Ontario when applying for the position of Chief Administrative Officer at the Hospital. He was appointed as one of the Hospital’s representatives on the RFQ and RFP Executive Committees largely because of the experience and credentials he acquired at IO. By serving on those Committees, Mr. Georgiou was placed in a position where he received confidential information concerning the procurement and participated in evaluating the competing bids.

Mr. Aquino relied on his reputation as an experienced participant in P3 procurements and as a President of a major construction company to deter scrutiny of his disclosure and conflict of interest declarations. In his ultimate submission, he emphasized Bondfield’s local experience and credibility in the industry. He suggested that he was “ideally suited” to lead the project because of his experience with IO projects and his “extensive knowledge” and background in the construction industry.

• Concealment of Evidence of Fraud: The defendants used an untraceable Blackberry to communicate secretly throughout the procurement. Mr. Georgiou actively misled the Hospital and IO by lying to investigators who had been tasked with investigating his potential conflicts of interest. When the Globe and Mail began to make inquiries regarding those conflicts, Mr. Aquino deleted all emails connected to Mr. Georgiou from the Bondfield servers and computers. Neither of the defendants ever disclosed the existence of the Blackberry.

42Abusing a position of trust in relation to the victim is also an aggravating factor: s.  718.2(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code. Mr. Georgiou occupied a position of trust both as a senior executive of the Hospital and as a member of the Executive Committee during the RFP process.

The Absence of Remorse

43Neither defendant has expressed any remorse for their conduct, and the evidence indicates that they have none.

44Shortly after being terminated, Mr. Georgiou commenced a wrongful dismissal action against the Hospital seeking $17 million in damages. During that litigation, he never disclosed that he had been secretly communicating with Mr. Aquino throughout the RFP process using an untraceable Blackberry. His Statement of Claim contained several assertions that were inconsistent with his testimony at this trial or contrary to my findings, including the following:

• That he did not have a significant personal relationship with Mr. Aquino;

• That he ended his involvement with Gervais Property Management when he joined the Hospital;

• That he had contact with only two owners of Gervais Property Management, neither of whom was Mr. Aquino; and

• That he had never acted dishonestly in his duties or misled the Hospital.

45The Hospital was required to defend this action, which prolonged and increased the losses flowing from Mr. Georgiou’s fraudulent conduct.

46Mr. Aquino, through Bondfield Construction Limited, commenced a civil action against The Globe and Mail seeking $125 million in damages for defamation. The claim alleged that the newspaper’s reporting falsely suggested a corrupt relationship between himself and Mr. Georgiou that influenced the award of the SMH 3.0 contract. Mr. Aquino also did not disclose the existence of the Blackberry or the nature of his communications with Mr. Georgiou in the course of that litigation.

47Mr. Georgiou also commenced a civil action against The Globe and Mail. In that proceeding, he asserted that he did not know the structure of OTEC or Gervais Property Management, that he was unaware of any conflict of interest during the SMH 3.0 procurement, and that he had not manipulated the RFP to benefit Bondfield. All these assertions were false.

48The civil proceedings are collateral to this case. Defence counsel argue that portions of those claims had merit and point out that all actions were ultimately settled. I agree that I cannot take the initiation of these civil claims to be an aggravating factor on sentence. However, it is now abundantly clear that Mr. Georgiou was properly dismissed from the Hospital and that the Globe articles alleging corruption in the SMH 3.0 procurement were substantially accurate.

49The accused pursued civil claims against the Hospital and the Globe because they were convinced that their misconduct would never be discovered. This conduct went on for years after the fraud was complete. While I do not consider the civil claims as an aggravating factor on sentence, I find that they do demonstrate an utter lack of remorse on the part of the defendants.

