CITATION: R. v. Aquino and Georgiou, 2026 ONSC 979

COURT FILE NO.: CR-23-00000359-0000

DATE: 20260218

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

JOHN AQUINO and VASOS GEORGIOU

Defendants/Applicants

)

Ellen Weis and Ben Lerer, for the Crown

Peter Brauti and Alexa Banister-Thompson for Georgiou; Alan Gold and Ellen Williams for Aquino, for the Defendants/Applicants

HEARD: February 4, 2026

1After a lengthy judge‑alone trial, I found the defendants guilty of two counts of fraud over $5,000. They now apply to re‑open the trial prior to sentencing. I understand the grounds for the application to be as follows:

A. The Crown never gave notice to the defence of the deprivation or risk of deprivation which it intended to prove at trial.

B. The Crown failed to call any evidence to establish a causal connection between the deceitful conduct of the defendants and Bondfield’s final bid.

C. The Crown failed to prove that Bondfield would have been disqualified if the fraudulent conduct of the defendant’s had been discovered.

D. The Court erred in its factual findings.

E. The Court’s findings with respect to deprivation and risk of deprivation are without precedent and have no foundation in law.

F. The Court erred in its application of the Rule in Browne and Dunn.

2If the application to re-open is granted, the accused do not seek to call additional evidence. Rather, they submit that they should be acquitted of all charges, or alternatively, that a mistrial be declared.

3The Crown disputes all of these submissions. It maintains that the defendants were always aware of the case they had to meet, that the Reasons for Judgment do not disclose any of the errors alleged by the defendants, and that the Court’s factual findings were fully supported by the evidence. The Crown further argues that, even if the applicants’ positions had merit, the appropriate forum to pursue the alleged errors is the Court of Appeal. In its view, there is nothing exceptional about this case to justify the extraordinary step of re‑opening the trial after conviction.

II. THE TEST TO RE-OPEN A TRIAL

4The Court does have jurisdiction to re-open a trial prior to passing sentence but this power "should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances and where its exercise is clearly called for": see R. v. Lessard, 1976 1417 (ON CA), [1976] O.J. No. 74. Re‑opening a case after a conviction is an unusual step which is generally taken only to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice: R. v. Chan, 2019 ONSC 783, at para. 30.

5The power to re-open the trial must not be used to usurp the Court of Appeal’s role in reviewing the trial judge’s legal rulings. Allowing such applications in those circumstances would undermine the principle of finality and would encourage convicted persons to advance repeated legal arguments, unnecessarily prolonging the proceedings: R. v. Theriault, 2020 ONSC 5725, at para. 11, affirmed 2021 ONCA 517, at para. 181.

6Re-opening typically occurs when a new issue has arisen prior to sentencing which was not argued or not available for the parties to raise at trial and the failure to consider the issue could result in a miscarriage of justice.

III. The FINDINGS AT TRIAL

7In the Reasons for Judgment, I concluded that the accused engaged in numerous forms of deceptive conduct which was intended to increase the probability that Bondfield would be selected as the First Negotiating Proponent and ultimately secure the contract for the St. Michael’s Hospital renovation project.

8The first count on the indictment alleges fraud against St. Michael’s Hospital (SMH) and Infrastructure Ontario (IO), the Sponsors of the Project. I found that the defendants’ fraudulent conduct caused the following forms of deprivation:

a. The Costs of Reviewing the Bondfield Bid: The defendants concealed their improper communications beginning in August 2013. Had the Sponsors known of this misconduct, Bondfield would have been disqualified, and the Sponsors would not have incurred the significant costs of reviewing its bid.

b. Harm to IO’s Market‑Integrity Investment: The defendants’ actions undermined IO’s investment in maintaining a fair and competitive marketplace for public procurement.

c. Loss of the Right to a Rule‑Based Selection Process: The defendants’ conduct deprived the Sponsors of their right to select the successful proponent in accordance with the established procurement rules, thereby causing significant prejudice, including exposing the Sponsors to substantial litigation costs.

d. Loss of Market Feedback: The deceitful conduct of the applicants prevented the Sponsors from obtaining accurate, market‑based information about the true cost of the SMH renovation, which they would have received if all three Proponents had complied with the procurement rules.

e. Risk to Public Donations: Mr. Georgiou’s fraudulent conduct created a risk that members of the public would be less willing, in the future, to contribute financially to the Hospital

f. Improper Bonus Payment: Mr. Georgiou deceived the Hospital into paying him a bonus in May 2014 that he would not have received had the Hospital been aware of the ongoing fraud.

