Douglas M. Belch

An incarcerated dangerous offender sought habeas corpus with certiorari seeking unconditional release, arguing his continued detention violated ss. 7, 9, and 12 of the Charter after completing treatment programs and serving more than a decade in custody.

The applicant asserted the parole system relied excessively on static risk factors and that only habeas corpus could provide unconditional release.

The respondents argued that the Corrections and Conditional Release Act establishes a comprehensive statutory review scheme through the Parole Board and federal courts.

The court held that where such a comprehensive expert scheme exists, a provincial superior court should decline habeas corpus jurisdiction.

In any event, the applicant’s indeterminate sentence remained lawful and constitutionally valid.

The defendant brought a motion seeking removal of the plaintiff’s counsel as solicitor of record on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest and risk to solicitor‑client privilege.

The motion relied on the fact that the plaintiff’s counsel maintained offices in the same building as another lawyer who had previously represented the defendant in an unrelated real estate transaction.

The court applied the principles from MacDonald Estate v. Martin regarding protection of confidential information and the competing values of maintaining professional integrity and preserving a litigant’s choice of counsel.

The evidence established that the two lawyers operated entirely separate practices with independent systems, staff, and files, and had not shared confidential information.

The motion was dismissed and the matter was ordered into case management due to the defendant now being self‑represented.

Vendors brought a motion for summary judgment after purchasers repudiated an agreement of purchase and sale for residential property.

The court addressed disputed heads of damages including bridge financing, cleaning and painting costs, and calculation of loss of bargain.

Bridge financing incurred to complete the purchase of a replacement residence was reasonably foreseeable and recoverable, while cleaning and painting expenses were not recoverable because they would have been incurred regardless of the breach.

Loss of bargain damages were calculated based on the difference between the net proceeds of the original aborted sale and the eventual resale.

Costs were not awarded as success was divided.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a personal injury action arising from a single-vehicle accident on a county road.

The municipality argued the claim was barred under s. 44(10) of the Municipal Act because the plaintiffs failed to provide written notice of the claim within ten days of the accident and that the delay prejudiced its ability to investigate the roadway conditions.

The plaintiffs argued there was a reasonable excuse for the failure to give timely notice due to the driver’s severe injuries and hospitalization, and that discoverability delayed awareness of the material facts underlying the claim.

The court held that the plaintiff’s medical condition constituted a reasonable excuse and that issues relating to discoverability, alleged roadway design deficiencies, and potential prejudice to the municipality raised genuine issues requiring trial.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to vary a consent order for child and spousal support.

The motions judge had found no material change in circumstances, noting the appellant was deliberately underemployed and maintained a comfortable lifestyle financed by credit, despite claiming no income.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motions judge's findings of fact or application of the law.

The applicant university sought judicial review of an arbitration award that granted a former employee sick leave benefits for a period after his fixed-term employment contract had expired.

The arbitrator found that the employee's entitlement to the benefits had vested while he was still employed, bridging the gap to his long-term disability benefits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the standard of review was reasonableness and that the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement was transparent, rational, and justified.

The mother appealed a trial judge's decision granting Crown wardship without access of her child to the Children's Aid Society.

The child was apprehended at birth due to concerns about the mother's cognitive delays and lack of parenting ability.

The mother argued she was not given adequate opportunity to learn to parent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the evidence, including psychological assessments, and correctly concluded that the mother lacked the ability to acquire and convert parenting information practically, even with assistance.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order permitting the plaintiff to video-record a defence psychiatric examination.

The motions judge had allowed the recording because the defence doctor refused to allow the plaintiff to take notes or record the examination.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decision under Rule 62.02(4)(a) and that the matter was not of general importance under Rule 62.02(4)(b), as the Court of Appeal had already established the legal principles in Bellamy v. Johnson.

The moving party father sought an extension of time to serve and file a Notice of Appeal from a trial decision granting Crown wardship without access.

The father missed the 30-day deadline under Rule 38 of the Family Law Rules but had expressed his intention to appeal shortly after the judgment.

The court applied the factors for extending time, finding the 30-day delay was not excessive, the intention to appeal was clear, and there was insufficient prejudice to the child's adoption prospects to deny the extension.

The motion for an extension of time was granted.