Samuel Greene

The appellant, licensed for medical marijuana, was arrested after an officer, ignorant of the relevant regulations, disbelieved his medical card.

A search incident to arrest yielded a handgun and cocaine.

The appellant sought to exclude this evidence under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found that the officer's belief was objectively unreasonable, leading to Charter violations.

However, applying the s. 24(2) Grant analysis, the court determined that despite the institutional and individual police failings, the seriousness of the conduct was at the less serious end of the spectrum.

Given the appellant's reduced expectation of privacy in the vehicle and the high reliability and importance of the evidence (gun and drugs), its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal against conviction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and wearing a disguise with intent, and his four-year sentence.

The primary issue was the reliability of identification evidence provided by the appellant's sister, who recognized him from surveillance videos.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the identification evidence, noting the judge's careful analysis and caution regarding frailties.

The court also rejected the admission of fresh evidence and found the sentence to be fit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, David Kaczmarek and Terrell Sullivan, appealed their convictions for sexual assault and Mr. Sullivan also appealed his sentence.

The trial judge had found the complainant lacked the capacity to consent due to extreme intoxication and did not agree to the sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of incapacity, rejecting arguments that the judge erred in the order of findings, equated lack of memory with incapacity, or reversed the burden of proof.

Mr. Kaczmarek's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging his counsel prevented him from testifying, was also dismissed, as the court found counsel's advice was sound and the decision not to testify was ultimately Mr. Kaczmarek's.

Mr. Sullivan's sentence appeal was dismissed, with the court affirming that continuing sexual activity after consent is withdrawn is not less morally blameworthy than engaging in sexual activity with someone who never consented or lacked capacity.

The Crown brought a motion for directions seeking a declaration that a co-accused, Jason Hamilton, had waived solicitor-client privilege over communications with his trial counsel regarding the accuracy and creation of an Agreed Statement of Facts.

Hamilton and the appellant, Haldane Smithen-Davis, were convicted based on this statement, and Smithen-Davis sought to reopen his appeal, relying on Hamilton's affidavit which challenged the statement's veracity and his counsel's advice.

Despite Smithen-Davis waiving his privilege, Hamilton refused.

The Court of Appeal found that Hamilton's partial and selective disclosure in his affidavit, and his reliance on it to explain his actions, constituted an implied waiver of privilege due to fairness.

The court ordered that Hamilton had waived privilege regarding the Agreed Statement of Fact's accuracy and origin, and directed cross-examination on these issues.

The appellant sought leave to appeal an eight-year total sentence for impaired driving causing death, criminal negligence causing death, and failing to comply with probation.

The appeal raised issues regarding credit for pre-trial incarceration conditions, house arrest bail, and the application of the parity principle compared to a co-accused.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's sentencing, particularly given the appellant's impairment, criminal record, and probation status, which justified a higher sentence than his co-accused.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against two young sisters.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for third-party records from the Children's Aid Society (CAS) and in making credibility determinations.

He also sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding that the CAS records were likely relevant to credibility and motive to fabricate and should have been reviewed by the trial judge.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The Crown sought leave to appeal two sentences imposed on the respondent for failing to remain at the scene of an accident and firearms offences, arguing that the first sentencing judge erred in calculating pretrial custody credit, which impacted the subsequent sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave for both appeals.

For the first sentence (Marshall #1), the Court found the trial judge erred by departing from an agreed-upon "Duncan" credit and by "double counting" mitigating factors, varying the pretrial custody credit from 39 days to 107 days, but not altering the suspended sentence.

For the second sentence (Marshall #2), the Court dismissed the Crown's appeal, upholding the suspended sentence, finding that the trial judge was entitled to give substantial credit for guilty pleas given the unique circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on the justice system.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard two motions arising from two notices of appeal filed by the appellant, Deepan Budlakoti.

The Crown sought to quash a 'Charter Appeal' concerning a pre-trial application dismissal, arguing it was an interlocutory order without a right of appeal.

Mr. Budlakoti sought reconsideration of a decision refusing his application for appointment of counsel for his 'Habeas Appeal' challenging detention conditions.

The court granted the Crown's motion, quashing the Charter Appeal as an interlocutory criminal appeal.

Mr. Budlakoti's motion for counsel was dismissed, as the court agreed there was no arguable ground of appeal for the Habeas Appeal.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for sexual assault, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering his continued detention.

The primary issue was whether he should be transferred to a less secure facility.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board applied the correct legal standard of "least onerous and least restrictive" and that its decision, based on the assessment of expert evidence regarding the appellant's readiness for transfer, was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the continued detention.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and common assault, and the imposed sentence of 45 days intermittent and two years' probation.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility and reliability, the application of the R. v. W.(D.) principles, and the consistency of the verdict.

The sentence appeal argued for restraint and a reduction due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings on credibility or the proper application of W.(D.), and upheld the sentence as appropriate and within range.

The applicant, Deepan Budlakoti, sought an order under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for the appointment of counsel to represent him on his appeal of two habeas corpus orders dismissed by the Superior Court.

The habeas corpus applications concerned his conditions of detention (meal program, internet/phone access, professional visits, yard time, medication, documents).

The Court of Appeal found it had jurisdiction on a narrow technical basis because the initial applications were filed under the Criminal Proceedings Rules.

However, the court dismissed the application for appointed counsel, concluding that there was no arguable ground of appeal as the alleged grievances did not amount to an unlawful deprivation of liberty or a more restrictive form of confinement, nor was Charter relief explicitly sought at the initial stage.

This appeal was brought by George Peters.

Due to the appellant's death, the appeal was dismissed as abated on consent of the parties.

The appellant appealed his sentence of six years, less credit for pre-sentence custody, received after convictions for impaired driving, dangerous driving, failing to stop while pursued by police, and driving while disqualified.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to fully apply Gladue principles when considering his criminal record, suggesting previous sentences established an artificially high baseline.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the sentence, noting the trial judge carefully reviewed the Gladue report, considered systemic factors, and that the "step up" principle was not applied.

The paramount consideration was the protection of other road users.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of setting aside the victim surcharge; in all other respects, it was dismissed.