9The second count on the indictment alleges fraud against the public which was specified to be the other companies competing in the SMH 3.0 procurement. I found that the defendants’ fraudulent conduct caused the following forms of deprivation to those parties:

a. Loss to PCL of the Opportunity to Negotiate: Had the defendants’ deceitful conduct been known, Bondfield would have been disqualified from the procurement process and PCL would have been designated the First Negotiating Proponent. As a result of the defendants’ misconduct, PCL was deprived of the opportunity to engage in negotiations for a contract that would have conferred significant benefits on the firm and its numerous subcontractors.

b. Depriving PCL and EllisDon of a Fair Chance: Mr. Aquino obtained confidential information from Mr. Georgiou that materially enhanced Bondfield’s prospects of success in the procurement process. This misconduct improperly deprived Bondfield’s competitors of a fair and equal opportunity to secure the contract and negated the value of the substantial investments they had made in preparing competitive bids.

IV. The grounds to re-open the TRIAL

A. The Failure to Provide Notice of the Crown’s Position

10The applicants submit that the Crown never disclosed its position regarding the deprivations suffered by the victims or how the conduct of the defendants caused those deprivations. The Crown’s Guide to the Evidence and opening to the court explained only the allegedly dishonest conduct of the defendants. It failed to identify any “monetary corpus” which could be the subject of the fraud and only “barely adverted” to any causal connection between the deceptive conduct and the deprivation. In their view, the Crown treated the offence as if deceptive conduct alone were sufficient, without addressing either deprivation or causation at any point during the trial.

11The applicants further submit that it was not until final submissions that the Crown first advanced its theories of deprivation:

a. The Sponsors were deprived of their right to select the First Negotiating Proponent in accordance with the procurement rules, thereby creating a risk of deprivation to the Sponsors.

b. The Sponsors were deprived of relevant information when they chose to spend money evaluating Bondfield’s bid.

c. The competing proponents were deprived of the value of their investments in the procurement.

12The applicants maintain that no evidence was presented at trial to support any of these purported deprivations, and they had no basis to apprehend they would be advanced in submissions.

13I do not accept that the defendants had no notice of the case they had to answer. The defendants were perfectly aware that the Crown was alleging that Georgiou had provided confidential information to Aquino to assist Bondfield in winning the procurement. The Crown called evidence throughout the trial to establish the grounds for deprivation cited in its final submissions, including the following:

David Ho testified that any breach of the rules of the procurement could expose the Sponsors to liability by an aggrieved bidder and one of the purposes of rigorously protecting the integrity of the procurement was to guard against that outcome.
The Sponsors invested significant resources in reviewing the Bondfield bid at a time when they were unaware of close connections between the two men or that Georgiou was in secret communication with Aquino throughout the RFP.
David Klassen testified that EllisDon invested far more in preparing its bid than was covered by the honourarium and this was a common circumstance in bidding for major P3 projects.
Jillian Newsome, the Fairness Monitor, testified that her firm performed over 800 hours of work on behalf of the Sponsors to ensure that the rules of the procurement were followed.

14If the defendants were in any state of uncertainty regarding the case they had to meet, they were entitled to bring a motion for particulars. If they believed that the Crown had failed to call any evidence to establish deprivation or causation, they could have brought a motion for a directed verdict. If they were surprised to learn the basis of deprivation for the first time in the Crown’s written submission, they could have applied to re-open the case before conviction. None of those things happened.