B. Mitigating Circumstances

Vas Georgiou

50Counsel for Mr. Georgiou submitted eleven letters from family members and twenty-one letters from close friends. These letters describe his dedication to his wife and children, his many contributions to the community, and his generosity towards those who have faced difficulties in their lives. I have read all the letters and have noted the following letters in particular:

• Mr. Georgiou’s wife, Helen, emphasizes his exceptionally strong work ethic at home and in the community. She describes the significant toll these proceedings have had on him and his family, including the bullying and harassment faced by their children as a result of the criminal proceedings.

• Mr. Georgiou’s eldest sister recounts their family faced after emigrating from Cyprus and proudly describes her brother’s success in Canada as the product of hard work, intelligence, and determination.

• His niece, Stefanie Liassides, highlights the loving support Mr. Georgiou provided to her during her parents’ separation.

• A former teacher of his children observes that Mr. Georgiou and his wife were consistently the first to volunteer for school events and describes him as an excellent father.

• Dr. Tom Harmantas of St. Joseph’s Health Centre wrote that he worked closely with Mr. Georgiou for over twenty years and considers him an honourable person of strong moral character. He believes that Mr. Georgiou is genuinely remorseful for his serious lapse in judgement.

51I accept these accounts of Mr. Georgiou’s good character as a husband, father, friend, and member of the community. They are all consistent with evidence which I heard from witnesses at trial who had worked with Mr. Georgiou during his tenure at Infrastructure Ontario. The letters demonstrate not only his positive qualities but also that he will have tremendous support when he returns to the community after completing his sentence. I am satisfied that he has very good prospects for rehabilitation, and I expect that he will be able to return to employment in his field notwithstanding these convictions.

52Many of the letters filed by Mr. Georgiou’s friends emphasize his abilities as an executive, fundraiser, organizer, and mentor. Unfortunately, those same skills played a significant role in the commission of the offences: he relied on them when applying for the CAO position at the Hospital and then used his reputation and considerable abilities to evade the Sponsors’ inquiries into his relationship with Mr. Aquino. Under s. 380.1(2) of the Criminal Code, the court may not treat an offender’s employment, skills, status, or community reputation as mitigating factors where those attributes contributed to the commission of the offence.

John Aquino

53There is no evidence concerning Mr. Aquino’s character.

VI. THE RANGE OF SENTENCE

The Applicability of the Mandatory Minimum Sentence

54If the total value of the subject-matter of a fraud exceeds $1 million, the court must impose a minimum sentence of two years incarceration: section 380(1.1) of the Code

55The defence disputes that the subject-matter of these frauds exceeds $1 million. They argue that the mandatory minimum sentence does not apply and that the Court may therefore consider imposing a sentence of less than two years.

56I find that the quantifiable losses arising from these offences easily exceed the $1 million threshold:

• Sponsors’ Losses: The Sponsors incurred enormous expenses in retaining consultants and experts to ensure compliance with procurement rules, to assess the merits of Bondfield’s bid, and later to investigate the defendants’ misconduct. These experts included Duff & Phelps (to examine Mr. Georgiou’s conflicts of interest), Integral Group and Marshall Murray (to review concerns about Bondfield’s bid in August 2014), the Hansell/Kroll investigation conducted for the Hospital, and the IO Special Committee Report prepared by external legal and accounting advisors.

• Losses to Other Proponents: PCL spent over $2.4 million preparing its bid. EllisDon spent over $1.7 million. Each Proponent received an $800,000 honorarium, leaving combined losses of approximately $2.5 million.

57More importantly, s. 380(1.1) refers to the total value of the subject‑matter of the offences, not to the victims’ quantifiable losses. Courts have consistently interpreted “subject‑matter” of the offence to mean the object of the fraud, rather than the provable financial loss suffered by the victim: see R. v. Plange, 2019 ONCA 646, at para. 3; R. v. Banks, 2024 NSSC 415, at paras. 14–15; R. v. Ber, 2025 ABKB 37, at paras. 66–75. In this case, the subject‑matter of the defendants’ fraud was the $301‑million contract to renovate the Hospital which obviously exceeds the $1‑million threshold that triggers the mandatory minimum sentence.

