Gerald J. Chan

The offenders were found guilty of fraud over $5,000 relating to syndicated mortgage loans for two construction projects, resulting in a loss of over $24.4 million to nearly 800 investors.

The court found the magnitude, complexity, and duration of the fraud to be significant aggravating factors, while the offenders' lack of prior records and community support were mitigating.

Emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation for large-scale commercial fraud, the court sentenced each offender to 5 years in penitentiary, a $12.2 million fine in lieu of forfeiture, and a 10-year prohibition order.

This decision concerns the continuation of refusals motions in complex insurance litigation involving environmental claims at 26 mining sites operated by Vale Canada Limited.

The court addresses the proportionality and sufficiency of discovery efforts, the organization and resolution of thousands of discovery refusals, and sets out directions for further production and inquiry.

The ruling emphasizes the need for balance and proportionality in discovery, especially in large-scale litigation, and provides a framework for resolving outstanding discovery disputes ahead of trial.

This decision concerns the conviction of Jawad Rathore and Vince Petrozza for Fraud Over $5,000 under section 380 of the Criminal Code related to syndicated mortgage loans raised through their organization, Fortress.

The Court found that Rathore and Petrozza intentionally misled investors by misrepresenting the value of the security backing the loans, using inflated and misleading appraisals to calculate loan-to-value ratios, thereby deceiving investors about the actual security of their investments.

The Crown's theory of non-disclosure of upfront fees was rejected, as fees were paid by the borrower and not the lenders, and no obligation to disclose them to investors was found.

The Court emphasized the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and relied on documentary evidence to assess credibility and reliability.

The accused were found guilty based on the misrepresentations of value that created a risk of deprivation to investors.

Jacob Hoggard appealed his conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm to J.B., arguing the trial judge erred by admitting expert evidence on the neurobiology of trauma, failing to correct the Crown's closing submissions, delivering an unbalanced jury charge, and improperly admitting discreditable conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in admitting the expert testimony as it was not necessary and risked misuse, but applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred due to the trial judge's effective corrective instructions.

The other grounds of appeal were dismissed, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a Markham city councillor, appealed the dismissal of her anti-SLAPP motion (pursuant to s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act) against an action brought by a developer.

The developer's action alleged defamation and other torts arising from the councillor's opposition to a development and her report to the police regarding an incident with the developer.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by adopting an overly narrow interpretation of "expression relating to a matter of public interest" and by conflating the stages of the s. 137.1 test.

The Court clarified that reporting concerns to the police and a city councillor's actions related to their public duties are matters of public interest, warranting a broad interpretation at the initial stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to a different judge to consider the second stage of the s. 137.1 test.

This is a sentence appeal from a conviction for manslaughter.

The appellant challenged his 8.5-year sentence on two grounds: the trial judge's treatment of his pre-trial offer to plead guilty to manslaughter, and the consideration of his pre-trial in-custody misconduct as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by characterizing the defence as an attempt to mislead and by treating post-offence misconduct as an aggravating factor rather than negating a mitigating one.

However, the Court concluded that these errors had no practical impact on the overall sentence, which was deemed fit given the appellant's participation in an armed home invasion with knowledge of firearm use.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Leonidas Economopoulos, appealed his convictions for drug offences and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing that the affidavit used to obtain a search warrant for his home and car was insufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

The trial judge had found the affidavit sufficient, despite noted deficiencies, to conclude there were reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, deferring to his review and agreeing that the affidavit met the legal test for ex parte authorizations, as articulated in R. v. Araujo.

The Court also rejected the argument that the trial judge improperly used cross-examination evidence to amplify the grounds for identification.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Michael Davani, appealed his conviction for murder, raising three grounds: improper cross-examination on prior discreditable conduct by co-accused's counsel, unfairness due to the trial judge's criticism and interjections, and an unbalanced jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Pollock principles regarding bad character evidence, no inappropriate or excessive judicial interventions, and that the jury charge was fair and balanced when read as a whole.

The appellant, a truck driver, appealed his convictions for importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking, following a retrial.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, with the central issue being the appellant's knowledge of the drugs found in his trailer.

The trial judge, sitting alone, rejected the appellant's testimony and concluded that knowledge was the only reasonable inference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict reasonable, the trial judge's application of circumstantial evidence principles correct (including considering inferences from lack of evidence), and no material misapprehension of evidence that led to a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant, Brian Lariviere, appealed a 12-month imprisonment sentence for aggravated assault, use of an imitation firearm, breach of recognizance, and fentanyl possession, after receiving credit for pre-sentence custody and stringent bail conditions.

The appeal sought a reduction in sentence due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on detention conditions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding the original sentence fit and that general pandemic conditions, without unique personal vulnerability, did not justify a sentence reduction.

This is a criminal appeal concerning convictions for possession of child pornography, making child pornography, and sexual assault.

The appellant argued that police breached his Charter rights (ss. 8 and 10(b)) through delayed access to counsel, an unlawful strip search, an unauthorized bedpan vigil, unlawful detention, a warrantless apartment entry, and invalid search warrants for electronic devices.