15From the outset of the trial, the defence denied that the defendants’ deceitful conduct caused any deprivation or risk of deprivation to anyone. Their position was that Bondfield submitted a satisfactory design within the Project budget, and that the two other Proponents eliminated themselves from the competition independently of their conduct. The defence maintained that their breach of the procurement rules had not given rise to any form of deprivation. An exchange between the Court and counsel for Mr. Georgiou early in the trial illustrates the position the defendants consistently advanced throughout the proceedings:

THE COURT: … Tell me if I’m wrong about this. You have developed evidence that Bondfield was the up and comer in and already quite closed market.

P. BRAUTI: Right.

THE COURT: That was to everybody’s advantage. IO as much as anybody wanted to see a third player, if not more, if possible.

P. BRAUTI: That’s right.

THE COURT: In order to foster a – a genuinely competitive marketplace, IO had developed a very careful procurement process which was enforced by a fairness monitor in large measure so that an outside like Bondfield or any of the other bidders in this case would have a fair chance of getting this kind of work, hopefully freed from the kind of, I’ll say, cronyism, that you’re describing now.

P. BRAUTI: I don’t think that that’s why – I disagree with that.

THE COURT: Okay. But at very least, we can agree that IO went to great lengths and significant expense to establish a process that was as fair as possible, in order to foster a genuinely competitive industry, which was necessary so that the taxpayers of Ontario would get the best possible deal for their infrastructure dollars.

P. BRAUTI: I – I don’t know if that was either. I think that they developed the procurement process, the rules and the fairness monitor to make sure that there was no material unfairness in the competition.

THE COURT: Right, and isn’t that....

P. BRAUTI: I – I don’t – I don’t necessarily think that translates into the taxpayers getting their best dollar out of this.

THE COURT: Okay. But from IO’s standpoint, we agree, the purpose of the procurement process, and the purpose of the fairness monitor was to foster a genuinely fair market?

P. BRAUTI: Yeah, I’m not – I’m not saying that it was – it was – it was obviously – I can’t say it better than what I said it, which is so that no proponent got a material unfair advantage. It’s like the witness Jillian Newsome. It’s – it’s not equal. It’s about a – it’s creating an equitable situation.

THE COURT: All right. So, the rule-breaking, which is acknowledged to have occurred in this case...

P. BRAUTI: Right.

THE COURT: ...was intended to circumvent, to a degree, a rigid process which had been developed to create a fair bidding process.

P. BRAUTI: I wouldn’t say that that was the intention.

THE COURT: Right. That is certainly the Crown’s contention.

P. BRAUTI: That’s the – that’s the Crown’s contention.

Transcript of November 19, 2024 – Trial Transcript Compendium at page 752 – Emphasis Added

16In my view, there is no foundation for the argument that the defendants were unaware of the Crown’s position on deprivation. The Crown’s evidence emphasized the considerable resources invested in ensuring the integrity of the procurement process and the significant benefits expected to flow from that integrity. It was apparent that those benefits were placed at risk when the defendants’ fraudulent conduct undermined the process. The Crown advanced these issues throughout the trial in both its evidence and its submissions.

B. No Evidence that Deceptive Conduct Caused Deprivation

17The applicants’ factum emphasizes that that the actus reus of fraud consists of deprivation and dishonesty. These two elements must coexist, and a causal relationship must be established between them. They submit that the Crown failed to call any evidence to establish a causal connection between their breach of the procurement rules and Bondfield’s final bid which won the procurement. Their factum includes the following assertions:

The Crown called no evidence to establish that any information provided by Georgiou factored into or had any impact on Bondfield’s final bid.
Bondfield’s bid had been completed and submitted to its insurer (Zurich) long before the May long weekend emails occurred.
The Crown did not introduce Bondfield’s final bid into evidence. If it had, it would have been obvious that a few phone calls or emails from a layman (Mr. Georgiou) could not have had any impact on such a high detailed plan.
The Crown did not call any employee of Bondfield who had been involved in preparing the final bid to testify that they received information from Aquino which influenced the final bid.
Bondfield had won the last five procurements by bidding to the project budget and they did so again in the SMH 3.0 procurement. If Aquino was receiving inside information from Georgiou, he would have known that he could have submitted a higher bid because the Hospital had a contingency fund and the other competitors were submitted bids which far exceeded the Project budget.