The Range of Sentence for Large-Scale Fraud

58In R. v. Kowal, [2001] O.J. No. 1205 (ONSC), Justice Watt identified the range of sentence for a large scale fraud as five to eight years:

72. The ingenuity of the commercial fraudsman, the wide range of activity taken in by the descriptive, make it difficult to establish a range of sentence in cases like this. It is probably fair to say that, in many cases, sentences of five to six years in the penitentiary are imposed. In some instances, especially those that involve

i. very large amounts of money or economic risk;

ii. breach of trust;

iii. victims of a vulnerable class; or

iv. the diminution of public confidence in a regulated activity or industry

or similar factors, the upper end of the range extends to about eight years or, in some cases, beyond.

59The range of sentence described in Kowal has been consistently applied and upheld: see R. v. Drabinsky, 2009 41220 (ONSC), at paras. 31 to 35, affirmed 2011 ONCA 582, at paras. 157-159, 164, 187; R. v. Waxman, 2014 ONCA 256, at para. 23; R. v. Eid, 2017 ONSC 898, at para. 29, affirmed 2020 ONCA 649.

60The defence submits that the appropriate range is 3-5 years based on the case of R. v. Davatgar-Jafarpour, 2019 ONCA 353

34In cases of large-scale fraud, the range of sentences imposed in circumstances like the one at bar is generally three to five years: see R. v. Khatchatourov, 2014 ONCA 464, at paras. 37-45; R. v. Dobis (2002), 2002 32815 (ON CA), at paras. 36-37; R. v. Bogart 2002 41073 (ON CA), at para. 36, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 398. This range reflects the substantial weight that courts must give to the principles of general deterrence and denunciation: Bogart, at para. 29; R. v. Drabinsky (2011), 2011 ONCA 582, at paras. 160-161, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 2012 16927.

61The range of three to five years referred to in Davatgar-Jafarpour was first established in R. v. Dobis, 2002 32815 (ONCA). Although Davatgar-Jafarpour was decided in 2019, the Crown submits that the three to five year range should be approached with caution in light of legislative amendments which occurred in 2004 and 2011. In 2004, Parliament increased the maximum penalty for Fraud over $5,000 from 10 years to 14 years, signalling an intention that such offences be treated more severely: R. v. Scholz, 2021 ONCA 506 at para. 18, fn. 3. In 2011, Parliament enacted a mandatory minimum sentence for frauds exceeding $1 million. The Crown argues that the introduction of a mandatory minimum generally increases sentences across the range.

62In my view, any uncertainty surrounding the applicable sentencing range stems from the broad nature of conduct which has been described as “large-scale” fraud. In Davatgar‑Jafarpour, the accused served as the executive director of a non‑profit organization that assisted new immigrants. He directed the organization to seek reimbursement from Citizenship and Immigration Canada (“CIC”) for expenses that had not been incurred or paid. He compelled two employees to fabricate invoices and payroll records. The fraud continued over several years and caused losses estimated between $2 million and $2.5 million. When the scheme came to light, the organization went bankrupt, resulting in the loss of 150 jobs. CIC recovered most of its losses. The trial judge imposed the minimum two‑year sentence. The Court of Appeal found that sentence to be demonstrably unfit and increased it to four years’ imprisonment.

63The fraud in Davatgar‑Jafarpour took place over an extended period, involved some sophistication, affected numerous victims, and concerned a substantial amount of money. These features support its characterization as a large‑scale fraud. However, the circumstances of Davatgar‑Jafarpour are not comparable in magnitude to the offences before this court:

• The subject-matter of that offence was approximately $2.5 million—significantly less than the $301 million contract at issue in the SMH procurement.

• The consequences of the SMH fraud are far more extensive, as reflected in the victim impact statements of the Hospital, the competing Proponents, and Zurich Insurance.

