Joshua Matthew Christopher Tupper

Three accused were charged with discharging a firearm with intent to wound, reckless discharge, and unauthorized possession of a firearm following a shootout outside a commercial building.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence and CCTV footage to identify the shooters.

The court found the Crown proved the identity of two of the accused but failed to prove the identity of the third.

For the two identified accused, the Crown conceded it could not disprove self-defence regarding the discharge of the firearms, leading to acquittals on those counts.

However, the court found the two accused possessed the firearms prior to the altercation, defeating the self-defence claim for possession, resulting in convictions for unauthorized possession of a firearm.

Following a conviction for assault causing bodily harm, the sentencing issue was whether the accused should receive a suspended sentence with a criminal record or a conditional discharge.

The court reviewed aggravating harm to the complainant, including concussion and whiplash, alongside mitigating factors including no prior record, mental health and substance use disorders, remorse, rehabilitation efforts, and Indigenous background.

Applying ss. 718 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code and the Gladue framework, the court emphasized restorative principles and the individualized circumstances of Indigenous offenders.

The court held that a non-custodial disposition without a criminal record was appropriate in the circumstances.

The accused was conditionally discharged and placed on probation for 18 months.

The offender was convicted of unauthorized possession of a loaded restricted or prohibited firearm contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The offences occurred during a police search of an illegal bar in Toronto in September 2019.

The offender was 21 years old at the time of the offences and 27 at sentencing.

The Crown sought 7-8 years imprisonment while the defence sought 2 years 9 months.

The court imposed a sentence of 4.5 years total (3.5 years for the firearm offence and 1 year consecutive for the drug offence), taking into account the offender's difficult background, youth at the time of the offences, and the principle of totality, balanced against the serious nature of the offences and the offender's subsequent criminal record.

Jean-Claude Robitaille was charged with assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm after kicking a volleyball that struck Michelle Powell in the face during Canada Day 2023 celebrations at Ashbridges Bay, Toronto.

The court examined whether the kick was accidental or reckless/deliberate, focusing on the mens rea for assault.

Evidence showed Robitaille kicked the ball hard toward a group of people, causing significant injury.

The court found that the force and proximity of the kick established that the risk of bodily harm was either intended or objectively foreseeable, rejecting the defence of accident.

Intoxication was not a defence as assault is a general intent offence.

The Ontario Review Board conducted an annual review for an accused found not criminally responsible for assault with a weapon and other offences.

The accused, diagnosed with schizophrenia and substance abuse disorder, had recently experienced a relapse requiring hospitalization after a period of stability in the community.

The Board accepted the joint recommendation of the parties and the treatment team, finding that the accused continues to pose a significant threat to public safety due to his brittle illness and vulnerability to stressors.

The Board ordered the continuation of the existing Detention Order as the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The Ontario Review Board conducted an annual review for an accused found not criminally responsible for sexual assault and other offences.

The accused, diagnosed with schizophrenia and substance use disorder, had recently decompensated in the community and required hospitalization.

The Board accepted the joint submission of the parties and the attending psychiatrist's evidence that the accused continues to pose a significant threat to public safety.

The Board ordered the continuation of the existing Detention Order, noting the accused requires supervised housing before any future discharge.

The applicant, Thomy Baez-Eusebio, brought two applications: a disclosure application for the Information to Obtain (ITO) for a search warrant under the Liquor Licence Act, and a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained from a Honda Civic, alleging a breach of his section 8 Charter rights.

The court dismissed both applications, finding that the applicant lacked standing to challenge the Liquor Licence Act search warrant and that the police had reasonable grounds to seize and search the Honda Civic.

The court also denied leave to cross-examine the affiant of the ITO, finding no misleading statements or deficiencies in the warrant process.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder after shooting an unarmed construction worker at a worksite following a motor vehicle collision and attempted theft of a work van.

The Crown sought a 15-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought the statutory minimum of 10 years.

The sentencing judge found no evidence of planning but noted the aggravating factors of introducing a loaded firearm into a public altercation.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 12 years.

The accused, Solomon Nnadede, was charged with sexually assaulting the complainant, MD, over a nine-month period.

The case turned on credibility and consent.

The complainant testified to three instances of forced vaginal penetration and other non-consensual sexual touching, asserting she eventually "gave up" fighting.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming all sexual activity was consensual based on an "understanding" where he provided financial support in exchange for sex.

The court rejected the accused's "understanding" as a valid defence for consent and found the complainant's testimony credible and reliable despite minor inconsistencies.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity.

The offender was convicted of aggravated assault and carrying a concealed weapon following an unprovoked stabbing in a shopping mall.

The court determined the appropriate sentence was five and a half years in prison, noting the seriousness of the offence and the offender's intoxication.

However, after applying credit for over three years of pre-trial custody, including enhanced credit for harsh lockdown conditions, the sentence was reduced to time-served with no probation order.

The accused, charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and carrying a concealed weapon, sought to have the defence of extreme intoxication put to the jury for the general intent offences (aggravated assault and carrying a concealed weapon).

