Joshua Matthew Christopher Tupper

Following a conviction for assault causing bodily harm, the sentencing issue was whether the accused should receive a suspended sentence with a criminal record or a conditional discharge.

The court reviewed aggravating harm to the complainant, including concussion and whiplash, alongside mitigating factors including no prior record, mental health and substance use disorders, remorse, rehabilitation efforts, and Indigenous background.

Applying ss. 718 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code and the Gladue framework, the court emphasized restorative principles and the individualized circumstances of Indigenous offenders.

The court held that a non-custodial disposition without a criminal record was appropriate in the circumstances.

The accused was conditionally discharged and placed on probation for 18 months.

The offender was convicted of unauthorized possession of a loaded restricted or prohibited firearm contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The offences occurred during a police search of an illegal bar in Toronto in September 2019.

The offender was 21 years old at the time of the offences and 27 at sentencing.

The Crown sought 7-8 years imprisonment while the defence sought 2 years 9 months.

The court imposed a sentence of 4.5 years total (3.5 years for the firearm offence and 1 year consecutive for the drug offence), taking into account the offender's difficult background, youth at the time of the offences, and the principle of totality, balanced against the serious nature of the offences and the offender's subsequent criminal record.

Jean-Claude Robitaille was charged with assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm after kicking a volleyball that struck Michelle Powell in the face during Canada Day 2023 celebrations at Ashbridges Bay, Toronto.

The court examined whether the kick was accidental or reckless/deliberate, focusing on the mens rea for assault.

Evidence showed Robitaille kicked the ball hard toward a group of people, causing significant injury.

The court found that the force and proximity of the kick established that the risk of bodily harm was either intended or objectively foreseeable, rejecting the defence of accident.

Intoxication was not a defence as assault is a general intent offence.

The applicant, Thomy Baez-Eusebio, brought two applications: a disclosure application for the Information to Obtain (ITO) for a search warrant under the Liquor Licence Act, and a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained from a Honda Civic, alleging a breach of his section 8 Charter rights.

The court dismissed both applications, finding that the applicant lacked standing to challenge the Liquor Licence Act search warrant and that the police had reasonable grounds to seize and search the Honda Civic.

The court also denied leave to cross-examine the affiant of the ITO, finding no misleading statements or deficiencies in the warrant process.

The accused, Solomon Nnadede, was charged with sexually assaulting the complainant, MD, over a nine-month period.

The case turned on credibility and consent.

The complainant testified to three instances of forced vaginal penetration and other non-consensual sexual touching, asserting she eventually "gave up" fighting.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming all sexual activity was consensual based on an "understanding" where he provided financial support in exchange for sex.

The court rejected the accused's "understanding" as a valid defence for consent and found the complainant's testimony credible and reliable despite minor inconsistencies.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity.

The accused, charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and carrying a concealed weapon, sought to have the defence of extreme intoxication put to the jury for the general intent offences (aggravated assault and carrying a concealed weapon).

The court reviewed the jurisprudence on extreme intoxication, emphasizing the high evidentiary burden, including the requirement for expert evidence to establish a state akin to automatism or insanity.

Despite evidence of the accused's intoxication, the defence's toxicologist did not opine that the accused's state reached the level of extreme intoxication required by the Supreme Court.

The court ruled that the accused failed to meet the evidentiary burden, and therefore, the defence of extreme intoxication would not be put to the jury for the general intent offences.

The accused brought a pretrial motion alleging infringements of his rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) or a stay of proceedings under section 24(1).

The court found no breach of section 10(a) regarding the information provided about the charges, as the accused was sufficiently informed of his jeopardy.

Regarding section 10(b), the court found no breach despite a delay in facilitating access to duty counsel at the hospital and police station, citing reasonable security concerns at the hospital and the police's diligent efforts at the station.

Even if a breach had occurred, the court stated it would not have excluded the evidence (eyewitness statements, video) under section 24(2) as it was not 'obtained in a manner' that infringed Charter rights, nor would it have granted a stay of proceedings under section 24(1).

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, and with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The accused was found sleeping in the driver's seat of his parked vehicle on a residential side street adjacent to his apartment building.

The trial judge found that the Crown failed to prove an essential element of the offence—that the accused had care or control of the vehicle.

Applying the framework established in R. v. Boudreault, the court determined that the accused had rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code by establishing he had no intention to drive.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to establish a realistic risk of danger to persons or property, as the vehicle was safely parked on a quiet residential street with no foreseeable danger.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The Crown sought to admit the initial hearsay statement of a highly vulnerable complainant with severe cognitive and developmental disabilities, who alleged sexual assault by the defendant while he was working as temporary staff at a group home.

The complainant was unable to testify due to the traumatic effects of a court visit, which caused significant behavioral regression.

The court admitted the statement under the principled hearsay exception, finding both necessity and threshold reliability were established.

The complainant's cognitive profile, emotional vulnerability, and the spontaneous nature of the initial statement to a trusted support worker provided adequate circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.

The defendant was convicted of two counts of possessing child pornography following a trial.

The court addressed the applicability of the Kienapple principle and imposed sentence.

The defendant, a 24-year-old security guard with no criminal record, had accumulated child pornography on his computer and external hard drive.

The material was discovered when a co-worker accessed the hard drive left at the workplace.

The court found that the Kienapple principle did not apply as the two offences had different factual and legal nexuses.

The court imposed a sentence of ten months incarceration on each count to be served concurrently, followed by three years probation, along with ancillary orders including a five-year prohibition order under section 161 of the Criminal Code, DNA order, and sex offender registration for life.

The accused, a 23-year-old international student from China, sought judicial interim release on eight criminal charges including criminal harassment, assault, sexual assault, break and enter with intent, unlawful confinement, and possession of a weapon.

The accused had previously been released on bail with no-contact conditions but allegedly breached those conditions by communicating with the complainant after his father departed Canada.

The court imposed publication bans under sections 486.4 and 517(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while the presumption of innocence and constitutional rights to reasonable bail are fundamental, the secondary ground for detention—protection of the public and the complainant—was not adequately addressed by the proposed release plan.

The court denied bail and ordered the accused detained.

In a second degree murder trial where the accused raised self-defence, the defence sought to introduce an exculpatory audio and video statement made to police shortly after arrest.

The Crown opposed admission on the basis that the statement was a prior consistent statement and not spontaneous.

Applying the principles in R. v. Edgar, the court held that spontaneous out-of-court statements by an accused made upon arrest may be admitted as evidence of reaction to an accusation and as circumstantial evidence relevant to credibility.

The court found the statement had significant probative value in demonstrating the accused’s emotional state, cooperation with police, and consistency with his anticipated testimony, and could rebut evidence of post-offence conduct suggesting guilt.

The post‑arrest statement was therefore admitted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

The principal issue at trial was whether an admitted breach of the accused's Charter right to counsel should lead to exclusion of breath test results under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The breach occurred because the first duty counsel provided was difficult to understand, and the accused complained about this to officers.

A second duty counsel was provided between the two breath tests.

The court dismissed the application to exclude the evidence and found the accused guilty.

The court applied the three-part test from R. v. Grant, finding the state conduct was at the low end of the breach spectrum, the impact on Charter-protected interests was relatively minor, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits favored admission of the evidence.