• Although Davatgar‑Jafarpour involved a breach of trust, the breach was minor compared to the profound breaches committed by the two defendants here, both of whom held senior, trusted positions in a highly regulated sector.

• The public harm in Davatgar‑Jafarpour was largely mitigated through the recovery of the fraudulently obtained funds. No restitution has been paid in this case, and the damage to the Sponsors’ reputations and the resulting loss of public confidence in the P3 procurement process are far more enduring.

64The following cases provide some context in identifying the types of offences which fall within the five-to-eight-year sentencing range:

a. In Kazman et al., the two defendants engaged in a sophisticated, multi-million dollar fraud against the Government of Canada’s small business program and five major banks. Levy received $2.3 million and Kazman $1.5 million. The accused were convicted of fraud, money laundering and committing an offence for the benefit of a criminal organization. Kazman had previously been a lawyer and was appealing his disbarment at the time of the offence. Both were first offenders. The Court of Appeal upheld sentences of 8 years for Levy and 7 years for Kazman: see R. v. Kazman, 2020 ONCA 22.

b. In Drabinsky, the two defendants carried out a long‑running scheme to misrepresent the financial results of their companies by inflating assets and manipulating expenses through improper accounting practices. Their conduct, which included the use of falsified invoices and systematic shifting of expenses across reporting periods, resulted in materially false financial statements provided to investors and the public. While the exact dollar value of the fraud was not known, the investments made in the public company were over $500 million. The trial judge imposed sentences of 7 and 6 years on the two defendants which were varied on appeal to 5 years and 4 years respectively: R. v. Drabinsky, 2011 ONCA 582, at paras. 157-159.

c. In R. c. Accurso and R. c. Vaillancourt, the former mayor of Laval was convicted of fraud where city officials ran closed competitions for public infrastructure projects. Participating contractors obtained contracts in exchange for a 2% kickback to the mayor and his associates. The fraud took place over 14 years and greatly affected public confidence in public institutions. The former mayor, Vaillancourt, pleaded guilty and made upfront restitution of $8.6 million. A joint submission for six years was imposed. Accurso, who was one of the contractors who participated in the fraud, received a sentence of four years: see R. c. Accurso, 2022 QCCA 752; and R. c. Vaillancourt, 2016 QCCS 6182.

d. In Eid, the accused orchestrated a series of falsified transactions and withheld payments through his company to misappropriate $1.7 million, ultimately causing losses that were determined to be approximately $8 million to the company’s subcontractors and creditors. Following his conviction on ten fraud‑related charges, he received a global sentence of seven years’ imprisonment along with restitution and a fine in lieu of forfeiture. That sentence was also upheld on appeal: see R. v. Eid, 2020 ONCA 649 at para. 29.

65These authorities demonstrate that certain common features are present in cases where sentences fall within the five‑to-eight year range. Offences involving fraud against public institutions, losses in the many‑millions of dollars, and conduct that undermines public confidence in essential institutions consistently attract sentences of this magnitude. All of these factors are present in this case. A sentence of three to five years would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendants’ conduct.

VII. ANALYSIS

66The purpose of sentencing is set out in section 718 of the code:

718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:

(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;

(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;

(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;

(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

67Denunciation and deterrence have always been recognized as the principal considerations in sentencing for large-scale fraud: see R. v. Drabinsky, 2009 41220 at para. 25.

Denunciation

68The sentencing objective of denunciation embodies the communicative and educative role of law. It reflects the fact that Canadian criminal law is a system of values. A sentence that expresses denunciation condemns the offender “for encroaching on our society’s basic code of values” and in doing so, affirms the importance of those values: see R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, at para. 105.

69While every criminal sentence includes some measure of denunciation, certain offences require a stronger response because of the particularly serious nature of the conduct or because the harm caused to the community may otherwise be overlooked. Sophisticated, large-scale fraud is an offence that generally calls for denunciation, and that is particularly true in this case:

• Mr. Georgiou and Mr. Aquino were well paid executives who did not act out of financial need.

