Jocelyn Speyer

The appellant was convicted of breaking into and assaulting a 68-year-old woman and breaking into and raping a 54-year-old woman.

He was declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate term.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of DNA evidence obtained through a saliva sample, arguing his Charter rights were violated.

He also challenged the trial judge's failure to preserve evidence and appealed his indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no Charter violations in the DNA seizure, that the trial judge properly exercised her discretion regarding the destroyed evidence, and that the indeterminate sentence was appropriate given the appellant's high risk of reoffending and consistent refusal to engage in treatment.

This addendum addresses the appellant Ronald Cyr's request for clarification regarding the court's refusal to allow him to advance a new Charter argument on appeal.

The appellant sought to argue that sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms required that clause 6 of section 3(1) of the Juries Act be expanded to exclude former auxiliary police officers from jury service.

The court declined to permit this new argument, finding no air of reality to the suggestion of bias and noting that sections 670 and 671 of the Criminal Code provided a complete answer to this ground of appeal.

Three accused were convicted of first-degree murder following a trial involving an undercover police operation.

The appellants challenged the conviction on multiple grounds including: (1) the trial judge's refusal to sever the trial; (2) the admissibility of statements made to an undercover officer; (3) jury management issues during sequestration; and (4) various trial procedure matters.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that joint trial was appropriate despite cutthroat defences, the undercover operation did not violate Charter rights, and jury management issues did not constitute a miscarriage of justice.

The appellants brought a motion to raise new issues on appeal regarding the eligibility of a juror who was a former auxiliary police officer.

They sought to argue that the juror was ineligible under the Juries Act and, alternatively, under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal permitted the appellants to advance the statutory interpretation argument but denied permission to advance the Charter argument, with full reasons to follow in the appeal judgment.

The appellants, a father, mother, and son, were convicted of four counts of first-degree murder after four family members were found drowned in a submerged vehicle.

On appeal, the son sought to introduce fresh evidence claiming he was a young person at the time of the offences, thereby challenging the adult court's jurisdiction.

The appellants also appealed on grounds relating to the admission of expert evidence on honour killings, instructions on post-offence conduct, the admission of ante-mortem hearsay statements, and the Crown's theory of liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to introduce fresh evidence, finding the proposed documents lacked threshold reliability.

The Court also dismissed all conviction appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant was convicted of theft under $5,000 and possession of property obtained by crime after a stolen vehicle was found abandoned with a balaclava inside containing his DNA.

The trial judge relied on the DNA evidence and the proximity of the theft to other crimes the appellant was acquitted of.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the verdict unreasonable, as the DNA evidence only proved the appellant wore the balaclava at some point, not that he possessed it during the theft.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol content over the legal limit.

Her summary conviction appeal was dismissed after the appeal judge refused to allow new Charter arguments that were not raised at trial.

The appellant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing she was treated unfairly.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding the proposed appeal did not raise a question of law alone as required by s. 839(1) of the Criminal Code and did not meet the test for granting leave.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to order a psychological assessment in preparation for his trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that such an assessment would not have been relevant to the factual determinations underlying his conviction.

The court also upheld the sentence as fit for the serious crimes committed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal after the trial judge excluded blood-sample and hospital-record evidence obtained under a valid warrant because police failed to report the seizure to a justice as soon as practicable under s. 489.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that s. 8 Charter protection extends beyond the initial taking to the continued detention of lawfully seized items, and the delayed report compromised the judicial oversight contemplated by ss. 489.1 and 490.

However, the court found the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) analysis by failing to consider that the original seizure was warrant-authorized, the items were used only for the authorized purpose, continued detention would inevitably have been ordered, compliance was delayed rather than wholly absent, and the accused's residual privacy interest was minimal.

Balancing the Grant factors afresh, the court held admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The moving party sought an extension of time to serve and file a notice of motion for leave to appeal his convictions and fines for driving without insurance and driving with a suspended licence.

He explained the multi-year delay was due to his alcoholism and mental disabilities at the time of the initial appeal, and that the outstanding fines were preventing him from obtaining a record suspension.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no legislative mechanism to commute the fines despite expressing great sympathy for the moving party's rehabilitation and financial plight.

The appellant appealed his convictions for kidnapping and unlawful confinement.

During his trial, his counsel was removed for ethical reasons, and the appellant represented himself for the final two days.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by not warning him about the dangers of self-representation, specifically that speaking in court would allow the judge to compare his voice to intercepted recordings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge relied on other evidence to convict and did not use the in-court voice comparison as the basis for guilt.

However, the court stayed the unlawful confinement conviction pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The applicant sought to review a single judge's order refusing an extension of time to appeal an Ontario Review Board (ORB) disposition and a finding of not criminally responsible (NCR) for criminal harassment.

The Court of Appeal held that the extension of time to appeal the NCR verdict must be sought in the Superior Court, as it was a summary conviction appeal.

Regarding the ORB decision, the Court applied a relaxed test for the intent to appeal due to the applicant's mental illness, but ultimately dismissed the motion, finding the ORB made no error and its decision to detain the applicant was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was not unreasonable given the appellant's admitted non-compliance with previous dispositions, lack of insight into his condition and medical needs, and recent events.

The appellant was convicted of historical sexual abuse against his step-daughter and biological daughter.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility by relying on improper cross-examination about motive to fabricate, failing to address inconsistencies, and improperly relying on the appellant's courtroom demeanour outside the witness box.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the cross-examination was proper, the inconsistencies were minor, and the trial judge's modest reliance on courtroom demeanour did not cause a miscarriage of justice given the other cogent reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a home invasion robbery, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a recanted K.G.B. statement, relying on the witness's guilty plea, and drawing an adverse inference from the late disclosure of the recantation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in admitting the statement or using the guilty plea to assess reliability.

However, the court held the trial judge erred in law by drawing an adverse inference against the appellant for the late disclosure of the recantation, as accused persons generally have no obligation to disclose their defence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Correctional Service of Canada brought an urgent motion to stay a ruling by the Coroner presiding over the Ashley Smith inquest.

The Coroner had dismissed CSC's motion for a sealing order regarding confidential documents and videos.

Applying the RJR Macdonald test, the Divisional Court found that CSC failed to demonstrate a serious issue to be tried or irreparable harm, noting that much of the information was already public and the assertions of harm were speculative.

The motion for a stay was dismissed with costs.

The accused pleaded guilty to theft over $5,000 after stealing over $700,000 from her employer over a four-year period to fund a severe gambling addiction.

Despite significant mitigating factors, including a guilty plea, genuine remorse, and extensive rehabilitation efforts, the court found that the magnitude of the breach of trust and the amount stolen required a traditional custodial sentence to address denunciation and general deterrence.

The accused was sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment, followed by 3 years' probation, and ordered to pay $288,286.41 in restitution.

The accused pleaded guilty to theft over $5,000 involving the misappropriation of over $722,000 from her employer over a four-year period.

The theft was committed through multiple methods including ATM withdrawals, credit card payments, and cheques written to herself.

The accused was a trusted employee and secretary with signing authority on the company account.

The court imposed a sentence of six months imprisonment followed by three years probation, rejecting a conditional sentence despite significant mitigating factors including the accused's gambling addiction, remorse, and rehabilitation efforts.

The court found that denunciation and general deterrence required custodial time given the magnitude of the theft, duration of conduct, egregious breach of trust, and impact on the victim.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the cross-examination of the complainant's mother constituted impermissible oath-helping.

A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that there was no violation of the oath-helping rule.

The Chief Justice and Justice McLachlin dissented, finding that the rule had been violated and would have ordered a new trial.