William Kingston Orr

The applicant, Tyler Wirag, brought Charter applications under sections 8 and 9 to exclude evidence (a handgun seized from a crashed vehicle and DNA evidence) and challenge his detention and arrest.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the warrantless seizure of the handgun was justified by exigent circumstances and common law police powers to protect public safety.

The court also found that police had reasonable grounds to believe the applicant was the driver of the vehicle, making his detention and subsequent arrest lawful and Charter-compliant.

This is a ruling on a Crown application to admit investigative notes and records of a police officer (DC Soucy) as a principled exception to the hearsay rule in a criminal trial.

DC Soucy, who was involved in forensic evidence collection and handling, is on medical leave and unable to testify.

The defence conceded necessity but disputed threshold reliability.

The court found that DC Soucy's limited, routine role, contemporaneous note-taking, photographic corroboration, and lack of motive to lie established sufficient substantive reliability.

The application was allowed, making the evidence admissible.

The appellant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle with excessive blood alcohol content.

On appeal, he raised several Charter arguments (ss. 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b)) concerning the lawfulness of the traffic stop, the roadside screening demand, the reliability of the Approved Screening Device (ASD) results, and the delay in accessing counsel.

The court dismissed all arguments, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's rulings, including factual findings based on credibility and the proper application of legal principles regarding police authority and Charter rights.

The accused, charged with being an accessory after the fact to murder and aggravated assault, brought a Charter application alleging breaches of her ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) rights during multiple arrests and detentions, seeking the exclusion of a seized firearm, cellphones, and statements.

The Crown brought a blended application seeking a finding that five statements made by the accused to police were voluntary.

The court found that the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct a high-risk vehicle takedown and reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused after observing a firearm in plain view.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding no breaches.

Furthermore, the court found that all five statements were made voluntarily, rejecting the accused's claim that her final statement was induced by an 'under the table' deal brokered by her former counsel.

The offender was convicted of aggravated assault and carrying a concealed weapon following an unprovoked stabbing in a shopping mall.

The court determined the appropriate sentence was five and a half years in prison, noting the seriousness of the offence and the offender's intoxication.

However, after applying credit for over three years of pre-trial custody, including enhanced credit for harsh lockdown conditions, the sentence was reduced to time-served with no probation order.

The accused, charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and carrying a concealed weapon, sought to have the defence of extreme intoxication put to the jury for the general intent offences (aggravated assault and carrying a concealed weapon).

The court reviewed the jurisprudence on extreme intoxication, emphasizing the high evidentiary burden, including the requirement for expert evidence to establish a state akin to automatism or insanity.

Despite evidence of the accused's intoxication, the defence's toxicologist did not opine that the accused's state reached the level of extreme intoxication required by the Supreme Court.

The court ruled that the accused failed to meet the evidentiary burden, and therefore, the defence of extreme intoxication would not be put to the jury for the general intent offences.

The accused brought a pretrial motion alleging infringements of his rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) or a stay of proceedings under section 24(1).

The court found no breach of section 10(a) regarding the information provided about the charges, as the accused was sufficiently informed of his jeopardy.

Regarding section 10(b), the court found no breach despite a delay in facilitating access to duty counsel at the hospital and police station, citing reasonable security concerns at the hospital and the police's diligent efforts at the station.

Even if a breach had occurred, the court stated it would not have excluded the evidence (eyewitness statements, video) under section 24(2) as it was not 'obtained in a manner' that infringed Charter rights, nor would it have granted a stay of proceedings under section 24(1).

The accused was discharged on all counts following reconsideration of a committal for trial order.

The original committal was based on evidence that the accused was found alone in an apartment where drugs and a firearm were discovered.

The Court of Appeal quashed the original committal order because the judge had misapprehended key evidence—specifically, a baseball hat that was thought to link the accused to the firearm was not, in fact, the same hat the accused had been seen wearing previously.

On reconsideration, the judge found that without this evidence, the Crown's case rested on impermissible speculation and inferential leaps.

The evidence was insufficient to establish the accused's knowledge and control of the contraband, as multiple other individuals had access to the apartment and forensic evidence linked others to the drugs.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision upholding his conviction for care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing identification evidence and admitting his statement to police.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no error by the summary conviction appeal judge and concluding the case lacked significance to the administration of justice.

Yolanda Meecham sought to exclude evidence seized under a search warrant, arguing a violation of her s. 8 Charter rights due to insufficient grounds in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court applied the R. v. Garofoli "step six" procedure for redacted ITOs and the R. v. Debot "three Cs" criteria (credibility, compelling, corroboration) for confidential informant information.

Despite acknowledging the ITO's poor drafting and inaccuracies, including a withdrawn charge, the court found that, after excisions and amplification, the ITO met the low threshold for reasonable and probable grounds to issue the warrant.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while her blood-alcohol level exceeded 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proved that the accused collided with another vehicle on Highway 409, fled the scene at high speed, and was subsequently found with a damaged vehicle.

Breath tests revealed readings of 216 and 199 milligrams.

The defence raised Charter challenges regarding the right to counsel, search and seizure, and lost evidence, all of which were dismissed.

The court found the Crown proved impairment through the accused's dangerous driving, glassy eyes, odour of alcohol, and expert toxicology evidence.

The accused was convicted on both counts, with the impaired driving count stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was convicted by a jury of fraud over $5000 for his role in a scheme involving fake loans and unreturned due diligence fees totaling over $500,000 USD.

