Samuel Greene

The applicant, Deepan Budlakoti, sought an order under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for the appointment of counsel to represent him on his appeal of two habeas corpus orders dismissed by the Superior Court.

The habeas corpus applications concerned his conditions of detention (meal program, internet/phone access, professional visits, yard time, medication, documents).

The Court of Appeal found it had jurisdiction on a narrow technical basis because the initial applications were filed under the Criminal Proceedings Rules.

However, the court dismissed the application for appointed counsel, concluding that there was no arguable ground of appeal as the alleged grievances did not amount to an unlawful deprivation of liberty or a more restrictive form of confinement, nor was Charter relief explicitly sought at the initial stage.

This appeal was brought by George Peters.

Due to the appellant's death, the appeal was dismissed as abated on consent of the parties.

The applicant applied for bail pending appeal pursuant to s. 679 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant had previously been convicted and his appeal was dismissed, but he subsequently applied to re-open his appeal against conviction to adduce fresh evidence.

Because the formal order dismissing the appeal had not been entered, the court was not functus officio and permitted the application to re-open to proceed.

The motion judge held that the original notice of appeal remained operative, granting jurisdiction under s. 679(1)(a) to consider and grant the applicant's request for bail.

The applicant, who was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference, brought motions for bail pending appeal and for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code.

The bail application was adjourned to allow the applicant's counsel to review newly disclosed information regarding the applicant's refugee status.

The motion for the appointment of counsel was granted, as the applicant's limited English skills and the presence of an arguable ground of appeal regarding uneven scrutiny of evidence made it desirable in the interests of justice to appoint counsel.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the motion judge erred in dismissing his section 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The appellant contended the judge improperly attributed delay to his indecision over retaining private counsel versus Legal Aid, and erred in finding exceptional circumstances due to interpreter issues requiring multiple audits.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault after randomly attacking and raping a stranger walking home at night.

He was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge misapplied Gladue principles by finding his Indigenous heritage moot due to the severity of the offence, and failed to apply principles of proportionality and restraint.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge erred in his Gladue analysis, the 12-year sentence remained fit given the egregious nature of the random attack and the need to prioritize denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and breaches of probation, as well as his 40-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge unevenly scrutinized his credibility compared to the complainant cab driver, and that the sentencing judge failed to apply the jump principle and give appropriate weight to his rehabilitation efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility findings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the increased violence of the robbery justified the sentence and the judge properly considered the appellant's rehabilitation efforts, except the victim surcharge was set aside.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for theft and failure to comply with probation, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition continuing his detention in a secure forensic unit.

He argued the Board erred in finding he represented a significant risk to public safety and sought an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the record amply supported the Board's conclusion given the appellant's serious acquired brain injury, psychiatric issues, and history of violence and aggression.

The appellant appealed his sentence of six years, less credit for pre-sentence custody, received after convictions for impaired driving, dangerous driving, failing to stop while pursued by police, and driving while disqualified.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to fully apply Gladue principles when considering his criminal record, suggesting previous sentences established an artificially high baseline.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the sentence, noting the trial judge carefully reviewed the Gladue report, considered systemic factors, and that the "step up" principle was not applied.

The paramount consideration was the protection of other road users.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of setting aside the victim surcharge; in all other respects, it was dismissed.