• Both had detailed knowledge of the P3 procurement process and used that knowledge to adopt a covert method of communication they knew would evade detection by officials overseeing the procurement.

• Mr. Georgiou relied on his experience and reputation as a former IO executive to mislead investigators about his conflicts of interest.

• The fraud harmed countless tradespeople who contributed hours of unpaid work to support the EllisDon and PCL bids, believing they were engaged in a fair competition for the opportunity to earn income from the hospital project.

• The breach of trust against the Hospital was profound. Dr. Howard, who was primarily responsible for hiring Mr. Georgiou, described this breach in his trial testimony:

“So, for me running a hospital is all about trust. I mean, a million patients a year coming through, sick, you know, every single member of the team doing the best they can, trust is huge. Without trust you can’t – can’t run a hospital. So, at that point, the trust is gone, and at that point, you can’t carry on.”

Deterrence

70General deterrence assumes heightened importance in cases of serious fraud. Large frauds require planning, organization, and deliberate decision‑making. Because such offences take time and forethought, it is reasonable to expect that potential offenders will consider the consequences of being caught before acting. Meaningful sentences for major frauds are capable of having a significant deterrent effect. To achieve that effect, courts must send a consistent message that the risks of committing the offence far outweigh any possible gains.

71General deterrence is also required because white‑collar crime is regrettably difficult to detect, investigate, and prosecute. Offenders are often industry insiders who understand weaknesses in oversight and know how to exploit those weaknesses without attracting attention. They may hold positions of trust or professional credentials that shield them from scrutiny and lend credibility to their explanations when irregularities arise. Evidence of fraud can often be easily concealed or destroyed. Given the historically low likelihood of prosecution and conviction for such offences, it is essential that successful prosecutions result in meaningful sentences to ensure that the risk‑to‑benefit ratio continues to deter potential offenders.

72All of the factors that call for a strong deterrent sentence are present in this case. The fraud unfolded over a period of two years and required ongoing planning by both offenders. At numerous points, Mr. Georgiou and Mr. Aquino could have abandoned or at least reduced their misconduct, but neither chose to do so. Both relied on their professional reputations to deflect scrutiny that might have revealed the scheme. When the Globe and Mail began making inquiries that could expose their actions, Mr. Aquino destroyed all digital records that could have confirmed the fraud. Were it not for the printed emails he inadvertently left in his office, the fraud would never have been proven. This case demonstrates exactly why deterrent sentences are necessary for serious insider fraud.

Proportionality

73The fundamental principle of sentencing is that the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and to the offender’s level of responsibility.

74The position of the defendants is that these offences were not grave because they did not result in significant losses. This position is developed in the Joint Defence Sentencing Submissions:

• The Court found that the Sponsors were deprived of the expenses required to review the Bondfield bid after the point that Bondfield would have been disqualified. The defendants submit that this loss would “largely be the cost of the human resources that went into the procurement” and those are unquantifiable. (Paragraph 59).

• The finding that the fraud risked deprivation to Infrastructure Ontario’s investment in establishing a competitive marketplace for P3 Projects was speculative. If there is a risk of loss, it has no value. (Paragraphs 61, 64)

• The defendants submit that the Sponsors did not suffer any discernible loss as a result of the procurement process not having been conducted in accordance with the applicable rules. (Paragraphs 65–71)

• The acts of the accused did not deprive the sponsors of market-based feedback regarding the costs of the Project because the other proponents did not submit plans which were responsive to the Sponsors requirements. (Paragraphs 73–74)

• There is no evidence that donations to the hospital were affected by the defendants’ conduct, and the risk of that possibility cannot be quantified. (Paragraph 77)

• The Hospital was not deprived of the $40,000 bonus paid to Mr. Georgiou because he made charitable donations to the hospital which exceeded $40,000. (Paragraph 81)

75These submissions are in keeping with the position taken by the defendants at trial. I do not accept them.

