Financial Services Commission des

Commission services financiers

of Ontario de l’Ontario

Neutral Citation: 2015 ONFSCDRS 148

FSCO A12-000481

BETWEEN:

NAJEEB ALMOUSAWI

Applicant

and

TD GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY

Insurer

DECISION ON A MOTION FOR INTERIM BENEFITS

Before: Alan Mervin

Heard: May 20, 2014, at the offices of the Financial Services Commission of Ontario in Toronto

Written submissions were received on June 9, 2014

Appearances: Samia M. Alam for Mr. Almousawi Asma Desai for TD General Insurance Company

Issues:

The Applicant, Najeeb Almousawi, was injured in a motor vehicle accident on December 22, 2009. He applied for and received statutory accident benefits from TD General Insurance Company (“TD General”), payable under the Schedule.¹ Disputes arose concerning income replacement benefits and whether the Applicant sustained a catastrophic impairment.

The parties were unable to resolve their disputes through mediation, and Mr. Almousawi applied for arbitration at the Financial Services Commission of Ontario under the *Insurance Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8, as amended.

At the upcoming arbitration hearing, Mr. Almousawi is seeking a finding that he has suffered a catastrophic impairment, which would give him the right to access the enhanced level of benefits available to those found catastrophically impaired.

He has brought this motion pursuant to section 67 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code — Fourth Edition (the “Code”) for interim benefits to be paid to him pending the resolution of his dispute with TD General. He is seeking funding for a catastrophic rebuttal report in the amount of $15,622.45, or alternatively, in the amount of $10,500.00 plus transportation and HST on all assessments.

Issues:

The issues on this motion are:

1. Is Mr. Almousawi entitled to interim benefits pursuant to section 279(4.1) of the *Insurance Act*?

2. Is Mr. Almousawi entitled to interest on any amounts awarded as a result of this motion?

3. Is either party entitled to expenses related to this motion?

Result:

1. Mr. Almousawi is not entitled to substantive interim benefits.

2. Mr. Almousawi is entitled to interim expenses in the amount of $10,500 plus HST.

3. The issue of expenses of this motion, other than interim expenses, is deferred to the hearing arbitrator.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS:

Introduction

Mr. Almousawi, according to the Applicant’s submission, was in relatively good health physically and had no psychiatric history prior to his December 22, 2009 accident.

It is alleged that, as a result of the accident, Mr. Almousawi sustained physical injuries to his neck, back, shoulders and left knee. He required surgery to his left knee, which apparently was not successful. According to his doctors, he has since developed a major depression, with anxiety and suicidal ideations for which he has been treated with medication and counselling.

His treating doctors were of the view that Mr. Almousawi likely met the threshold for catastrophic impairment, and he submitted plans regarding funding for assessments. He submitted nine OCF 18’s in April 2012, all of which were denied by the Insurer.

In May 2012, the Insurer had a paper review completed by Dr. C.B. Paitich, who concluded that the chances were “exceedingly low” that a physical exam would lead to a finding of a whole person impairment of 55% or greater, and, further, that nine individual treatment plans as submitted by the Applicant was “excessive and unreasonable”.²

In July 2012, the Applicant completed an Application for Determination of Catastrophic Impairment (OCF 19) which was received by the Insurer in October 19, 2012, after receipt of which the Insurer scheduled catastrophic assessments by Dr. Paitich, (orthopedic surgeon who had already expressed his opinion in his earlier paper review), Dr. Lawrie Reznek (psychiatrist), Dr. Keith Meloff (neurologist), and Elyse Freedman (occupational therapist).³

Based on these multidisciplinary assessments, the reports of which were served on the Applicant on or about March 14, 2013, the Applicant was found to have a 15% whole person impairment and therefore, in the opinion of the Insurer’s assessors, did not meet the threshold for a finding of Catastrophic Impairment.

The Insurer denied funding for the catastrophic assessments requested by the Applicant, and the Applicant brought this motion to fund “rebuttal” reports.

THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES

The Applicant

The Applicant’s submissions can be summarized as follows.

The Applicant has submitted that, but for the new Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule –Effective September 1, 2010, (“the new SABS”), the Applicant would be entitled to funding of the rebuttal reports under the old *Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Accidents on or after November 1, 1996*, (“the old SABS”) because, even though the Application for CAT determination was made well after the new SABS came into force on September 1, 2010, the accident occurred on December 22, 2009.

