Susan L. Reid

The appellant appealed his convictions for armed robbery, pointing a firearm, and being masked with intent, as well as his sentence of 17.5 years.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructions regarding eyewitness identification and prior statements, and that there was no evidence the handgun was a firearm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding any errors in the jury charge were harmless and there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that the weapon was a firearm.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the lengthy sentence was justified by the appellant's status as an untreatable, dangerous career criminal with a history of bank robberies.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder arising from an armed robbery where the deceased was shot in the back of the head.

On appeal, the appellant raised several grounds, including errors regarding a potential Corbett application, the adequacy of a Vetrovec warning, comments on the right to silence, mischaracterization of defence positions, instructions on after-the-fact conduct, and the trial judge's suggestion that the deceased was on his knees when shot.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors and concluding that any imperfections in the jury charge did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

Two appellants challenged convictions arising from a failed police takedown, raising issues about jury exhortation, a police-created videotaped re-enactment, and the timing of a Corbett ruling.

The court held that the trial judge improperly exhorted the jury and imposed a deadline on deliberations, creating a reasonable possibility of coercion and requiring a new trial for both appellants.

The court further held that the videotaped re-enactment was wrongly admitted against one appellant because it inaccurately depicted undisputed facts, presented only the prosecution version of disputed events, had little or no probative value, and was highly prejudicial.

The court also found prejudicial error in delaying the Corbett ruling until after the appellant completed examination-in-chief, undermining the fairness of the jury's credibility assessment.

The appellant appealed a first degree murder conviction arising from the disappearance of a 14-year-old victim whose body was not found until after conviction.

The court upheld the admission of a jailhouse informant's evidence, finding the informant was not acting as a state agent when the initial inculpatory statements were elicited and therefore there was no breach of the appellant's s. 7 right to silence.

The court also rejected the proposed fresh evidence concerning the later discovery and forensic examination of the remains, holding that it did not materially undermine the informant's evidence or the Crown's theory and would not reasonably have affected the verdict.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged both conviction and sentence following a jury trial, arguing among other things that the trial judge's charge improperly referred to the accused's criminal record and that the response to a jury question was inadequate.

The court held that the impugned reference was evidently a mistaken attribution intended for another witness and, in any event, caused no prejudice in light of the context and overwhelming evidence.

The court further found no basis to conclude the jury was confused about the causal link between the assaults and bodily harm, and held the trial judge's answer was complete.

The conviction appeal was dismissed; leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder.

Following the murder, they fled the jurisdiction, committed two bank robberies, violated parole, fled from police, and attempted to dispose of the murder weapon.

At trial, they argued this post-offence conduct was explained by the robberies and parole violations, and thus had no probative value regarding the murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that because the appellants denied any involvement in the murder, their identity was in issue, and the post-offence conduct was relevant and properly left to the jury.

The Court further held that the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies only to the ultimate verdict, not to individual items of circumstantial evidence such as post-offence conduct.

The accused was acquitted at trial of sexual assault.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge made several errors in his charge to the jury, including mischaracterizing evidence, failing to properly instruct on prior inconsistent statements, and improperly leaving the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent to the jury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the cumulative effect of the trial judge's errors was significant and that there was no evidentiary foundation to lend an air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his three-year-old son after grabbing the child's genitals for disciplinary purposes.

The appellant argued that the absence of intent for sexual gratification meant the act was not a sexual assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that viewed objectively in all the circumstances, the assault was of a sexual nature and violated the sexual integrity of the child.