76Many entities and individuals contributed to the SMH 3.0 Project, including Infrastructure Ontario, the Hospital, the Proponents, the tradespeople who joined the Proponent teams, the insurer, and the lenders. Each participated on the understanding that the procurement process was tightly regulated and that its outcome would be demonstrably fair. This case is unlike the typical fraud in which an offender induces the victims to invest through false representations. Rather, it was the Sponsors’ unequivocal assurance of a fair procurement process that led participants to invest their resources. In my view, it is self‑evident that these participants would not have committed their resources or exposed themselves to substantial liabilities had they known that Bondfield’s Lead Proponent and a member of the Executive Committee had undisclosed financial ties and were secretly communicating throughout the RFP process. The offence, however, does not require such a finding; it is sufficient that the Crown establish that the defendants’ flagrant breach of the procurement rules created a risk of loss to those who relied on the regulatory framework when making their investments. I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that this risk was established. Accordingly, I reject the defence submission that the offences caused little harm to the other participants and find that the defendants caused significant harm. I therefore conclude that the offences are very grave.

77I find, however, that there is a meaningful difference in the gravity of the two counts on the indictment. The first count concerns the fraud perpetrated against the Sponsors and, in my view, it is the more serious offence. This conduct targeted critical public works and has undermined confidence in the integrity of the marketplace for public infrastructure. It has also exposed the Sponsors to immense potential liability and required them to incur substantial litigation costs—costs that will ultimately fall upon the taxpayer.

78The second count concerns the losses suffered by PCL and EllisDon. Those losses are capped at approximately $2.5 million, and although I do not minimize the non‑monetary harms experienced by those companies, they have continued to operate successfully without any apparent long‑term detriment. This is, therefore, a less serious offence.

79Proportionality also requires an assessment of the blameworthiness of the offenders. In my view, there are important factors that distinguish the two defendants.

80In Mr. Aquino’s case, there are no mitigating circumstances. From the outset of the procurement process, he sought confidential information from Mr. Georgiou, orchestrated the fraudulent scheme by providing an untraceable Blackberry phone, and falsely denied receiving confidential information. When it became apparent that the Globe and Mail would disclose his connection to Mr. Georgiou, he destroyed evidence that could have confirmed the fraud. His sole objective was to secure an unfair advantage over his competitors. He has shown no remorse for his conduct. A sentence at the upper end of the available range is appropriate.

81I view Mr. Georgiou’s circumstances differently.

82In a letter filed with the Court, Mr. Georgiou’s wife wrote that her husband’s longstanding ambition was to become the CEO of a hospital. She states that, although he was offered positions in the private sector with significantly higher compensation throughout their marriage, he declined them in order to pursue this goal. I accept that evidence.

83I have no doubt that Mr. Georgiou hoped to succeed as the Chief Administrative Officer at St. Michael’s Hospital. I am sure that he was industrious, hard‑working, and determined in his efforts to bring the SMH 3.0 Project to a successful conclusion. Mr. Georgiou maintained in his testimony that he was always loyal to the Hospital, and I find that there is some truth in that assertion. Regrettably, however, he was subject to divided loyalties.

84The evidence adduced at trial persuades me that Mr. Georgiou felt a sense of indebtedness to Mr. Aquino. I cannot be certain of the source of that indebtedness. It may have arisen from the renovations Bondfield performed on Mr. Georgiou’s home, or from their shared involvement in various investments, or from the assistance Mr. Aquino provided following the termination of Mr. Georgiou’s employment with Infrastructure Ontario in February 2012. It is equally possible that the sense of obligation stemmed solely from their personal friendship. The evidence establishes only that such indebtedness existed; it does not show its exact origin.

