Jeffrey E. Streisfield

The appellant residents association appealed a Committee of Adjustment decision granting minor variances to permit the construction of a new two-storey single detached house.

The requested variances related to maximum lot coverage and minimum side and rear yard setbacks.

The Tribunal accepted the uncontradicted expert planning evidence that the proposed development was compatible with the evolving character of the neighbourhood, where similar variances had been approved.

The Tribunal found the variances met the four tests under section 45(1) of the Planning Act and dismissed the appeal, authorizing the variances.

The Ontario Land Tribunal held a Case Management Conference to settle the Issues and Procedural Order for Phase 2 of a hearing regarding multiple appeals of Official Plan and Zoning By-law amendments in the Town of Richmond Hill.

The Tribunal approved the City's proposed Hearing Plan, which divided the hearing into four sub-phases, and rejected attempts by North Elgin Centre Inc. to expand the issues list to include area-wide matters such as the location of the Bernard Bus Terminal.

The Tribunal also corrected a minor omission in a previous zoning by-law amendment and dismissed a renewed motion for recusal.

McDonald's sought to declare North Elgin Centre Inc. (NEC) in contempt of a prior court order requiring NEC to provide "all reasonable cooperation" to obtain Planning Act consent for a renewed lease.

NEC filed a report with the Town's Committee of Adjustment proposing conditions for consent approval, which McDonald's argued was a breach.

NEC also brought a cross-motion for declaratory relief and directions.

The court dismissed McDonald's contempt motion, finding that NEC's report, including its proposed conditions, reflected legitimate concerns as the property owner and did not constitute a failure to provide "all reasonable cooperation." NEC's cross-motion was also dismissed as unnecessary given the contempt motion's dismissal, and because a single judge could not vary a panel order.

On appeal from a Divisional Court decision, the Court of Appeal considered whether the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) had jurisdiction to impose a 25 percent cap on the alternative parkland dedication requirement under section 42 of the Planning Act.

The Town of Richmond Hill had adopted an Official Plan policy allowing for parkland dedication at a rate of one hectare per 300 dwelling units.

Developers challenged this policy, and the OMB imposed a 25 percent cap on the amount of land required to be conveyed.

The Divisional Court set aside the cap, finding the OMB lacked authority to impose it.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that the legislature has given municipalities exclusive authority to determine the rate under section 42(3), subject only to the requirement that an Official Plan contain specific policies dealing with parkland provision and the use of the alternative requirement.

The OMB's role is limited to reviewing whether such policies are appropriate and accord with provincial policies, not to set or cap the rate itself.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave under Rule 48.04(1) to compel further discovery and production of documents from the defendants, specifically seeking unredacted daytimers and a fourth re-attendance for discovery.

The court granted leave to bring the motion but dismissed the substantive requests, noting the long-standing knowledge of the daytimers, the imminent 20-day trial, and the unreasonableness of ordering a further re-attendance at this late stage.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the responding defendants.

The moving party defendant brought a motion to compel the responding party plaintiff to answer undertakings and refusals from an examination for discovery, and to re-attend to answer follow-up questions.

The court ordered the plaintiff to answer most of the contested questions, finding them relevant to the pleadings, but declined to order production of communications between counsel and experts or the experts' files, citing a lack of factual foundation for improper influence.

The plaintiff was ordered to re-attend discovery, and the moving party was awarded costs in the cause.

The plaintiff brought a motion for various procedural relief, including leave to bring the motion after setting the action down for trial, further examinations for discovery, and further documentary production.

The court granted leave under Rule 48.04(1) due to substantial amendments to the pleadings.

The court ordered further examinations of certain defendants and non-parties, and ordered the defendants to serve further and better supplementary affidavits of documents.

Timetables were set for expert reports and further motions.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the plaintiff in the cause, while costs of a prior motion were awarded to the defendants in the cause.

The moving party defendants brought a motion to settle a previous order, fix a timetable, and order reciprocal property inspections.

The court found that the reciprocal inspections had already been consented to in a prior order and through undertakings, and ordered them to proceed.

The court also addressed the costs of a previous motion, finding divided success and ordering that each party bear their own costs.

A motion was brought seeking various forms of disclosure and re-attendance at discovery.

