Randall Vincent Johns

The applicant brought two motions: (1) seeking interim injunctive relief including orders to restrain respondents from acting as directors, restricting access to corporate bank accounts, preserving corporate records, freezing personal assets, granting administrator-level access to corporate systems, and obtaining a Norwich order for bank records; and (2) seeking leave to commence a derivative action under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The motions arose from an oppression remedy application concerning a cannabis retail business.

The court dismissed both motions, finding the applicant failed to establish a prima facie case of fraud or misappropriation, did not demonstrate irreparable harm, and failed to satisfy the balance of convenience test.

The court converted the application to an action and imposed a litigation timetable.

The Plaintiff brought a motion to strike portions of the Defendant's Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, arguing they disclosed no reasonable cause of action (Rule 21.01(1)(b)) or were scandalous, frivolous, and/or vexatious (Rule 25.11(b)).

The Defendant sought leave to amend its pleading to incorporate an abuse of process claim.

The court found that the Defendant failed to properly plead the essential elements of the tort of abuse of process, specifically lacking special damages.

As a result, the Plaintiff's motion to strike certain paragraphs, including a claim for punitive damages based on abuse of process, was granted, and the Defendant's proposed amendments related to the abuse of process claim were denied.

The Plaintiff was deemed the successful party on the motions and entitled to costs.

The defendant, Melissa Harrison, moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's construction lien claim against her personally.

The plaintiff alleged an oral contract for construction services was made exclusively with Harrison.

Harrison argued the contract was with her corporation, 2427087 Ontario Inc. The court found that based on the objective evidence, including a confidentiality agreement and correspondence, the plaintiff was on notice that it was dealing with a corporate entity.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the claim against Harrison personally.

The applicant, a not-for-profit corporation providing short-term accommodation and transportation to First Nations individuals accessing medical services, sought an exemption from municipal taxation under s 3(1)-12 of the Assessment Act.

The applicant argued it was organized for the relief of the poor because its clients are overwhelmingly poor.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's primary purpose was to address problems of geography and access to medical services, not the relief of poverty.

Applicants sought a declaration under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 that the respondents had effectively resigned as attorneys for property and personal care under powers of attorney granted by the grantor.

The respondents had signed a resignation notice stating that the resignation would become effective when delivered to the grantor and her five children, but the notice was not delivered to all of them.

The court considered the statutory framework governing resignation of attorneys under ss. 11 and 52 of the Act and the evidence regarding whether the attorneys had acted under the powers.

The court held that, regardless of statutory conditions, the respondents imposed their own express condition in the resignation document requiring delivery to all five children.

Because that condition was not satisfied, the resignation was ineffective.

The applicant brought a motion to strike the respondent’s statement of claim under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and an application under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act seeking a declaration that the respondent was a vexatious litigant.

The respondent had commenced a civil action asserting that he was a separate legal entity from the person involved in ongoing family proceedings and sought declarations granting him superior title and possession of his children.

The court held that the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, duplicated issues already before the family court, and constituted an abuse of process.

After reviewing the respondent’s extensive litigation history and repeated disregard of court orders, the court found that he persistently commenced meritless proceedings and conducted litigation in a vexatious manner.

The action was struck and the respondent was declared a vexatious litigant prohibited from commencing further proceedings without leave of the court.

The applicant proceeded by way of an uncontested family law trial seeking divorce, spousal support, child support for an adult child, equalization of net family property, and sale of the matrimonial home.

The court attributed annual income of $125,000 to the respondent based on partial financial disclosure.

The court held that the parties’ adult child, who struggled with drug addiction, was not a “child of the marriage” within the meaning of the Divorce Act because the evidence did not establish that his condition prevented him from withdrawing from parental charge or obtaining the necessaries of life.

Spousal support was awarded at $2,313 per month retroactive to October 2011, and equalization of $124,622.50 was ordered through division of the respondent’s pension.

The matrimonial home was ordered sold with the respondent’s share charged for spousal support arrears.

The applicant brought an uncontested motion to change seeking termination of existing child and spousal support orders made following divorce.

The court reviewed the parties’ financial circumstances, including the respondent’s unemployment following the collapse of the family business and his reliance on RRSP withdrawals while retraining for new employment.

The court held that one adult child remained a "child of the marriage" due to mental health difficulties and ongoing dependency.

Spousal support and child support obligations were not terminated but were reduced to nominal amounts given the respondent’s limited present income, while support for another adult child was terminated.