Nakita Cheyenne Kelsey

Andrew Francis was charged with drug offences following a warranted search.

He brought a Garofoli application to quash the search warrant and exclude evidence, arguing a lack of reasonable grounds.

The court reviewed the Information to Obtain (ITO), including redacted confidential informer privilege information, and found sufficient credible and reliable evidence to support the warrant's issuance.

The application was dismissed, and no Section 8 Charter violation was found.

On extensive pre-trial motions in a first degree murder prosecution, the court addressed Charter challenges arising from a related arrest investigation, lost evidence, and multiple Garofoli applications to successive warrants and production orders.

The court found numerous serious breaches, including unlawful phone pinging, failures under ss. 10(a) and 10(b), unlawful seizure and reporting failures concerning cell phones, and unacceptable negligence in the loss of both bullpen video and a physically seized phone, leading to exclusion of all post-arrest statements, utterances, the seized phones, and extraction reports.

The court also found unacceptable negligence in the loss of the deceased's Corvette, but held that the proportionate remedy was a jury instruction rather than exclusion of the Van Dam evidence.

The Garofoli challenges largely failed because, after excision and amplification, the issuing justice could still have granted the contested authorizations, save for the phone-content search tied to the unlawfully obtained phones.

The applicant, charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm, sought to exclude blood analysis results and medical records obtained via search warrant and production order.

The applicant argued insufficient grounds for the authorizations and an unreasonable manner of search, specifically that the police tested for drugs (THC) when the warrant only specified alcohol.

The court found the authorizations facially valid and the manner of search reasonable, given the broad interpretation of "evidence with respect to the commission of an offence" under the Criminal Code and the specific provisions for testing blood in driving offences.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application for summary dismissal of the accused's application for a stay of proceedings, which alleged breaches of Charter ss. 7 and 11(d).

The Crown argued that the accused had failed to comply with the Criminal Proceedings Rules by filing a revised factum and new book of authorities late, expanding her arguments, and intending to call a new witness without sufficient notice.

The court dismissed the Crown's application for summary dismissal, finding that the accused's application had merit and that it was in the interests of justice to allow the accused to rely on her revised materials and call the witness, provided the Crown was given adequate time to respond.

The court balanced the accused's right to present her case with the Crown's right to respond and the need for an expeditious trial.

Ms. Blake sought a stay of proceedings under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, alleging pre-charge delay and lost evidence prejudiced her right to a fair trial.

The court found no evidence of egregious Crown conduct or bad faith.

It determined that Ms. Blake failed to prove actual prejudice, as the lost evidence (cell phone communications, business documentation, and an initial police statement from Mr. Ocran) did not prevent her from presenting a defence, even if it made it more difficult.

The court also noted that some evidence was never in state possession and that police are not obligated to pursue specific defence-directed investigations.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

During a criminal trial for fraud, the accused, Claire Graham and Roslyn Blake, moved for a mistrial and the discharge of two jurors (Juror 1 and Juror 4) due to alleged misconduct involving outside research.

The Crown opposed the motion.

The court found that while Jurors 1 and 4 technically breached instructions by researching the lawyers involved, their conduct was not egregious enough to compromise trial fairness or cause actual prejudice.

The court distinguished their actions from a previously discharged juror (Juror 12) who had researched an accused and was found to be less than candid.

The requests for discharge and a mistrial were dismissed, with the court determining that a strong mid-trial instruction to the jury was the appropriate remedy.

The defendant, Tal Singh Fermah, was convicted of possession of a restricted firearm with ammunition, possession of 111 grams of heroin for trafficking, and simple possession of 1.4 grams of heroin.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7 years, but credited the defendant with 7 years for time served due to the "excruciatingly difficult" and "unacceptable" conditions of his pre-trial custody at the Toronto South Detention Centre.

These conditions included frequent lockdowns, failure to administer prescribed medications on time, neglect of serious medical issues, and repeated unsafe bunk assignments despite a seizure disorder.

The court found the institution's conduct "shocking and appalling" and "unconscionable."

The applicants sought a stay of fraud charges due to the loss of a video-taped complainant statement, arguing a breach of their Charter rights to full answer and defence.

The court found the Crown breached section 7 of the Charter due to unacceptable police negligence in preserving the evidence, as a clear policy for making copies was not followed and no explanation was provided for the loss.

However, the court determined that the applicants failed to demonstrate substantial or material prejudice, or an inability to put forward their defence, given the availability of other extensive disclosure.

Consequently, the application for a stay was dismissed, but the court deemed an adverse inference instruction to the jury appropriate as a lesser remedy.