As the accident occurred prior to the coming into force of the new SABS, the Applicant has submitted that the right for funding was a substantive right created by the Insurance contract that crystallized as of the date of the accident; as the right to reimbursement for rebuttal reports had vested at the time of the accident, the old SABS apply.

The Applicant further submits that he will suffer prejudice if he is unable to obtain funding for his own expert multidisciplinary catastrophic assessments to enable him to challenge the Insurer’s reports which were the basis of its decision to terminate benefits.

The Applicant has submitted that Dr. Paitich, the orthopedic surgeon who assessed the Applicant and prepared an orthopedic CAT report for the Insurer, failed to fully take into account the serious psychiatric aspects of the Applicant’s condition, and went beyond the scope of that which was required of him for the purposes of the catastrophic assessment.

The Applicant questions Dr. Paitich’s impartiality, and has submitted that Dr. Paitich was less than objective, in that he was unlikely to have changed his opinion from what he had expressed in his earlier paper review of the Applicant’s condition.

The Applicant further submits that to deny the Applicant funding for rebuttal reports would be procedurally unfair.

The Insurer

The Insurer’s submissions can be summarized as follows.

The Insurer submits that funding of rebuttal reports under the new SABS has been eliminated, and therefore, the Applicant is not entitled to funding of the requested rebuttal reports.⁴

The Insurer submits that entitlement to reimbursement for rebuttal reports was not a right that had vested despite the coming into force of the new SABS which eliminated that right from September 1, 2010 onwards.

It is the Insurer’s position that the OCF 19 was received over two years after the new SABS came into force, and that the Applicant had no vested right to funding of rebuttal reports, since the OCF 19 wasn’t received until well after the new SABS came into effect.

Further, even if the Applicant’s right to a rebuttal report had vested, the legislature had expressed its clear intention in the new SABS that rebuttal reports should not be funded.

The Insurer submits that a bulletin posted by Phillip Howell, Chief Executive Officer and Superintendent of Financial Services, supports its position that the old SABS do not apply, and that the Applicant is not entitled to reimbursement for rebuttal reports.

That bulletin, entitled “Transition to the New Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, Effective September 1, 2010”,⁵ stated that, “ as of September 1, 2010, as a general rule, the new SABS will govern claims processing relating to old accidents…”, and further states that, “Section 42.1 of the old SABS concerning rebuttal assessments does not apply after August 31, 2010”.⁶

The Insurer submits that the intention of the legislature is clear and that there is no ambiguity in the transitional provisions.

The Insurer further submits that, in the alternative, should I find that the old SABS apply in this case, the Applicant has not met the test for funding under the old SABS, as the Applicant has not complied with the requirements of section 42.1(3)3 of the old SABS.

That section requires that the insured person claiming catastrophic impairment (hereinafter “CAT”), complete the assessments and provide the reports to the insurer not more than 80 business days after the day the insurer gave the insured person notice of its determination as to whether he or she had sustained a catastrophic impairment. It is not disputed that the Applicant failed to meet these time requirements.

THE LAW

General Principles regarding Interim Benefits

Section 279(4.1) of the *Insurance Act*⁷ gives arbitrators the discretionary authority to make interim orders pending the final order in any matter.

In this case, I am going to assume, without deciding, that I have the authority to grant the relief sought in a case where it is appropriate to do so. There is some conflicting case law concerning the appropriate test for granting relief on an interim basis and, in particular, the appropriate test for ordering an insurer, on a motion for interim relief, to pay for the cost of a rebuttal catastrophic impairment assessment. This case, however, does not turn upon this issue. As will be seen in the reasons that follow, the Applicant is ultimately unsuccessful with respect to substantive relief in this motion for reasons unrelated to the test as to when relief ought to be granted on a motion for interim benefits. However, consideration will be given as to whether relief as an interim expense is appropriate under the circumstances.

ANALYSIS:

Right to Rebuttal Reports

Rebuttal reports are reports of assessors that respond to and critique other expert reports.

Section 42.1(3)3 of the old SABS allowed for payment of rebuttal reports by the insurer.

The new SABS has removed the right for compensation for rebuttal reports. The new SABS, however, do provide a limited means of obtaining funding for these reports at the conclusion of an arbitration hearing. The hearing arbitrator has discretion to award up to $1,500.00 as an expense (disbursement) for each report.