85Mr. Georgiou’s sense of indebtedness led him to provide Mr. Aquino with confidential information for the purpose of enhancing Bondfield’s chances of winning the procurement. Although this constituted an inexcusable breach of his duties to the Sponsors, it is reasonably possible that Mr. Georgiou believed his misconduct would ultimately benefit the Hospital. That belief may have been reinforced during Executive Committee meetings in which EllisDon was disqualified due to its inadequate design and PCL submitted a bid that exceeded the Project budget by $230 million. Bondfield, by contrast, submitted a design that independent reviewers considered satisfactory and buildable within the budget. Mr. Georgiou may have convinced himself that his actions were justified because they would lead to what he believed to be the best possible outcome for the Hospital.

86I reach this conclusion primarily on the basis of the May long‑weekend emails. Those emails prove that Mr. Georgiou was providing confidential information to Mr. Aquino, but he was also repeatedly urging Mr. Aquino to submit the lowest possible bid. Both men knew the Sponsors’ budget was $301 million, but Mr. Georgiou also knew that the Hospital had access to approximately $30 million in contingency funds if the Ministry of Health refused to increase the budget. He also knew that, unless the other Proponents had materially altered their designs or pricing since the Commercially Confidential Meetings, Bondfield was likely to win the procurement even if its bid exceeded the budget. There is no evidence that he ever disclosed to Mr. Aquino the existence of the contingency funds or the anticipated bids of the competing Proponents.

87If Mr. Georgiou believed that he was acting in the best interests of the Hospital, he was tragically mistaken. The Hospital was fully committed to the integrity of the procurement process, and Mr. Georgiou had no entitlement—moral or otherwise—to depart from it. His interference has resulted in catastrophic consequences for the Hospital, the people of Ontario, and his own family. His intentions are relevant, however, to his moral blameworthiness and in my view, they are a mitigating factor on sentence.

VIII. THE SENTENCES

88For John Aquino, I find that a fit sentence on count one is 7 years’ incarceration. The sentence on count 2 will be 5 years concurrent.

89For Vasos Georgiou, the sentence on count one is 5 years’ incarceration. The sentence on count 2 will be five years concurrent such that the total sentence is five years.

IX. ANCILLARY ORDERS

A. Victim Fine Surcharge

90There will be a victim fine surcharge of $400 imposed on each count for a total of $800 to be paid by each of the defendants.

B. DNA Order

91The Crown seeks a DNA order for both accused. Because fraud over $5,000 is a secondary designated offence, the Crown must satisfy the Court that making such an order is in the best interests of the administration of justice. In deciding whether to require an offender to provide a bodily sample for inclusion in the National DNA Data Bank, the Court is guided by the criteria set out in s. 487.051(3):

In deciding whether to make the order, the court shall consider the person’s criminal record, whether they were previously found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for a designated offence, the nature of the offence, the circumstances surrounding its commission and the impact such an order would have on the person’s privacy and security of the person and shall give reasons for its decision.

92The Crown submits that the accused were convicted of serious frauds involving deliberate deception, the destruction of evidence, and, in Mr. Georgiou’s case, the use of an alias. The Crown argues that granting the DNA orders would promote the public interest in deterring serious offences. It also submits that the intrusion on the accused’s privacy is minimal.

93Neither accused has a prior criminal record. The investigation of these offences would not have been assisted by the existence of a DNA sample in the National Data Bank, nor is it likely that DNA evidence would assist in investigating similar offences in the future. Requiring a DNA sample would constitute a significant intrusion on the privacy of the defendants and, from their perspective, would carry significant stigma. The purpose of the legislation is not punitive; it is intended to assist in the investigation of future crimes and to deter offenders whose conduct could be effectively investigated through forensic DNA analysis. I am not satisfied that either objective would be advanced in this case. The Crown has therefore not met its onus, and I decline to make the requested DNA orders.

Justice Peter Bawden

Released: February 18, 2026

CITATION: R. v. Aquino and Georgiou, 2026 ONSC 984