Christopher Edward Clermont

The applicant brought an urgent motion seeking an order for their incapacitated 86-year-old mother to move into a memory care suite at a retirement residence, while one respondent advocated for a long-term care facility.

The court found no urgency and, to resolve the impasse between the siblings acting as powers of attorney, appointed the respondent who had primarily cared for the mother as the sole power of attorney for personal care regarding the mother's placement.

Additionally, the court ordered the sale of the mother's home, appointing the applicant as the sole power of attorney for property for the sale, subject to agreement on terms and disposal of personal property.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike paragraphs of the statement of claim, arguing they were irrelevant, scandalous, or an abuse of process.

The challenged paragraphs pleaded that the plaintiff's sole director, Mr. Syed, suffered from bipolar disorder and was incapable of managing his affairs when an agreement of purchase and sale (APS) was signed.

The court granted leave for the plaintiff to amend the claim to plead that the defendant knew or ought to have known of Mr. Syed's mental incapacity and to describe him as the "directing mind" of the corporation.

However, the court limited the scope of mental health evidence to the relevant period of the transaction.

The motion to strike was partially granted with leave to amend, and partially dismissed, as the court found the law on corporate mental incapacity in contract was not sufficiently clear to strike the pleadings entirely.

Vendors brought a motion for summary judgment after purchasers repudiated an agreement of purchase and sale for residential property.

The court addressed disputed heads of damages including bridge financing, cleaning and painting costs, and calculation of loss of bargain.

Bridge financing incurred to complete the purchase of a replacement residence was reasonably foreseeable and recoverable, while cleaning and painting expenses were not recoverable because they would have been incurred regardless of the breach.

Loss of bargain damages were calculated based on the difference between the net proceeds of the original aborted sale and the eventual resale.

Costs were not awarded as success was divided.

The plaintiff bank brought a summary judgment motion against a corporate borrower and its principals following default on credit facilities.

The corporate defendant did not dispute the indebtedness.

The primary issue was whether the individual defendants were personally liable under a forbearance agreement after prior guarantees were released.

The court interpreted the commercial contract as a whole and concluded that the individuals were jointly liable for the monthly forbearance fee and for failing to convey assigned tax credits, as expressly contemplated by the agreement.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the bank against both the corporation and the individual defendants.