Rebuttal reports were regarded as an important evidentiary tool to “level the playing field” and counter the opinions of the Insurer’s assessors, who were often viewed as “hired guns”. As Arbitrator Wilson noted in R.J. and Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company,⁸ since DACs were eliminated, the final determination as to entitlement was made by the Insurer. This had the effect of limiting objectivity. Arbitrator Wilson noted that, if determinations as to eligibility were based on IE assessor’s reports, rebuttal reports made sense, in that the claimant could commission his or her own report to address the shortcomings, if any, of the insurer’s experts’ analysis; the rebuttal reports were additional evidence with which the Insurer could assess the claim.

The rebuttal reports would assist in making a fair determination and would facilitate the claims process.

It should also be noted that, while the new SABS purports to eliminate funding by Insurers of rebuttal reports, they do not eliminate the use of rebuttal reports. There is no question that, if those reports are ultimately obtained, they can be relied on in arbitration proceedings whether or not they are initially funded by the Insurer.

Do the Old SABS or the New SABS apply?

My decision, for the reasons that follow, can be summarized in this way: if the old SABS apply, the time requirements of Section 42.1(3)3 of the old SABS were not met and there is no

reasonable explanation put forth by the Applicant for non-compliance. If the new SABS apply, there is no right to funding of rebuttal reports. Either way, the Applicant is not entitled to funding of the rebuttal reports.

The Applicant cites the case of R.J., supra, in support of his motion for interim benefits.

In R.J., the factual situation was similar to the current case, in that the accident occurred prior to the passage of the new SABS and the CAT application and requests for payment were made subsequent to the amendments. Arbitrator Wilson ordered funding of the rebuttal reports notwithstanding that the request for funding was made subsequent to the coming into force of the new SABS.

Arbitrator Wilson found the expert medical evidence in RJ was flawed to the extent that in order to have a fair hearing, rebuttal reports were appropriate to answer the inaccuracies in the Insurer’s expert evidence.

In the current case, the Applicant has relied heavily on that decision in urging me to come to a similar decision; the submission is that the Insurer’s assessments have not taken into account, or ignored, important findings by the treating doctors and, as in RJ, the evidence of the treating practitioners who have followed the Applicant for some time should have more weight than the reports of the Insurer’s assessors.

In the case at bar, the Applicant has submitted a list of alleged deficiencies in the Insurer’s expert reports, in an effort to liken the situation to that found by Arbitrator Wilson in R.J. The Applicant has also submitted numerous medical reports, notes and opinions of his own doctors and health care professionals in support of his position. For the most part, those reports are in stark contrast to the opinions of the Insurer’s experts.

While it is true that in the case at bar, (as in most contested cases at FSCO) the opinions of the Insurer’s assessors are very different from those of the treating practitioners expressed in the various reports submitted by the Applicant, those differences can be fully explored at a full hearing. The hearing arbitrator will be in a better position to make a full assessment after having heard all of the evidence.

However, having said that, the Applicant has also urged me, in the alternative, to order payment of the requested reports as interim expenses, should I decide that the Applicant is not entitled to reimbursement under either the old or new SABS.

In deciding whether or not to do so, some consideration should be given in a procedural fairness context to the potential negative consequences to the Applicant of being unable to answer when these have been described by the Applicant as inaccurate, contradictory and incomplete opinions by the Insurer’s experts. This will be discussed at a later point.

In any event, I am not bound by RJ, and further, I find that RJ can be distinguished from the case at bar, as there was no mention of compliance with section 42.1(3)3 of the old SABS in that decision.

The Insurer has submitted that since the coming into force of the new SABS, the right to funding of rebuttal reports has been eliminated. It is clear that the legislature intended to eliminate funding of these reports under the new SABS, and the Applicant is therefore not entitled to funding of rebuttal reports under the new SABS, unless they are ordered as an expense under the Expense Regulation.

Much of the Applicant’s submission focused on whether the right to the funding of rebuttal reports was a substantive contractual right that had vested at the time of the accident, which took place on December 22, 2009, well before the coming into force of the new SABS.

However, even if this were so, the Applicant’s motion must fail due to the Applicant’s non-compliance with Section 42.1(3)3 of the old SABS.

Section 42.1(3)3 of the old SABS states:

If the insured person has sustained a catastrophic impairment or the examination under section 42 relates to whether the insured person has sustained a catastrophic impairment, the assessment or examination under this section is conducted and the report provided to the insurer not more than 80 business days after the day the insurer gave the insured person notice of its determination.

