Brendan L. Gluckman

The applicant, a lawyer charged with money laundering and possession of property obtained by crime, sought to vary or vacate three restraint orders freezing his bank and securities accounts.

He argued the orders were based on information obtained in breach of his s. 8 Charter rights, PIPEDA, and a production order, and that the banks acted as state agents.

The court dismissed the application, finding the accounts were properly restrained as offence-related property or proceeds of crime.

The court held the applicant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the banking information disclosed, the banks acted independently to protect their own interests and not as state agents, and the disclosures complied with PIPEDA.

The court also found the CRA tax information was properly acquired and used.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his summary conviction appeal.

He had been convicted of attempting to obtain income tax refunds and sentenced to two years less a day.

His conviction appeal was dismissed by the summary conviction appeal judge due to an unexcused delay in perfecting the appeal.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the appeal did not raise a question of law alone, but rather involved the discretionary application of procedural rules.

Furthermore, the court found the underlying claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to be without merit.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge gave insufficient weight to his rehabilitative efforts and that his sentence was disparate compared to another person convicted in the same police operation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle in the trial judge's assessment of the rehabilitative efforts alongside the appellant's lengthy record.

The Court also rejected the disparity argument, noting differences between the offences and offenders justified the different sentences.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing that the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent was a street-level seller and an addict was unsupported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that substantial deference must be accorded to a sentencing judge's factual conclusions and that the trial judge's finding was not entirely unsupported by the evidence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision upholding his conviction under the Fisheries Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding no arguable errors of law regarding the interpretation of an inspection under the Act, the admissibility of expert evidence, or the defences of officially induced error and due diligence.

The appellant was ordered to pay $10,000 and complete required remediation work.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and his four-month custodial sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his innocent explanation for being at a grow operation, finding knowledge and control, and applying the W.D. framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or inference of knowledge and control.

The court also found no air of reality to a newly raised public duty defence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the sentence was within the appropriate range and a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the appellant's prior record.