WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1,172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or
(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).
(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
YADWINDER SINGH
Before Justice P.T. O’Marra
Heard on February 24, 2026
Oral Reasons for Judgment on Sentence released on March 30, 2026
Counsel: Ryan Mullins, counsel for the Crown Jassi Vamadevan, counsel for the accused Yadwinder Singh
P.T. O’Marra, J.:
Introduction
1Mr. Singh is before the Court on five charges arising from events that occurred between 2016 and 2018 during his marriage to the complainant. The charges were two counts of sexual assault, two counts of assault, and mischief to property. The trial proceeded over several days, namely October 3 and 4, 2023, April 23 and 24, 2024, and May 1, 2024. I released my oral reasons for judgment on June 19, 2024, finding Mr. Singh guilty on all counts. I ordered a presentence report.
2Sentencing did not proceed immediately because Mr. Singh retained new counsel and brought a mistrial application under sections 14 and 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach arising from an interpretation error. On August 1, 2025, I dismissed the application but permitted the defence to reopen to admit a corrected interpretation. On December 18, 2025, I confirmed that the verdict remained unchanged. The matter now returns for sentence.
Findings of Fact on Each Count
3For sentencing, I rely on my trial findings. In March or April 2016, Mr. Singh committed mischief by cutting the complainant’s pyjama bottoms with scissors while she was wearing them, as part of his efforts to control what she wore in the home. In September 2016, he forced vaginal intercourse on the complainant without her consent by restraining her and overcoming her resistance. On July 17, 2017, Mr. Singh assaulted the complainant by twisting her arm and leaving a visible bruise, and later that night, he again forced vaginal intercourse by holding her down and ignoring her refusals. In June 2018, he assaulted her in bed, striking her and pinching and twisting her cheek, causing a visible facial injury that persisted for days. Convictions were entered on all five counts.
Positions of the Parties
4The Crown requests a total sentence of five years and one month of imprisonment, to be served consecutively, with a reduction for totality, along with the usual ancillary orders. It references appellate guidance that, barring highly mitigating factors, forced penetration generally results in a penitentiary sentence of at least three years, with the typical range being three to five years, whether the victim is a stranger or an intimate partner. (See: R. v. A.J.K., 2022 ONCA 487, 162 O.R. (3d) 721, at para. 77; R. v. S.W., 2024 ONCA 125, at paras. 30–33.)
5The defence requests a combined sentence of two and a half years' imprisonment. It bases this on Mr. Singh’s lack of prior criminal record, stable employment, family support, and the collateral immigration consequences of serving time. The defence highlights the importance of restraint for first offenders and recognizes that the ancillary orders remain applicable. (See: R. v. Borde, 2003 4187 (ON CA), 63 O.R. (3d) 417, at para. 36; R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 739.) Mr. Vamadevan presents an interesting argument that, although a penitentiary sentence is appropriate, in order to preserve Mr. Singh’s right to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division regarding a removal or deportation order, the sentence should be structured so that the offences are served consecutively in segments of six months, minus one day's imprisonment. This would produce a total sentence of approximately two and a half years. The “less one day” approach is often used to stay just below statutory thresholds that can apply to a particular offence.
Victim Impact
6The complainant attended court and read her victim impact statement. The complainant’s statement describes ongoing harm affecting multiple aspects of her life. She reports persistent fear and anxiety that limit her ability to engage fully in daily activities. She experiences intrusive memories and nightmares that disturb her sleep and concentration. She has difficulty trusting others. Ordinary disagreements in her current relationship provoke heightened distress, which she connects to the past violence. She has withdrawn from family and friends because of shame and fear. Her sense of security has been significantly diminished, particularly in the home. It is clear from the complainant’s account that she has ongoing, serious, and enduring psychological consequences, which inform the weight to be given to denunciation and deterrence, as well as the placement of the sentence within the applicable range.
Mr. Singh’s Background and Support
7Mr. Singh is 41 years old. He was born and raised in India and immigrated to Canada in 2015. He has no prior criminal record. He has been steadily employed as a truck driver throughout his time in Canada. He maintains close relationships with his siblings and his mother, and he conducts himself respectfully, presenting with no mental health or substance use concerns. He is connected to his religious community and volunteers at Temple. He denies the offences. He remarried in 2023. His current wife resides in India. He is a permanent resident and faces the prospect of deportation as a collateral consequence of conviction.