18The submission that there was no evidence that information from Georgiou influenced Bondfield’s final bid is incorrect. Lee Ford, the estimator for Ozz Electric, testified that the estimate that he provided to Bondfield on the Friday of the May long weekend totaled $53 million. Mr. Aquino consulted with Mr. Georgiou that weekend regarding the Ozz quotation and demanded that Mr. Ford attend his office to discuss it. Mr. Ford met with Aquino and subsequently provided a revised quote which reduced Bondfield’s base bid by $14 million. Mr. Aquino sent the revised quote to Mr. Georgiou for review. This evidence clearly permitted a finding that confidential information from Mr. Georgiou did influence Bondfield’s final bid.

19The applicants also rely on assertions which are not founded in the evidence. There was no evidence that Bondfield had submitted their final proposal to their insurer prior to the May long weekend emails and the content of those emails strongly suggest they had not. The evidence did not establish that Georgiou was “a layman” who was incapable of offering any information which could assist the Bondfield bid. On the contrary, the evidence established that Georgiou had significant experience in healthcare construction and as a member of the Executive Committee for the SMH Project, there is every reason to believe that he could provide valuable assistance.

20The applicants maintain that there is no evidence that information from Georgiou changed Bondfield’s final bid. This submission overlooks the court’s finding that Mr. Georgiou assisted the Bondfield bid throughout the RFP, not just in preparing its final bid:

Georgiou discussed the shutdown of the Shuter Wing of the Hospital with Aquino long before other proponents received notice from IO.
Aquino benefited from immediate consultation with Georgiou when IO mistakenly posted confidential communications into the Bondfield data room.
Georgiou leaked information from the Executive Committee meetings to Aquino at a point when Bondfield’s design was in jeopardy.

21The May long weekend emails are the most tangible evidence of Georgiou’s efforts to assist Bondfield to the detriment of other participants in the procurement, but they are not the only evidence which the court considered in concluding that deceitful conduct of the defendants caused deprivation or the risk of deprivation to the victims.

22The applicants’ submission regarding the lack of evidence of causation ultimately rests upon the applicants’ dispute with the factual findings of the Court. The defendants effectively argue that the Crown failed to prove a causal link between their deceptive behaviour and the deprivation to the victims because there was no direct evidence to prove it. The submission overlooks the large body of circumstantial evidence which overwhelmingly indicates that Georgiou did provide valuable information which was intended to assist Bondfield win the competition.

C. The Crown Failed to Prove that Bondfield Would Have Been Disqualified

23In the Reasons for Judgment, I found that Bondfield would have been disqualified if the Sponsors had become aware that Aquino had provided Georgiou with an untraceable Blackberry phone and Georgiou was using the device to provide confidential information concerning the procurement. This finding played a role in two findings regarding deprivation: (1) the expenses paid by the Sponsors to entertain the Bondfield bid after the point when Bondfield should have been disqualified; and (2) PCL’s loss of the opportunity to be the first negotiating proponent. The applicants submit that there was no evidence from either of the Sponsors that Bondfield would have been disqualified, the Crown did not submit that Bondfield would have been disqualified, and the defence had no notice that the Court was contemplating making such a finding. The argument is presented as follows in the applicant’s factum:

Because the second element was never identified at trial, that causal element was not explored and it was not explored to such an extent that whatever was caused by or was the result of the accused’s impugned conduct was also never explored. The Crown was content to leave the issue by simply filing the relevant rules governing the procurement, which included the Sponsors’ theoretical, discretionary remedies for any violations. There was absolutely no attempt by the Crown to produce in evidence the actual, practical causal realities by evidence from the Sponsors as to what they would or would not do given the accused’s impugned conduct. As the Crown said - as if it was of no consequence - the Crown was not focusing on ‘end result’. In fact, there was no evidentiary focus on any result, creating a missing legal element.

