Nicholas R. Cooper

This decision clarifies the meaning of "export" under the Cannabis Act in the context of possession for the purpose of exporting cannabis.

The Court held that "export" means sending cannabis or industrial hemp from Canada to another country and does not require proof of commercial value or any additional purpose beyond the physical act of exportation.

The ruling emphasizes that the Act and its regulations permit exportation only for medical, scientific, or industrial hemp purposes, and that the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the possession was intended to cause the cannabis to leave Canada.

The appellant, Muhammad Hassan, appealed his sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking of three kilograms of cocaine.

The trial judge had imposed a sentence of just under seven years.

The Court of Appeal found two reversible errors: first, the trial judge erred in finding the appellant was a high-level trafficker without sufficient proof; second, the trial judge erroneously rejected mitigating evidence of the appellant's difficult upbringing by taking judicial notice of the neighbourhood's circumstances.

These errors led to a demonstrably unfit sentence.

The appeal was allowed, the original sentence was set aside, and a reduced sentence of six years less pre-sentence custody was imposed, aligning with the Crown's initial proposal at trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime, arguing the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis by admitting evidence obtained from warrants based on a redacted Information to Obtain (ITO).

The trial judge found a s. 8 Charter breach due to insufficient grounds in the redacted ITO but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, finding no error in the application of the Grant criteria.

The court clarified that the Crown's litigation choice to proceed under Garofoli step five (redacted information), rather than step six (unredacted information), does not automatically imply bad faith for the purpose of the s. 24(2) analysis, especially when the Crown took active steps to provide a summary and the defence consented to its use.

The appellant, Salvatore Lamacchia, appealed an eight-year global sentence for two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and breach of recognizance.

He argued the sentencing judge failed to consider the totality principle and did not give sufficient weight to his community work.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge was alert to the totality principle and properly balanced aggravating and mitigating factors, including the appellant's community work.

The court reiterated the high standard for appellate intervention in sentencing.

The appellant, convicted of importing fentanyl and possession for the purpose of trafficking, appealed his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction appeal, affirming the trial judge's application of wilful blindness to both the nature and origin of the controlled substance.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the 15-year global sentence, finding the comparison of fentanyl to heroin for sentencing purposes to be apt, and emphasizing the principles of denunciation and general deterrence given the drug's extreme danger and quantity.

The victim surcharge was set aside.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion to compel the Crown to disclose details regarding police "pointer car" designations, arguing its relevance to a Charter Section 9 arbitrary detention issue.

The applicant was detained solely because he was driving a vehicle designated as a "pointer car," which may have been an outdated and incorrect designation.

The court found the evidence concerning the purpose, implementation, and removal procedures of the pointer car designation system to be "obviously relevant" to assessing the constitutional validity of the detention.

The motion was allowed, and the Crown was ordered to disclose all requested information.

The accused, Angella Marie Lewis, was found guilty by a jury of importing 1.955 kilograms of cocaine.

This decision outlines the reasons for her sentence.

The court considered the sentencing range for importing multi-kilograms of cocaine (6-8 years), aggravating factors including her lengthy criminal record (though with a significant gap), and mitigating factors such as her difficult family history, remorse, and restrictive bail conditions over four years.

The court also addressed ancillary orders for forfeiture, a weapons prohibition, and a DNA data bank order.

The accused, Ryan Reeves, brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence (cocaine and statements) obtained during an alleged unlawful detention and search by police.

The court found that the police officer unlawfully detained and searched the accused and his vehicle without legal authority, violating his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights.

The officer's testimony was found to be unreliable and inconsistent.

Applying the Grant tripartite test for exclusion of evidence, the court concluded that the seriousness of the Charter-infringing conduct and its impact on the accused's rights outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits, leading to the exclusion of the evidence.

The accused, Keisha Cox, was charged with importing cocaine after 1.8 kg of the drug was found concealed in expertly packaged foodstuffs in her luggage upon returning to Toronto from Jamaica.

The Crown's case was largely circumstantial, relying on the sophisticated concealment, the high value of the cocaine, and the accused's control over her luggage.

The accused's spontaneous exculpatory statement was deemed voluntary but rejected as untrue by the court.

The court applied principles of circumstantial evidence and the W.(D.) analysis, finding that the only rational inference was that the accused knew or was willfully blind to the cocaine in her bag.

The offender, Barna Olvedi, was convicted after trial of importing fentanyl and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, particularly the importation of 499.5 grams of 100% pure fentanyl citrate with an estimated street value of over $14 million, and the devastating impact of fentanyl in the community.

Aggravating factors included the quantity, purity, and powder form of the drug, the financial motivation (greed), and wilful blindness.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record at the time of the offence, cooperation with police, post-conviction remorse, reluctance to accept delivery due to threats, and excellent rehabilitation potential.

The Crown sought 17 years, while the Defence proposed 8-12 years.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 years' imprisonment for importing fentanyl and a concurrent sentence of 12 years' imprisonment for possession for the purpose of trafficking, along with forfeiture of $10,759.37 and a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $34,240.63, and mandatory victim fine surcharges.

The accused, charged with drug possession for trafficking, brought applications under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude evidence (drugs and statements) obtained from a motel room.

The Crown also sought a ruling on the voluntariness of an accused's statement.

The court found multiple Charter breaches: police entered the motel room without informed consent, conducted a warrantless search, and breached the right to counsel.

Applying the R. v. Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.