Jeffrey E. Streisfield

The moving party sought leave to appeal, which was dismissed on the basis of prematurity.

The successful respondents sought costs.

The moving party argued each party should bear its own costs due to the public interest and novelty of the issue.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the usual rule of costs following the event applied, especially since the motion was dismissed for prematurity.

The court awarded costs of $3,000 inclusive to the clients represented by Mr. Streisfield.

In a new trial ordered following a successful appeal concerning a possessory claim and an appeal under the Land Titles Act, the objector sought to read portions of the claimant’s prior cross‑examination transcript from the original trial into evidence.

The claimant objected on the basis that prior procedural orders required lay witnesses to testify viva voce and did not authorize the use of her previous testimony.

The court held that the Rules of Civil Procedure governed the proceeding rather than the evidentiary flexibility permitted under the Land Titles Act or the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The proposed transcript excerpts could only be used for impeachment and should have been put to the witness during cross‑examination in accordance with the rule in Browne v. Dunn and the Ontario Evidence Act.

As the statutory and common‑law requirements for admitting such evidence were not satisfied, the motion to read in the transcript evidence was dismissed.

The Town of Richmond Hill sought leave to appeal a preliminary decision of the Ontario Municipal Board regarding the interpretation of parkland dedication provisions under the Planning Act.

The Town argued that the Board could not set an alternative park dedication rate in an Official Plan.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding it premature.

The Court held that the issue was not a discrete threshold question and that granting leave would improperly fragment the ongoing Board proceedings.

The possessory claimant brought a motion to stay a new trial or, in the alternative, for security for costs, following a successful appeal that ordered a re-trial due to apprehension of judicial bias.

The objector brought a cross-motion for security for costs.

The court noted that both parties had achieved parallel success in previous proceedings and faced similar risks of losing their properties to pay litigation costs.

Finding that a stay would deny access to justice and that neither party should be given an advantage under the rules, the court dismissed both the motion and the cross-motion.

The appellant appealed a trial decision regarding a property dispute over waterfront access.

At the outset of the trial, the trial judge disclosed that his wife was a real estate agent specializing in waterfront properties in the area and had clients connected to the dispute, but he declined the appellant's request to recuse himself.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's wife's deep and multi-layered connections to the properties and witnesses created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The moving party municipality sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board that approved official plan and zoning bylaw amendments permitting a mixed-use high-density development.

The municipality argued the Board failed to have regard to its new official plan, exceeded its jurisdiction regarding community benefits, and provided inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the Board's decision on the applicable official plan and height issues were matters of fact or mixed fact and law entitled to deference.

The court also held that the Board did not impose community benefits and that its reasons were adequate and met the duty of procedural fairness.

The Deputy Director of Racing issued a Notice of Proposed Order to revoke the appellant's horse racing licenses, alleging he conspired to fix a race at Fraser Downs in 1999.

The appellant requested a hearing before the Ontario Racing Commission.

The Commission found the Administration's case lacked clear and cogent evidence, noting significant inconsistencies in the key witness's testimony, the failure to call the bettor as a witness, and the failure to produce the race videotapes.

The Commission quashed and set aside the Notice of Proposed Order.

The appellants (defendants) were successful in their appeal, resulting in the plaintiffs' statement of claim being struck out as an abuse of process and the action dismissed.

The parties could not agree on costs, and the court received written submissions.

The appellants sought $42,302.66 on a partial indemnity scale, while the respondents argued for a reduced amount of $12,000 to $14,000.

The Divisional Court found no reason to reduce the amounts claimed, noting the action involved serious allegations of fraud, conspiracy, dishonesty, and malice.

Costs were fixed at $42,302.66, payable by the respondents to the appellants.

The appellant appealed an order finding that a partnership was terminated on April 10, 2003.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 32(c) of the Partnership Act does not require express notice of termination, and the application judge reasonably concluded that a letter sent on that date clearly conveyed an intention to dissolve the partnership.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $4,200.

The Deputy Director of Racing issued a Notice of Proposed Order to Revoke the owner, trainer, and driver's licenses of the respondent on the grounds that he was involved in fixing a horse race in British Columbia.

The respondent requested a hearing before the Ontario Racing Commission.

The Commission determined that it had the jurisdiction to substitute its opinion for that of the Director, but that denial of a license should be based on clear and cogent evidence.

The majority of the Commission found the testimony of a co-conspirator credible despite inconsistencies, and confirmed the proposed order to revoke the licenses.

One commissioner dissented, finding the evidence lacked the necessary clarity and cogency.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Racing Industry Board of Appeal that rescinded the Judges' decision to place the horse DELCREST LAVEC from first to second for a passing lane violation.

The majority of the Ontario Racing Commission found that DELCREST LAVEC progressively occupied the extended inside lane, denying access to the trailing horse WHITESAND TITAN, which was in contention.

The Commission allowed the appeal, rescinded the Board of Appeal's decision, and restored the Judges' original order of finish.

The appellant challenged summary judgment dismissing claims arising from a municipality's road-closing by-laws and related dealings with an adjoining landowner near Lake Ontario.

He alleged the segmented by-laws were used to avoid ministerial approval for closing a road leading to a lake and argued that a perpetual grading easement was effectively a sale that had to be offered to him as the abutting owner.

The court rejected both arguments, finding no evidentiary foundation for allegations of bad faith and holding that the easement did not trigger statutory sale rights.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.