Applicant’s Factum at para. 12(xii) – italics in the original

24I do not accept this submission. The Crown alerted the defence to its position in the Crown Guide to the Evidence which was provided in disclosure. The Guide stated that the Crown would argue that by concealing their ties to one another during the procurement process, the applicants had “eliminated the risk that … Bondfield would be disqualified.” The possibility that Bondfield could be disqualified if the misconduct of the defendants was discovered had been advanced throughout the trial, including during the cross-examination of Mr. Georgiou where the following exchange occurred:

Q. Okay. And in fact, if you declared a conflict of interest with John Aquino and - you might not have been able to do the job for SMH that you were hired for, right? ‘Cause this - this project was a big part of your job there.

A. It’s part of the job, yes. And again, I’m not sure of the - there’s always different scenarios that are identified to, you know, carve out portions of roles and responsibilities.

Q. If Bondfield had been disqualified from bidding because of - ‘cause it - it could go either way, right? It could be either the person on the sponsor’s side or the applicant could be disqualified, right? Those are both options.

A. Or both, yeah, correct.

Q. Or both. Yeah. So, if Bondfield had been disqualified from bidding because if John Aquino had been found to be in a conflict of interest ‘cause of your role and the hospital wanted to keep you in place then Bondfield and John would’ve lost out on a lucrative deal, right?

A. Correct.

Cross-Examination of Vas Georgiou, Trial Transcript Compendium at PDF p. 3415.

25The defence addressed the prospect of disqualification in its written submissions, stating “had a conflict of interest been declared, this would not have automatically removed a participant from the RFQ process – it was discretionary”: see Joint Defence Written Submissions at para. 205.

26In its reply to the Crown’s submissions, the defendants made the same argument that they raise here: “The prosecution points to the potential of being disqualified for any unauthorized contact. The prosecution failed to lead any evidence about when the potential disqualification would become a reality and never asked any of the witnesses from I.O. and/or Fairness Monitor whether the informal communication would have actually led to any disqualification. Accordingly, there is a gap in the evidence, and therefore little to no weight should be placed on this point.”: see Joint Defence Reply Submissions at para. 68.

27The possibility that Bondfield could be disqualified because Mr. Aquino failed to disclose his close relationship with Mr. Georgiou was explored throughout the trial. It was also open to the Sponsors to disqualify Bondfield if they learned that Mr. Aquino had provided Mr. Georgiou with an untraceable Blackberry to obtain confidential procurement information. The defence addressed these issues through Mr. Georgiou’s testimony—during which he denied both the existence of any conflict and the provision of confidential information—and through its written submissions.

28The Crown acknowledges that it did not seek a finding that Bondfield would have been disqualified, but observes that this finding was unnecessary to prove the charges:

32It is true that the Crown focused on how the applicants’ conduct either increased Bondfield’s chances of success or decreased Bondfield’s risks of failure, including disqualification. That is because, in a procurement fraud, this is all the Crown needs to prove (citing R v Riesberry, 2014 ONCA 744, at paras. 21-22). But once the Crown put disqualification in play, the applicants were on notice of the only point that mattered: they were alleged to have eliminated a real prospect of removal from the process. Whether disqualification was merely possible or would have occurred is a difference of degree, not kind. Any response to the former is necessarily a response to the latter.

29The applicants argue that, because no member of the Sponsorship Group was specifically asked whether Bondfield would have been disqualified, there is no evidentiary basis for such a finding. I do not accept this submission. Whether Bondfield could or would have been disqualified was a factual issue for the Court to determine as the trier of fact. Although testimony from knowledgeable witnesses might have assisted, the ultimate determination rested with the Court. The issue is analogous to whether Mr. Georgiou and Mr. Aquino were required to disclose their mutual involvement in OTEC and the Gervais Properties as a potential conflict of interest. Several witnesses possessed relevant expertise and could have offered informed views, but none could provide a definitive answer. That determination also fell to the Court, based on the trial evidence, the conflict‑of‑interest guidelines, and the submissions of counsel. I explained at an early stage of the trial the basis on which such determinations would be made:

Since I have to make my own findings about the conflict of interest and failure to disclose, what does it matter to me whether IO or any other body in this Province reviewed the alleged conduct and what their conclusions were? I decide it myself based on what I hear from the witness box, and the documents.