The court found the accused played a lesser role than his co-conspirator but still lied to victims, causing significant financial and personal harm.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for large-scale frauds, the court determined a fit sentence was 3 years' imprisonment, which was reduced to time served due to pre-sentence custody credit.

A restitution order for 50% of the loss ($341,263.04 CAD) was also imposed.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to quash search warrants and exclude evidence obtained from searches of his residences and storage lockers, alleging police misconduct and fabrication of information in the Informations to Obtain (ITOs).

The court rejected the defence theory that police had planted firearms and drugs, finding the accused’s explanation for the incriminating evidence implausible.

However, the court found that the affiant officer deliberately fabricated portions of the ITO, including altering dates and inventing information to strengthen the grounds for the warrants.

Although the remaining evidence could have supported the issuance of the warrants, the deliberate fabrication was found to be so subversive of the prior authorization process that the warrants were quashed.

Applying the framework in Grant, the court excluded the seized guns, drugs, and related evidence under s.24(2) of the Charter due to the seriousness of the police misconduct, while admitting the accused’s voluntary statements to police.

The appellant, a car mechanic, issued a Safety Standards Certificate for a truck without conducting the required inspection.

The truck was later involved in a fatal accident.

At the preliminary inquiry, the appellant was discharged on a count of criminal negligence causing death based on a break in the chain of causation.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari to quash the discharge.

On appeal, the appellant argued there was insufficient evidence that the steering defect existed when the certificate was issued.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient evidence, including expert testimony and witness accounts, for a properly instructed jury to find the appellant's actions were a significant contributing cause of the death.

The applicant brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing serious firearms and drug charges to trial.

The court analyzed multiple periods of delay totaling approximately 57 months from arrest to the anticipated trial start, allocating time among inherent case requirements, defence delay, Crown delay, and institutional delay.

Although the applicant had been incarcerated for most of the period and experienced prejudice to liberty and security interests, the court found that most delay resulted from defence actions or inherent case complexity, including counsel availability and pre-trial litigation.

Institutional and Crown delay totaled approximately 11.5 months, falling within the acceptable Morin guidelines.

The court concluded that the delay was not unreasonable and that the applicant’s right to a fair trial had not been prejudiced.

The Crown applied to remove defence counsel due to a conflict of interest after the same lawyer had represented both an accused and a key Crown witness who later provided incriminating statements.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings or exclusion of the witness’s evidence under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, arguing police inducements and delayed disclosure compromised their fair trial rights.

The court found that while police comments undermining the witness’s confidence in her lawyer were inappropriate, the accused could not rely on alleged Charter breaches affecting the witness, and no actual prejudice to their ability to make full answer and defence was established.

The court declined to grant a stay or exclude the witness’s evidence but held the conflict required removal of counsel.

The accused would need to obtain new counsel and a new trial date.

The accused sought judicial interim release under s. 520 of the Criminal Code following a justice of the peace’s order detaining him on secondary and tertiary grounds in connection with multiple charges arising from an alleged staged motor vehicle accident and insurance fraud scheme.

The proposed plan of release included two sureties, house arrest, and electronic monitoring.

The court held that the justice of the peace erred in detaining the accused on secondary grounds and found that strict conditions including electronic monitoring could address concerns relating to secondary and tertiary grounds.

However, the court concluded that the proposed sureties were unsuitable due to credibility concerns and prior criminal justice involvement.

Because the sureties were not satisfactory, the proposed bail plan failed.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after a justice of the peace ordered detention on primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The charges involved alleged firearms offences, dangerous driving, and failing to stop for police following an incident in which a shotgun was allegedly discharged and a high‑speed police pursuit ensued.

The applicant proposed a revised release plan involving multiple sureties and electronic monitoring.

The court found serious credibility issues with both the applicant and the proposed surety and concluded the release plan would not adequately mitigate risks of flight or non‑compliance.

The court held that detention remained justified on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds and dismissed the bail review application.

The accused brought a second application seeking a stay of proceedings for abuse of process arising from plea negotiations conducted during a firearms and drug prosecution.

The accused argued that the Crown’s settlement offer—requiring an induced statement recanting prior evidence and implicating defence counsel in knowingly presenting false testimony—constituted prosecutorial misconduct.

The court held that plea negotiation communications were protected by settlement privilege and could not be unilaterally waived by the defence.

The presence of the accused’s father during the discussions did not vitiate the privilege.

Finding no extrinsic evidence of prosecutorial impropriety sufficient to justify piercing the privilege or reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the court ruled the evidence of settlement discussions inadmissible and dismissed the application.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal for trial following a preliminary inquiry on charges of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and conspiracy to possess heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The applicant argued the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded her jurisdiction because there was no evidence that he knew the shipment he handled contained heroin or any controlled substance.

The court reviewed the governing test under s. 548 of the Criminal Code and the jurisprudence in Shephard, Arcuri, and related authorities, emphasizing the highly deferential standard applicable on certiorari review of committal decisions.

The court held that the circumstantial evidence, including phone intercepts, coordinated activity with a co‑accused, and handling of the shipment, was capable of supporting an inference of knowledge if believed.

As some evidence existed on the essential element of knowledge, the preliminary inquiry judge acted within jurisdiction and the committal could not be disturbed.