Sentencing Objectives and Section 718.1 of the Code
8Denunciation and deterrence carry particular weight for intimate partner sexual and physical violence. Proportionality is the fundamental principle and requires that the sentence reflect the gravity of the offences and the offender’s moral responsibility. The Supreme Court has emphasized that proportionality governs sentence fitness and that ranges are guides for parity, not binding rules. (See: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at paras. 60 and 143.)
Relevant Sentencing Principles and Authorities
9Forced penetration in an intimate relationship attracts significant penitentiary terms. The Court of Appeal has ended the distinction between intimate and non-intimate contexts and has held that, absent highly mitigating factors, forced penetration will typically attract a penitentiary term of at least three years, with a general range of three to five years. (See: A.J.K., at para. 77; S.W., at paras. 30–33.)
10Domestic assaults prioritize denunciation and deterrence because the home is a place of expected safety, and courts reject stereotypical reasoning about expected victim behaviour. (See: R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275, paras. 63 to 66; R. v. A.R.J.D., 2018 SCC 6, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 218.)
11Restraint for first time offenders is important, although it cannot overshadow the seriousness of the offences. (See Borde, at para. 36.)
12Collateral immigration consequences may be considered as part of individualization but cannot render an otherwise fit sentence unfit. (See: Pham.)
Aggravating, Mitigating, and Neutral Factors
13The aggravating features are significant. There were two separate sexual assaults involving forced penetration, each accomplished through physical restraint and the overcoming of the complainant’s refusal. The offending occurred in the complainant’s bedroom within an intimate relationship, which engages the statutory aggravating factor for abuse of an intimate partner. The assaults caused bodily harm. The bruising was more than merely transient or trifling, within the statutory definition. The complainant’s statement also describes enduring psychological harm, which the Code recognizes as aggravating where the offence has a significant impact on the victim. These features warrant sentences toward the upper end of the range for forced penetration. (See: R. v. A.J.K., 2022 ONCA 487, at para. 77; R. v. S.W., 2024 ONCA 125, at paras. 30–33; Criminal Code, s. 718.2(a)(ii) (intimate‑partner abuse), s. 718.2(a)(iii.1) (significant victim impact), and s. 2 (definition of bodily harm).)
14The mitigating factors are Mr. Singh’s lack of prior record, steady employment, and family support. Restraint for a first incarceration remains a consideration in serious cases, but it does not displace proportionality. (See: Borde, at para. 36.)
15Mr. Singh’s immigration status and potential deportation are collateral consequences that may be weighed for individualization but cannot reduce a sentence that is otherwise proportionate nor render a fit sentence unfit. (See: Pham, para. 19.)
16Exercising the right to a trial is neutral on sentence. The absence of a guilty plea removes a potential ground of mitigation, but it is not an aggravating factor and cannot attract a penalty. In R. v. Reeve, 2020 ONCA 381, at para. 20, the Court held that accused persons are entitled to put the Crown to its proof and must not be punished for doing so; proceeding to trial cannot, by itself, warrant an increased sentence. The same point was reaffirmed in R. v. Griffiths, [2025] O.J. No. 3115, where the Court found it was an error to equate the decision to go to trial with a lack of remorse or to increase the sentence on that basis. A guilty plea may mitigate because it evidences responsibility and spares resources, but its absence is simply the absence of that mitigation, not an aggravating factor.
Consecutive or Concurrent Sentences
17The offences were distinct in time and location, which could, in principle, justify consecutive terms. The law recognizes that separate occasions will often attract consecutive sentences, while concurrency remains available where there is a sufficient nexus and where a concurrent structure still yields a proportionate global sentence. (See Criminal Code, s. 718.3(4).)
Totality
18Section 718.2(c) of the Code provides that where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh; totality functions as a final proportionality check to ensure that the aggregate punishment does not exceed the gravity of the offence and the offender’s overall responsibility.
