Ellen Weis

The defendant, Bradley Cheveldayoff, was sentenced for manslaughter after being acquitted of second-degree murder.

The incident involved a physical altercation followed by Cheveldayoff shooting the unarmed victim, Gabriel Nikov, six times in the back as he walked away.

The court considered Cheveldayoff's violent criminal record, his disregard for court orders (carrying a firearm while prohibited), and the severe impact on the victim's family.

While acknowledging the initial provocation, the court found a significant disconnect between the scuffle and the fatal shooting.

The Crown sought 18-19 years and delayed parole, while the defence sought 8-12 years and opposed delayed parole.

The court imposed a sentence of 16 years, reduced to 12 years after credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh detention conditions, but declined to impose delayed parole under s. 743.6 of the Criminal Code, finding the overall sentence sufficient for denunciation and deterrence.

This decision addresses two applications within a second-degree murder trial.

First, the defence sought an order compelling the Crown to call a witness, Malique Kamara, whose statements were inconsistent and whose latest account radically contradicted previous versions.

The court dismissed this application, affirming the Crown's prosecutorial discretion and the absence of a duty to call a witness it deems unreliable, even if previously indicated.

Second, the defence applied to have the partial defence of provocation left to the jury.

The court granted this application, finding that there was an "air of reality" to the subjective elements of suddenness and loss of control, and a "real doubt" regarding whether an ordinary person subjected to the assault would form the intention to commit murder and act upon it, thus warranting the defence to be considered by the jury.

In a second-degree murder trial, the court adjudicated four evidentiary applications.

The defence was permitted to introduce evidence of the deceased's prior violent disposition to support self-defence or provocation, with a corresponding right for the Crown to adduce reply evidence of the accused's violent antecedents to ensure trial fairness.

A hearsay utterance by the deceased, indicating an intent to rob the accused, was admitted under the "statement of present intention" exception, satisfying necessity and reliability criteria despite witness inconsistencies.

Lay opinion evidence was largely excluded, save for an observation of the accused's emotional state.

Finally, a post-offence video depicting the accused re-enacting the shooting was deemed admissible as circumstantial evidence relevant to identity and to rebut self-defence.

The accused, a youthful first offender, was convicted by a jury of robbery, attempted robbery, use of an imitation firearm, and threatening bodily harm against two sex workers.

The Crown sought a three-year sentence, while the defence sought two to two and a half years.

The court considered the mandatory minimums for the firearm offences, the vulnerability of the victims, and the accused's strong rehabilitation prospects.

The court declined to give credit for pre-trial bail conditions, finding them not severe enough.

A total sentence of three years was imposed, less 14 days credit for pre-sentence custody, along with DNA and weapons prohibition orders.

This is a ruling on committal to stand trial following a preliminary hearing.

Three accused were jointly charged with seven counts involving a Glock 10mm semiautomatic pistol, including careless use of a firearm, possession of restricted firearms without licence, occupying a motor vehicle with a restricted firearm, discharging a firearm recklessly, and possessing a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The Crown alleged that during an early morning drive, one of the accused discharged the firearm in a residential neighbourhood.

The court discharged all accused on count 7 (possession of weapon for dangerous purpose).

All accused consented to committal on count 5 (occupying motor vehicle with restricted firearm).

Walter Long was discharged on all other counts.

Van Hoang Le was committed on counts 2, 3, 4, and 5 based on the court's finding that as the designated driver, he had constructive possession of the firearm.

Vishnuvarthan Srivaratharajah was committed on counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, with the court finding sufficient circumstantial evidence that he was the person who discharged the firearm.

Emiliana Piccinini, a legal assistant and bookkeeper, was charged with theft over $5000 and fraud over $5000 for allegedly receiving unauthorized excess payments disguised as payroll from her employer's law firm between 2011 and 2014.

Piccinini asserted these payments were authorized fees owed to her from a prior agreement.

The court found Piccinini's evidence to be internally inconsistent, unreliable, and unsupported by credible evidence or bank records, particularly regarding the alleged fee arrangement and her explanations for the numerous extra payments.

Conversely, the court accepted the employer's and accountant's testimony as credible and reliable.

Consequently, Piccinini was found guilty of fraud over $5000, with the theft charge conditionally stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol in blood following a motor vehicle accident on January 27, 2015.

The defence challenged the arrest on Charter grounds under section 8, arguing the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the impaired driving charge.

The defence also argued the toxicologist's opinion was inadmissible due to the Crown's failure to prove the absence of bolus drinking, and that symptoms of impairment could be attributed to head injuries from the accident.

The court found the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, rejected the bolus drinking defence as lacking an air of reality, and found the Crown proved both charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL.

The Crown relied on breath readings of 140 and 130 obtained through an approved screening device and an intoxilyzer.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath evidence, alleging four Charter violations under section 8.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make the initial demand under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The objective evidence from an in-car video contradicted the officer's testimony regarding slurred speech and manner of driving.

The court concluded that the smell of alcohol alone from a vehicle with another occupant was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.

The breath evidence was excluded under section 24(2) as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and the defendant was acquitted.