Christopher Edward Clermont

The applicant brought an urgent motion seeking an order for their incapacitated 86-year-old mother to move into a memory care suite at a retirement residence, while one respondent advocated for a long-term care facility.

The court found no urgency and, to resolve the impasse between the siblings acting as powers of attorney, appointed the respondent who had primarily cared for the mother as the sole power of attorney for personal care regarding the mother's placement.

Additionally, the court ordered the sale of the mother's home, appointing the applicant as the sole power of attorney for property for the sale, subject to agreement on terms and disposal of personal property.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike paragraphs of the statement of claim, arguing they were irrelevant, scandalous, or an abuse of process.

The challenged paragraphs pleaded that the plaintiff's sole director, Mr. Syed, suffered from bipolar disorder and was incapable of managing his affairs when an agreement of purchase and sale (APS) was signed.

The court granted leave for the plaintiff to amend the claim to plead that the defendant knew or ought to have known of Mr. Syed's mental incapacity and to describe him as the "directing mind" of the corporation.

However, the court limited the scope of mental health evidence to the relevant period of the transaction.

The motion to strike was partially granted with leave to amend, and partially dismissed, as the court found the law on corporate mental incapacity in contract was not sufficiently clear to strike the pleadings entirely.

The moving defendants, an elderly couple, brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained against them four years prior.

They discovered the judgment when attempting to refinance their home and faced potential mortgage enforcement proceedings.

The defendants denied being served with the statement of claim and provided an arguable defence, asserting that a signature on a dishonoured cheque was forged.

The court found the defendants moved reasonably promptly given the COVID-19 pandemic, provided a plausible explanation for the default, and raised an arguable defence.

The court set aside the default judgment, emphasizing the preference for determining disputes on their merits, and awarded the plaintiffs $1,500 in costs thrown away.

The plaintiff, a former probationary employee of the defendant, sued for negligence and breach of a duty of good faith after the defendant failed to fully complete a verification of experience form required for the plaintiff to obtain a nursing license in the Northwest Territories.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the motion, finding that the employment contract had been terminated during the probationary period and there was no recognized duty of care requiring a former employer to provide a reference or complete such forms.

The statement of claim was struck with leave to amend.

Vendors brought a motion for summary judgment after purchasers repudiated an agreement of purchase and sale for residential property.

The court addressed disputed heads of damages including bridge financing, cleaning and painting costs, and calculation of loss of bargain.

Bridge financing incurred to complete the purchase of a replacement residence was reasonably foreseeable and recoverable, while cleaning and painting expenses were not recoverable because they would have been incurred regardless of the breach.

Loss of bargain damages were calculated based on the difference between the net proceeds of the original aborted sale and the eventual resale.

Costs were not awarded as success was divided.

The plaintiff bank brought a summary judgment motion against a corporate borrower and its principals following default on credit facilities.

The corporate defendant did not dispute the indebtedness.

The primary issue was whether the individual defendants were personally liable under a forbearance agreement after prior guarantees were released.

The court interpreted the commercial contract as a whole and concluded that the individuals were jointly liable for the monthly forbearance fee and for failing to convey assigned tax credits, as expressly contemplated by the agreement.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the bank against both the corporation and the individual defendants.

The appellant contracted with the respondent for the installation of a high-efficiency gas furnace and air-conditioning unit.

Dissatisfied with the location of the ductwork and other elements, the appellant refused to pay the balance owing.

The respondent successfully sued in Small Claims Court for the unpaid balance.

The appellant appealed to the Divisional Court.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no substantial error by the trial judge, noting that the appellant had left the specific location of the materials to the professionals and the contract made no specific provision for it.

The appellant challenged a trial judgment in a contract dispute concerning whether the agreement was for copying work or for design services.

The Court of Appeal held the matter was fact driven and found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings.

There was evidence to support the finding that the contract was to copy and not to design, and the remainder of the disposition followed from that conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.