This section was eliminated as of September 1, 2010, when the new SABS came into force.

It is the Insurer’s position that the obligation to pay for the rebuttal reports, under the old SABS, is only triggered when, after an examination or assessment of an insured is conducted, the report is provided to the insurer not more than 80 business days after the day the insurer gave the insured person notice of its determination. It is not contested that the Applicant did not provide the reports within the required timeline.

The Insurer submits that notice was given to the Applicant that, in the opinion of its assessors, he did not meet the tests for catastrophic impairment on March 14, 2013. Under the old SABS, he was required to provide a catastrophic rebuttal report on or before June 3, 2013. The Insurer submits he has failed to do so, and is therefore not entitled to payment for the rebuttal reports under the old SABS.

Assuming for the moment that I accept the argument that the Applicant’s right to payment for a rebuttal report had vested at the time of the accident, the Applicant cannot succeed, as the Applicant clearly did not comply with the requirements of Section 42.1(3)3 of the old SABS.

In my view, in order for me to even consider granting this motion under the old SABS, it would first be necessary to find that section 42.1(3)3 of the old SABS has been complied with. In this case, non-compliance with the time requirements of section 42.1(3)3 of the old SABS has made this issue moot.

The Applicant has submitted that there have been decisions allowing funding notwithstanding non-compliance with s 42.1(3)3 of the old SABS.

In Morelli and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,⁹ the insured had been the subject of a multidisciplinary assessment, and delivery of the report of the occupational therapist to the insurer did not take place within the 80 day timeline prescribed by the section.

Arbitrator Richards found that, notwithstanding the insured’s failure to complete and forward the rebuttal assessment within the required 80 days, the insured was entitled to funding, as the insured put forward a “reasonable excuse” for non-compliance with s. 42.1(3)3.

Arbitrator Richards cited subsection 31.1 of the old SABS, which states that a person’s failure to comply with a time limit does not disentitle the person to a benefit if the person has a reasonable explanation.

In Morelli, the explanation for late delivery of the occupational therapist report was that the occupational therapist had experienced family issues and was late in delivering the report.

Morelli can be distinguished from the case at bar, as no “reasonable excuse” has been put forward in the current case.

I therefore find that the Applicant is not entitled to funding of rebuttal reports under either the old SABS or the new SABS.

Procedural Fairness

The Applicant has submitted that it would be procedurally unfair to the Applicant to deny funding of rebuttal reports in order to answer the Insurer’s experts.

Procedural fairness is a requirement in every case, no matter under which version of the SABS, a case is decided.

In my view, the Insurer has done nothing wrong in this case in refusing to fund the rebuttal reports under either the old or the new SABS.

Ensuring procedural fairness does not mean that a person is entitled to a substantive remedy or benefit to which they are not otherwise entitled.

However, in this case, the Applicant has made strong arguments in urging me to order these rebuttal reports, if not under the SABS, then as a justified interim expense.

The Applicant has submitted that it would be unfair if the Applicant was unable to answer the Insurer’s CAT assessments, with its own rebuttal reports.

In Certas Direct Insurance v. Gonsalves ¹⁰, an Ontario Divisional Court decision, the Court made the following comments with regard to procedural fairness:

Fundamental to any administrative process, is the requirement that it be fair. At its most basic procedural fairness requires that a party have an opportunity to be heard and that it be able to respond to the position taken against it.

While these comments were made in the context of an application for adjournment, the issue of fairness is applicable to all stages of the administrative process, and are to be considered carefully in deciding whether to exercise my discretion.

Funding of the Rebuttal Reports as an Interim Expense

The Applicant has submitted that I might consider allowing payment for the rebuttal reports as an expense, authority for which is contained in Section 282(11) of the *Insurance Act*.

Usually, the issue of expenses related to this type of proceeding is best left to the hearing arbitrator to be determined under the expense regulation at the end of a full hearing, after hearing and evaluating all of the evidence, and consideration of the criteria contained in the expense regulation.

In this case, however, the Applicant has made what I consider to be compelling arguments in favour of an interim expense award. Although such an award can be considered an extraordinary remedy, and rarely granted, Section 282(11.1) of the *Insurance Act* states that:

The arbitrator may at any time during an arbitration proceeding, make an interim award of expenses, subject to such terms and conditions as may be established by the arbitrator.