19The Supreme Court has characterized totality as an aspect of proportionality that obliges a sentencing judge to take a last look at the cumulative result and, if necessary, adjust to maintain fitness; proportionality governs the fitness of the global sentence, and ranges are guides, not rules. (See: R. v. M. (C.A.), 1996 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 42; Lacasse, at paras. 60 and 143.)
20I adopt the structured approach outlined in R. v. Hutchings, 2012 NLCA 2:
(1) The first step is to determine an appropriate sentence for each offence.
(2) The second step is to decide whether the terms are to be served concurrently or consecutively, based on the relationship among the offences, without considering totality at this stage.
(3) The third step is to review the combined sentence to ensure it is neither unduly long nor harsh, and to adjust if needed.
Application in this Case
21With the governing principles settled, I turn to their application in this case, beginning with the component sentences for each count, then addressing concurrency or consecutively, and concluding with a last look to confirm proportionality.
22At step one, I fix the component sentences. On the facts as found, a fit sentence for each sexual assault is four years' imprisonment. This reflects the Court of Appeal’s guidance that forced penetration typically attracts a penitentiary sentence of at least three years, with a general range of three to five years, regardless of the relationship between the parties. On each assault, a fit sentence is 30 days' imprisonment. On the mischief count, one day imprisonment is fit.
23At step two, I address concurrency and consecutively. The incidents occurred on different dates, and consecutive terms could be justified in principle. However, I order concurrency in this case. This structure recognizes the pattern of intimate partner violence found at trial and permits the totality to be satisfied by selecting proportionate component terms rather than by arithmetic reduction of stacked sentences. (See Hutchings.)
24At step three, I take a last look to ensure that the sentence is not unduly long or harsh. Even with concurrency, in my view, the global sentence is proportionate to the overall culpability and harm. The global four-year term corresponds to the established range for forced penetration and accounts for the repeated sexual assaults, the assaults in the domestic setting, and the broader coercive control established at trial. It is not unduly long or harsh and requires no further adjustment under section 718.2(c) of the Code. (See: M. (C.A.), at para. 42; and A.J.K., at para. 77.)
Analysis and Sentence
25I have considered the gravity of the sexual and physical violence, the pattern of coercion and control, the injuries inflicted, and the enduring psychological harm to the complainant. I have weighed the mitigating factors and Mr. Singh’s background. I have considered restraint for a first offender and the collateral immigration consequences within the limits set by proportionality. (See: Borde, at para. 36; Pham.)
26I have considered the defence’s proposed sentence. In my view, A structure of “six months less one day” on each count, ordered consecutively to reach roughly two and a half years, would be wholly inappropriate in this case because it departs from the governing framework of proportionality and the Court of Appeal’s guidance for penetrative sexual assaults, and it would impermissibly skew sentence design to preserve immigration appeal rights rather than to reflect the gravity of the offending behaviour.
27Furthermore, engineering sub‑six‑month component terms to preserve an immigration appeal right would be an error in principle. Immigration consequences may be considered when individualizing a sentence, but proportionality remains paramount, and collateral consequences must not skew the process. Here, crafting artificially low component terms for penetrative sexual assaults to influence removal‑order appeal rights would distort proportionality. (See: Pham.)
28On each sexual assault count, I impose four years' imprisonment, concurrent. On each assault count, I impose a term of 30 days' imprisonment to run concurrently. On the mischief count, I impose a concurrent term of one day's imprisonment. The global sentence is four years' imprisonment. This sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the offences and the offender’s moral blameworthiness, is consistent with the range set out in A.J.K. and S.W., and accords with the proportionality framework in Lacasse.
Ancillary Orders
29I impose the following orders:
(1) A ten-year firearms prohibition under the Code, pursuant to s. 109.
(2) A DNA order as the sexual assaults are primarily designated offences, pursuant to s. 487.051 of the Code.
(3) Sex Offender Information Registration Act Order (SOIRA) for 20 years pursuant to ss. 490.012 and 490.13 of the Code.
(4) A non-communication order prohibiting direct or indirect contact with the complainant while the offender is in custody pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Code.
30The victim fine surcharge is waived.
Released: March 30, 2026
Signed: Justice Paul T. O’Marra