The court reviewed the jurisprudence on extreme intoxication, emphasizing the high evidentiary burden, including the requirement for expert evidence to establish a state akin to automatism or insanity.

Despite evidence of the accused's intoxication, the defence's toxicologist did not opine that the accused's state reached the level of extreme intoxication required by the Supreme Court.

The court ruled that the accused failed to meet the evidentiary burden, and therefore, the defence of extreme intoxication would not be put to the jury for the general intent offences.

The accused brought a pretrial motion alleging infringements of his rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) or a stay of proceedings under section 24(1).

The court found no breach of section 10(a) regarding the information provided about the charges, as the accused was sufficiently informed of his jeopardy.

Regarding section 10(b), the court found no breach despite a delay in facilitating access to duty counsel at the hospital and police station, citing reasonable security concerns at the hospital and the police's diligent efforts at the station.

Even if a breach had occurred, the court stated it would not have excluded the evidence (eyewitness statements, video) under section 24(2) as it was not 'obtained in a manner' that infringed Charter rights, nor would it have granted a stay of proceedings under section 24(1).

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, and with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The accused was found sleeping in the driver's seat of his parked vehicle on a residential side street adjacent to his apartment building.

The trial judge found that the Crown failed to prove an essential element of the offence—that the accused had care or control of the vehicle.

Applying the framework established in R. v. Boudreault, the court determined that the accused had rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code by establishing he had no intention to drive.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to establish a realistic risk of danger to persons or property, as the vehicle was safely parked on a quiet residential street with no foreseeable danger.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The Crown sought to admit the initial hearsay statement of a highly vulnerable complainant with severe cognitive and developmental disabilities, who alleged sexual assault by the defendant while he was working as temporary staff at a group home.

The complainant was unable to testify due to the traumatic effects of a court visit, which caused significant behavioral regression.

The court admitted the statement under the principled hearsay exception, finding both necessity and threshold reliability were established.

The complainant's cognitive profile, emotional vulnerability, and the spontaneous nature of the initial statement to a trusted support worker provided adequate circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.

The accused was tried on multiple counts of sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation arising from allegations by his step-daughter and a foster child over several years.

After a jury mistrial triggered by concerns about interpretation of the accused’s testimony, the matter proceeded before a judge alone.

Applying the W. (D.) framework, the court found major credibility and reliability problems in both complainants’ evidence, accepted key defence evidence about the household composition and the accused’s work schedule, and concluded the Crown had not proved any count beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all 17 counts.

The defendant was convicted of two counts of possessing child pornography following a trial.

The court addressed the applicability of the Kienapple principle and imposed sentence.

The defendant, a 24-year-old security guard with no criminal record, had accumulated child pornography on his computer and external hard drive.

The material was discovered when a co-worker accessed the hard drive left at the workplace.

The court found that the Kienapple principle did not apply as the two offences had different factual and legal nexuses.

The court imposed a sentence of ten months incarceration on each count to be served concurrently, followed by three years probation, along with ancillary orders including a five-year prohibition order under section 161 of the Criminal Code, DNA order, and sex offender registration for life.

The accused, a 23-year-old international student from China, sought judicial interim release on eight criminal charges including criminal harassment, assault, sexual assault, break and enter with intent, unlawful confinement, and possession of a weapon.

The accused had previously been released on bail with no-contact conditions but allegedly breached those conditions by communicating with the complainant after his father departed Canada.

The court imposed publication bans under sections 486.4 and 517(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while the presumption of innocence and constitutional rights to reasonable bail are fundamental, the secondary ground for detention—protection of the public and the complainant—was not adequately addressed by the proposed release plan.

The court denied bail and ordered the accused detained.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving a complainant under 16.

The Crown relied primarily on the complainant’s testimony and supporting evidence from the complainant’s mother, including an alleged admission by the accused and observations of blood following the alleged assault.

The court found serious credibility and reliability concerns with both witnesses, including significant inconsistencies and the complainant’s change of the alleged date of the assault by several years.

The court held that the Crown failed to establish the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The accused, a loss prevention officer at a retail warehouse store, was charged with two counts of theft over $5,000 under s. 334 of the Criminal Code following a coordinated diversion theft captured on store security footage.

The Crown alleged the accused orchestrated the diversion by sending other employees away from the store entrance to allow accomplices to remove merchandise.

The evidence against the accused was entirely circumstantial and relied heavily on video recordings and witness testimony describing the accused directing staff away from the entrance moments before merchandise exited.

The court found the Crown proved that a theft exceeding $5,000 occurred but held that the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused participated in the theft.

Suspicion alone was insufficient to meet the criminal standard of proof.

During a second-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to re-examine the sole eyewitness (the accused's wife) by playing portions of her videotaped police statement.

The defence had cross-examined the witness on prior inconsistent statements made during the interview.

The Crown argued the video was necessary to show the witness's highly emotional state and provide context for the inconsistencies.

The court ruled that the Crown could not play all portions showing the witness in distress, as it would be prejudicial and misleading, but permitted the Crown to play the specific portions upon which the witness was cross-examined to provide full context.