Ruling - Trial Transcript Compendium, at p. 282

30The issue of disqualification fell into the same category as the conflict of interest. It was a factual question which the parties had addressed both in evidence and submissions and the determination of the fact was helpful in reaching a verdict. As the trier of fact, I was entitled to make the finding.

D. Disputed Factual Findings

31The applicants’ factum disputes several findings in the Reasons for Judgment:

The accused position was that what needed to be disclosed was disclosed and what was not disclosed did not, in the particular context, constitute disclosable conflict. As for the Blackberry, the accused’s position and evidence that its use was not in relation to SMH 3.0. This was confirmed by the minimal messages preserved in the Bondfield SMH 3.0 file folder. There were only a few messages that took place in the context of unanswered Requests for Information on the very eve of bid submission. The lengthy and detailed bid would have long before been finalized for examination by the Insurer, who was guaranteeing 50% of the bid price. Any messages were inconsequential. There was no reason to assume there were other relevant unsaved messages. No reason can be suggested why Mr. Aquino would save only those and not others.

Applicants’ Factum – Application to Re-Open Convictions at para. 17

32All these findings were litigated extensively during the trial. The applicants are free to argue in the Court of Appeal that the Court’s findings demonstrate palpable and overriding error, but such arguments provide no basis to re-open the trial.

E. Unjustified and Impermissible Findings of Deprivation

33The applicants submit that there is no precedent for a fraud conviction on the basis set out in the Reasons for Judgment:

At the end of the day, the irrelevance of both Riesberry and Landry is shown by their not being utilized in the Reasons for Judgment to justify the convictions in this case. In fact, as demonstrated by the absence of cited precedent, there is simply no prior precedent providing an example of a fraud conviction on the basis set out in the Reasons for Judgment. That is because the facts established in this trial failed to prove the elements of the offence of fraud according to law. No victim has suffered a loss or risk of loss of any monies as a result of the accused’s conduct.

Applicants’ Factum – Application to Re-Open Convictions at para. 30 [Italics Added]

34Counsel for Mr. Georgiou elaborated on this position in his oral submissions. Mr. Brauti argued that there is no precedent for the intangible deprivation cited in the judgment, those being (1) the loss of public confidence in public procurements; (2) the loss of market based information which would have been provided by a fair procurement; (3) the corruption of the marketplace which might discourage future bidders from taking part in public procurements; (4) the risk of loss of future donations to the Hospital. The defence maintains that fraud cases have always been concerned with identifiable monies, securities or other property and intangible losses such as the loss of public confidence in the procurement process cannot form the basis for criminal liability.

35Mr. Brauti further submits that there was no evidence to support these findings. He notes, for example, that no witness testified that the defendants’ conduct caused any loss of confidence in the public‑infrastructure procurement system. He also observes that David Klassen, an EllisDon employee, was not asked whether the defendants’ dishonest actions would discourage EllisDon from participating in future procurements. Nor was any evidence led, such as a public survey, to show that members of the public would be less willing to donate to the Hospital as a result of Mr. Georgiou’s fraudulent conduct.

36I do not accept these arguments. The defendants’ fraudulent conduct took place in the context of strictly regulated procurement which had multiple purposes including:

(1) to foster public confidence that good value was being obtained for tax dollars spent on public procurements;

(2) that the Sponsors were uncertain of the real cost of the SMH 3.0 renovation and anticipated that the procurement would provide reliable market-based feedback;

(3) IO was attempting to foster a more competitive marketplace for public procurements by encouraging new companies to bid for major projects; and

(4) the Hospital relied heavily on charitable donations to fund its operations.

