David Michael Aaron

The plaintiff, a federal penitentiary warden, commenced a civil action against a subordinate employee for defamation and harassment.

The defendant moved to strike the claim, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction under section 236 of the Federal Public Service Labour Relations Act because the matter was a workplace dispute subject to the statutory grievance process.

The motion judge allowed the action to proceed against the individual defendant and added the Attorney General as a party.

On appeal, the Divisional Court reversed the decision, holding that the broad scope of the grievance process ousted the court's jurisdiction over both the Crown and the individual employee.

The appeal was granted and the action dismissed.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a lower court order.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, with costs of the leave motion to be determined by the hearing panel.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen convicted of drug smuggling in Japan, was transferred to Canada to serve the remainder of his sentence under the International Transfer of Offenders Act.

His 13-year Japanese sentence was adapted to the Canadian maximum of 10 years.

The appellant brought a habeas corpus application, arguing that 400 days spent in a Japanese workhouse in lieu of paying a fine should be credited toward his Canadian custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the fine and imprisonment were separate elements of the Japanese sentence, and the workhouse days were served solely to purge the fine, not on account of the penal sentence.

A federal inmate applied for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid challenging an involuntary transfer from a medium security institution to a high security institution following discovery of a sharpened knife in the inmate’s shoe.

The applicant argued the warden’s decision was unreasonable under the standard articulated in Mission Institution v. Khela because a member of the case management team believed the inmate’s explanation that he was unaware of the weapon.

The court held the warden was the statutory decision-maker and that the transfer decision fell within the range of reasonable outcomes based on the safety risks posed by possession of a weapon in a correctional facility.

The existence of a differing opinion among staff did not render the decision unreasonable.

The habeas corpus application was dismissed.

An inmate serving a life sentence applied for habeas corpus challenging his continued detention in a medium-security institution following a settlement that required his transfer from a maximum-security institution to a medium-security federal penitentiary in Ontario.

The applicant argued that transfer to a particular medium-security facility imposed more restrictive housing conditions and therefore constituted a deprivation of liberty.

The court held that the move from maximum to medium security increased, rather than reduced, the applicant’s liberty and therefore did not establish the deprivation required for habeas corpus.

The court further found that the transfer complied with the parties’ settlement terms and that the correctional authorities retained discretion to determine the specific institution.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant brought a habeas corpus application alleging that federal correctional authorities had miscalculated his sentence following his transfer from Japan to Canada under the International Transfer of Offenders Act.

He argued that 400 days spent in a Japanese prison workhouse for failure to pay a fine should count toward his custodial sentence and that additional credit should be granted for pre-sentence custody.

The court held that Canada must respect the legal nature and duration of the foreign sentence under the continued enforcement method in the Act.

The Japanese court had treated the workhouse detention as serving the fine sentence, not the custodial term, and had expressly determined the amount of pre-sentence credit.

Canadian authorities therefore correctly calculated the enforceable sentence as ten years less 165 days commencing February 19, 2005.

The appellant challenged Canada's assent to changes to the royal succession rules, arguing that the continued exclusion of Roman Catholics from the throne violated s. 15 of the Charter and seeking declaratory relief.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the application, holding that the succession rules form part of the constitution of Canada and cannot be amended or overridden by the Charter.

The court further held that the appellant lacked both private standing and public interest standing, and rejected the argument that standing had been admitted through a failure to respond to a notice to admit.

The appeal, including the appeal on costs, was dismissed, with appeal costs fixed at $10,000 all inclusive.

After dismissal of a constitutional application for lack of standing and non‑justiciability, the respondent sought costs of the proceeding.

The court considered the absence of Rule 49 offers and the respondent’s partial indemnity entitlement as the successful party.

The respondent incurred over $38,000 in legal costs and disbursements but sought recovery of $10,000.

The court found the request reasonable given the constitutional issues raised and the applicant’s litigation conduct, including voluminous irrelevant materials and late filings.

Costs of $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST were awarded against the applicant.

An inmate brought a habeas corpus application challenging his reclassification and transfer from a minimum security institution to a medium security institution.

He argued the correctional authorities’ decision was unreasonable and that he had not received adequate disclosure of the information relied upon.

The court reviewed the legal framework governing habeas corpus, including the requirement to show unlawful deprivation of liberty and the administrative nature of prison transfer decisions.

It concluded that even if a reasonableness standard applied, the decision to transfer was supported by information available to correctional authorities and was not arbitrary.

The court further held that procedural fairness requirements were satisfied because the inmate received sufficient information to understand the case against him.

The applicant sought declarations that the Canada Act 1982 prevents Canada from consenting to United Kingdom legislation altering the rules of succession to the Crown and that provisions barring Catholics or those married to Catholics from ascending to the Crown are of no force or effect.

The court addressed preliminary issues of justiciability and standing.

Relying on prior authority, the court held that the rules of royal succession form part of the constitutional structure of Canada as a constitutional monarchy and are not subject to Charter scrutiny.

The court further held that the applicant lacked standing because he had no personal stake and raised only a hypothetical concern.

The application was therefore dismissed.

The applicant brought an application for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid challenging a decision by the warden to reclassify him from medium to maximum security within the federal penitentiary system.

He argued that Correctional Service Canada failed to provide adequate disclosure of the case against him, thereby breaching procedural fairness under s. 27 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The court held that in the penitentiary context the duty of disclosure requires only that the inmate receive the gist of the case, not full particulars or disclosure of informer identities or investigative details.

The applicant had been informed of the essential allegations, including concerns about rehabilitation progress and communications intercepts linking him to contraband activity.

The court concluded that the disclosure met procedural fairness requirements and that the warden’s decision was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his claim against the government for alleged unfair treatment in his employment.

The appellant argued he should be considered a whistleblower.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant was not a whistleblower and that his complaints must be grieved or arbitrated under the applicable labour relations statutes, as they did not fall within the court's residual jurisdiction.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.