This section gives an arbitrator authority to make an award at any time during a proceeding.

The arbitrator, in deciding whether to exercise his or her discretion, considers factors such as, but not limited to:

• urgency — the party seeking the interim expense order would have to adduce evidence as to why such an order be made now, and why it could not wait until the conclusion of the hearing;

• necessity — whether the expenses requested have been incurred; whether receipts have been provided; the cost of the expenses requested; whether the denial of the expense would cause the Applicant to suffer further financial distress.

In this case, the Applicant stated in his affidavit¹¹, that he suffered from depression for which he has been and still is being treated. He stated that he has been receiving $600.00 per month from Ontario Works, from May 2011, to March 2013, when he was approved for ODSP and his benefits were raised to $1,118.00 per month; and that this was his only source of income, as he was unable to work because of his injuries. He further stated that he has had to obtain loans from friends and family to support himself, which he is obligated to pay back.

Further, his solicitor, Mr. Barrafato, included in his affidavit, excerpts from Ms.Tina Bettridge ‘s notes from the period October 4, 2010 to October 24, 2011.¹² Ms. Bettridge is a mental health counselor who worked with the Applicant.

Those notes contained the following;

October 4, 2010 — Level of Current Risk: He states he thinks about suicide a lot…”¹³; and July 22, 2011“…poverty is a huge issue that will bring on his depression and stress… . Due to his current circumstances, he isn’t ready and/or able to work at this time.”¹⁴

Many of the other health care professionals who have treated the Applicant echo these comments of depression, suicidal ideation, inability to work, and physical impairments.¹⁵

The Applicant testified at the Social Benefits Tribunal, that one of the causes of his depression is his need to be heavily reliant on others. That Tribunal found his evidence to be credible.¹⁶

As stated earlier, there is some conflicting case law concerning the appropriate test for granting relief on an interim basis and, in particular, the appropriate test for ordering an insurer, on a motion for interim relief, to pay for the cost of a rebuttal catastrophic impairment assessment.

While I have decided that a substantive remedy is not available to the Applicant under the old or new SABS, the usual analysis of the principles that arbitrators employ in deciding whether or not to grant interim relief for the substantive remedies may be of assistance when it comes to deciding whether I should exercise my discretion at this time with respect to an interim expense award.

In reviewing the some of the past interim benefit arbitral decisions, arbitrators have incorporated various approaches in deciding how to exercise their discretion.

In Henry and Aviva Canada Inc.¹⁷, Arbitrator Killoran stated;

Many considerations have been relied on by arbitrators to determine entitlement to interim benefits.

Principally, arbitrators have applied the prima facie test and that of urgency/ necessity. … A prima facie case is one in which a party provides evidence, which if unanswered and believed, is sufficient to render a reasonable conclusion in favour of entitlement.

In Nguyen and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company¹⁸, Arbitrator Wilson’s preferred approach is to look at the whole case, and consider the strength of the case from the perspectives of both parties.

The “whole case approach” has been referred to in several recent arbitral decisions in deciding whether to award interim benefits. It calls for an evaluation of each case on its own merits.

It would seem that, in reviewing more recent decisions, arbitrators have been moving in the direction of this approach.

In reviewing the evidence on this motion, I find that the Applicant has adduced sufficient evidence for me to find on a balance of probabilities, that: he cannot afford to pay for rebuttal reports; that his financial position is one of poverty; that there is need for these reports in order to answer what has been portrayed as inaccurate and incomplete Insurer’s expert’s reports in order to ensure procedural fairness.

I therefore find that, in looking at the whole case, an interim expense award is justified in this case.

Quantum of Expense Award

The Applicant has submitted OCF 18 treatment plans totalling $15,622.25 for funding 7 catastrophic impairment reports in accordance with the statutory cap placed on assessments under the new SABS.

In the alternative, the Applicant requests the series of rebuttal reports be paid in the total sum of $10,500, plus transportation and HST on all assessments in accordance with the Expense Schedule of the Code¹⁹, which caps expenses paid to an expert for the preparation of a report, to a maximum of $1,500.00.

The Insurer has submitted that, should an award be made, it be limited to $2,000.00 in total, in accordance with section 25(5)(a) of the new SABS, which provides as follows:

Despite any other provision of the Regulation, an Insurer shall not pay,

(a) more than a total of $2,000.00 in respect of fees and expenses for conducting any one assessment or examination and for preparing reports in connection with it, whether it is conducted at the instance of the insured person or the insurer.