37Although these interests were not as easily valued as money or securities, they are “economic interests” that were put at risk by the conduct of the defendants. In Riesberry, the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that such intangible losses may constitute deprivation or risk of deprivation for the purposes of section 380 of the Code:

22Further, as in Drabinsky, where there is a failure to disclose material non-compliance with the regulatory scheme, it is no answer to say bettors may have relied on other factors in making their bets. Bettors were entitled to assume compliance with the regulatory scheme when weighing those others factors and coming to a final decision. Non-compliance with the regulatory scheme in a manner so as to affect the outcome of a race necessarily puts the bettors' economic interests at risk. Bettors were deprived of information about the race that they were entitled to know; they were also deprived of an honest race run in accordance with the rules. In these circumstances, the trial judge erred in law because he failed to take account of the regulatory scheme in considering the risk of deprivation issue.

R. v. Riesberry, 2014 ONCA 744

38The applicants simply do not accept this statement of the law. They instead submit the following:

No stakeholder testified that the impugned conduct had any impact whatsoever on the expense money they chose to spend, much less the accused’s impugned conduct “caused” or “resulted in” any expenditures. Expenditures do not even meet the fundamental requirement for causation: the “but for” test. Ironically, the accused’s conduct would not have taken place ‘but for’ the expenditures (i.e. holding the procurement process). Applying ‘but for causation,’ the procurement “caused” the accused’s conduct, thereby demonstrating that ‘but for’ causation is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for factual causation or legal causation.

Applicants’ Factum – Application to Re-Open Convictions at para. 24

39As I understand this submission, the applicants argue that there is no causal link between their deceitful conduct and the losses suffered by the stakeholders. They say that the Sponsors invested certain resources in running the procurement and that there is no evidence the defendants’ actions caused them to spend even one dollar more. Similarly, they submit that PCL and EllisDon invested in their bids without knowing about the defendants’ conduct, and therefore cannot be said to have suffered any loss.

40This argument overlooks the fact that all stakeholders made their investments on the assumption that every participant would comply with the strict regulatory framework governing the procurement. For example, PCL and EllisDon understood that preparing a competitive bid required spending far more than the honorarium offered by the Sponsors. As the trier of fact, I am satisfied that they would not have incurred those expenses had they known that a member of the Executive Committee had concealed extensive financial ties to Bondfield’s lead representative, was secretly communicating with him about the procurement, and had provided him with confidential information to shape Bondfield’s bid. In any event, it was unnecessary to make that finding, because it was sufficient to conclude that the defendants’ fraudulent conduct created a risk to the investments made by stakeholders who relied on the expectation that all participants would follow the rules.

41There was evidence at trial to support all of the factual findings relating to deprivation or risk of deprivation. It is true that some matters could not be proven with absolute certainty. For example, it would not be possible to establish definitively whether Mr. Georgiou’s conduct caused any decrease in charitable donations to the Hospital. Any fluctuation in donations could be attributed to a variety of factors, including economic conditions, marketing efforts, or coincidence; an increase in donations would likewise not prove that his conduct had no negative effect. Even a public survey would not provide a definitive answer. In such circumstances, it is for the trier of fact to determine, on all the evidence, whether the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the fraudulent conduct created a risk of deprivation to the victim. In this case, I was so satisfied. The defendants are free to challenge that conclusion on appeal, but it is not basis to reopen the trial.

F. The Alleged Browne and Dunn Error

42The applicants allege an error in the Reasons for Judgment concerning one of the nine grounds on which the Court rejected Mr. Georgiou’s evidence. This issue was fully addressed in the parties’ written submissions and considered in the judgment. It is a matter for appellate review and does not provide a basis to re‑open the trial.

V. CONCLUSION

43I do not accept any of the arguments the defendants have advanced concerning the factual findings made at trial or the basis for their convictions. Even if I assume that I am wrong in rejecting these arguments, I still would not be satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist to justify re‑opening the trial. All of the issues raised in this application were addressed during the trial through evidence or submissions, and I have no reason to believe that any miscarriage of justice has occurred. The defendants are entitled to challenge their convictions, but the proper forum for those arguments is the Court of Appeal, not this Court.

44The application to re-open is dismissed.

Justice Peter Bawden

Released: February 18, 2026