The Court of Appeal found multiple serious Charter breaches, including a reckless disregard for fundamental constitutional rights and significant impact on privacy interests (body, home, devices).

The court re-evaluated the s. 24(2) Grant analysis, concluding that the evidence obtained through these breaches should have been excluded.

The trial judge's attempt to sever the breaches and stay lesser charges was deemed an error in principle, as the police conduct tainted all evidence.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and acquittals entered.

X.C., charged with sexual assault, sought directions on whether he needed to bring a s. 278.93 application under the Criminal Code to adduce WeChat text messages with the complainant, D.Z., at trial, and on the timing of any such application.

The court analyzed the Bill C-51 amendments to ss. 276, 278.1, and 278.92, distinguishing between messages with and without sexual content, and assessing the complainant's reasonable expectation of privacy.

The court ruled that some non-sexual messages and messages discussing past sexual activity directly related to the charge did not require pre-screening.

For other sexual messages, pre-screening was required, but the application could be brought mid-trial after the complainant's testimony, to protect the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of sexual interference contrary to s. 151(b) of the Criminal Code.

The offence involved sexual touching and fellatio with a 14-year-old complainant when the accused was 20 years old.

The conduct occurred between September 2017 and October 2017 at a church where both parties attended.

The court imposed a six-month conditional sentence with an initial three-month period of virtual house arrest, followed by probation.

The sentencing decision balanced the serious nature of the offence and the need for denunciation and general deterrence against significant mitigating factors including the accused's youth, lack of criminal record, genuine remorse, successful completion of counselling, and low risk of reoffence.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from a trial judgment entered by Justice Peter Bawden of the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant raised concerns about the trial judge's credibility findings in the Notice of Appeal but did not advance these submissions orally.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment.

The appellant also expressed regret about not testifying at trial, but this concern was not raised in the Notice of Appeal and the Court found no basis for appellate intervention.

On the sentence appeal, duty counsel advanced two arguments alleging errors in the reasons for sentence, both of which were rejected by the Court of Appeal.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash a preliminary hearing decision committing him for trial on first-degree murder.

The defence conceded sufficient evidence for second-degree murder and interfering with human remains, but argued no evidence supported first-degree murder.

The Crown contended the murder occurred during a sexual assault or forcible confinement, relying on s. 231(5)(b) and (e) of the Criminal Code.

The court, reviewing the preliminary hearing judge's decision for jurisdictional error, found that a reasonable jury could infer a sexual assault in the elevator and that the murder was part of a continuous transaction with the sexual assault or forcible confinement, based on the short timeframe and the victim's cell phone activity.

The application for certiorari was dismissed, and the accused was ordered to stand trial for first-degree murder.

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography and appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the police search of the appellant's computer was reasonable and not unreasonably invasive under section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that where child pornography has been located on a computer during initial examination, it is reasonable for police to examine all images and videos on the computer, as well as Internet search history, to identify further material and determine who was responsible.

The court also found that the mandatory minimum six-month sentence for possession of child pornography was grossly disproportionate in reasonable hypothetical circumstances and violated section 12 of the Charter.

However, the court upheld the ten-month sentence imposed by the trial judge as fit and proportionate, given the serious nature of the offence and the appellant's collection of 89 unique videos and 50 unique images of extreme child pornography.

The appellant was charged with operating a taxicab without a valid licence contrary to the City of Oshawa Taxicab Licensing By-law.

The appellant was detected through an undercover operation where a municipal officer used the Uber app to request a ride.

The appellant accepted the ride request and arrived at the pickup location but was detained before any passenger entered the vehicle.

At trial, the appellant argued that no completed trip occurred and therefore no "operation" of an illegal taxicab had been proven.

The trial justice convicted based on findings that the appellant accepted the Uber ride request, arrived at the pickup location, and paid a cancellation fee, constituting evidence of hiring himself out for conveyance.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the interpretation of "conveyance" and "for hire" under the by-law.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed both his conviction for sexual assault and his sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant argued that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence of the appellant and the complainant.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that the trial judge's reasons must be construed as a whole and that the Crown's case had great strength based on eyewitness and technical evidence, including blood alcohol content corroborating that the complainant was incapacitated.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the sentence was not unfit given the gravity of the offence.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice on December 21, 2017.

The sentencing judge had refused to grant credit for pre-sentence custody on more than a one-for-one basis due to the appellant's breaches of no contact provisions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the sentencing judge did not have the benefit of R. v. Plante and fresh evidence showing good behaviour in custody.

The court granted an additional 1.5:1 credit of 43 days for pre-sentence custody based on parity of treatment principles.

The appellant appealed a sentence of concurrent 12-month sentences followed by three years probation imposed for two counts of breaching court orders forbidding contact with the complainant.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred in principle by misapprehending evidence regarding threats.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence and upheld the sentence, noting the appellant's history of five previous breach convictions, his failure to be deterred by earlier sentences, and the devastating impact on the victim.