The Insurer submits that the wording of section 25(5)(a) does not provide an exception for catastrophic impairment assessments, and accordingly, if any amount is payable in that respect, the amount must be limited to $2,000.00. I disagree.

The Insurer has not disclosed the amount it paid its catastrophic assessors per assessment, but has conducted 4 assessments, and, according to the Applicant, has presumably paid at least

$2,000.00 per assessment, in accordance with the rate prescribed under the new SABS.²⁰

In essence, the Insurer’s multidisciplinary report consisted of several individual assessors conducting separate assessments, working as a team to produce one integrated report.

The assessments requested by the Applicant are fair, and appropriate in response to those obtained by the Insurer.

In my view, the appropriate amount is $10,500.00 as an interim expense in accordance with the Expense Schedule in the Code. This amount is awarded as a disbursement and is not limited to one report.

EXPENSES:

The question of expenses related to this motion, other than those awarded as an interim expense, is deferred to the hearing arbitrator.

July 9, 2015

Alan Mervin Arbitrator

Date

Financial Services Commission des

Commission services financiers

of Ontario de l’Ontario

Neutral Citation: 2015 ONFSCDRS 148

FSCO A12-000481

BETWEEN:

NAJEEB ALMOUSAWI

Applicant

and

TD GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY

Insurer

ARBITRATION ORDER

Under section 282 of the *Insurance Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8, as amended, it is ordered that:

1. Mr. Almousawi is entitled to interim expenses in the amount of $10,500 plus HST.

July 9, 2015

Alan Mervin Arbitrator

Date

Footnotes

1. 1The *Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule — Accidents on or after November 1, 1996*, Ontario Regulation 403/96, as amended.(“the old SABS”)
2. 2Tab B, Motion Record of the Respondent, Paper review by Dr. Paitich dated May 9, 2012
3. 3Tab 36, Motion Record of the Applicant, Multidisciplinary Catastrophic Assessment report by Dr. Paitich dated February 28, 2013
4. 4Effective September 1, 2010, the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Effective September 1, 2010 (the “new SABS”) came into force. The transition rules in the new SABS provide that, subject to certain exceptions, benefits that would have been available pursuant to the *Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule – Accidents on or after November 1, 1996* (the “old SABS”) shall be paid under the new SABS, but in amounts determined under the old SABS. As a result, both the old SABS and the new SABS are applicable to accidents that occurred on or after November 1, 1996 and before September 1, 2010 and both should be considered.)
5. 5Factum of the Respondent, Paragraphs 42, 43 and 44
6. 6Old SABS s.3 (1.2).
7. 7*Insurance Act,* R.S.O. 1990, c.I.8, as amended.
8. 8R.J. and Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company (FSCO A12-001233, September 17, 2013) Applicant’s Book of Authorities — Tab 28
9. 9(FSCO A10-0003813, November 7, 2012), Affirmed (FSCO P12-00042A and P12-00042C, March 21, 2014), Applicant’s Book of Authorities Tab 13 and 14
10. 102011 ONSC 3986, [2011] O.J. No. 3290
11. 11Affidavit of Najeeb Al-Moussawi, Motion Record of the Applicant, Tab C, Paragraphs 10-17.
12. 12Tina Bettridge’s patient notes, Motion Record of the Applicant, Exhibit 19, Affidavit of Paul Barrafato.
13. 13Affidavit of Paul Barrafato, Motion Record of the Applicant, Paragraph h
14. 14Affidavit of Paul Barrafato, Motion Record of the Applicant, Paragraph p
15. 15Affidavit of Paul Barrafato, Motion Record of the Applicant, excerpts from medical reports various practitioners, Paragraph 20
16. 16Affidavit of Paul Barrafato, Paragraph 22, from decision of Social Benefits Tribunal, Exhibit 26 attached.
17. 17Henry and Aviva Canada Inc. (FSCO A11-000191, March 1, 2012)
18. 18Nguyen and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (FSCO A05-000305, December 22, 2005)
19. 19Dispute Resolution Practice Code (Fourth Edition, Updated – January 2014), Section F Expense Schedule, s.5(5), Applicant’s Book of Authorities, Tab 35
20. 20Factum of the Applicant, Paragraph 69