Some matters were resolved by consent, including a defendant municipality serving a supplementary affidavit of documents and a representative attending discovery for up to 2 hours.

The court addressed the requirement for leave to bring the contested parts of the motion, denying leave for most requests as they did not fall under Rule 48.04(2)(b).

For the remaining contested relief concerning a co-defendant's supplementary affidavit, the court declined to order it as the co-defendant agreed to comply with their obligations.

The scope of the municipality's re-attendance was limited to documents in the supplementary affidavit.

The court also ordered the moving party to pay installment costs thrown away for amendments to the statement of claim to the responding parties.

The Town of Richmond Hill appealed an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision that approved the Town's official plan policies regarding parkland dedication but imposed a 25% cap on the alternative requirement under s. 42 of the Planning Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the OMB's interpretation of the Planning Act was unreasonable.

The Court held that the legislation expressly grants municipalities the authority to set the alternative parkland dedication rate by by-law, and the OMB does not have the jurisdiction to impose a cap or fix a specific rate through its power to approve official plan policies.

The appellant sought costs for two trials and an appeal regarding a property dispute involving adverse possession and prescriptive easements.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant was largely successful and that the respondent's actions in maintaining an erroneous claim to the entirety of the disputed property were unreasonable.

The Court awarded the appellant $282,000 in costs for the two trials and set off the $25,000 appeal costs against a previous costs order in favour of the respondent.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment granting the respondent possessory title over a portion of his beachfront property by way of adverse possession or, alternatively, a prescriptive easement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the finding of adverse possession because the respondent had not effectively excluded the appellant from the property.

The Court also varied the easement finding, limiting it to non-vehicular traffic on a specific path, as there was no continuous 20-year period of vehicular use.

The trial judge's costs orders, including an order against the appellant's counsel personally, were set aside.

The moving party sought leave to admit an affidavit on its pending motion for leave to appeal.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the points raised in the affidavit regarding the public importance of the issues could be made by counsel without the affidavit, that other municipalities had already been granted leave to intervene, and that the remaining aspects of the affidavit contained inadmissible opinion evidence.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the responding parties.

The Town of Richmond Hill sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision imposing a cap on the alternative requirement for parkland dedication under s. 42(3) of the Planning Act.

Several other municipalities sought leave to intervene in the motion for leave to appeal and the appeal itself, arguing the Board's decision could impact their own parkland dedication policies.

The Divisional Court granted the motions to intervene, finding the issue transcended the immediate parties and the proposed interveners could offer distinct and useful perspectives on an issue of public importance.

The appellant sought to appeal a judgment disposing of claims under the Land Titles Act to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction, as section 27 of the Land Titles Act directs such appeals to the Divisional Court.

The court transferred the appeal and the related motion for leave to appeal costs to the Divisional Court pursuant to section 110 of the Courts of Justice Act, with a request to expedite the hearing.

In a commercial property boundary dispute, the applicant sought declarations of ownership over a disputed strip of land and authority to relocate a chain link fence to the surveyed property line.

The respondent argued the application was barred by abuse of process due to earlier litigation between predecessors in title and alternatively relied on adverse possession under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court held that the respondent had not established the required ten years of adverse possession before the land was converted to Land Titles Qualified, and that s. 51(1) of the Land Titles Act barred acquisition of adverse interests thereafter.

The earlier action concerned easement and access issues, not ownership of the disputed lands, so the application was not an abuse of process.

Declaratory and injunctive relief were granted, with implementation delayed for sixty days.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Municipal Board decision that dismissed parts of her appeal regarding a municipal Official Plan.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application on the basis that the applicant had an adequate alternative remedy.

Specifically, the applicant failed to request a review or rehearing under section 43 of the Ontario Municipal Board Act, which provides a statutory mechanism to address her claims of procedural unfairness.

The court noted that allowing the judicial review would undermine the legislative scheme, which requires leave to appeal Board decisions.

Following a successful claim for possessory title, the claimant sought costs for two protracted appeal hearings.

The court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $490,000, citing the claimant's multiple favorable Rule 49 offers to settle and the objector's unreasonable and vexatious conduct throughout the proceedings.

The parties disputed the ownership of a portion of beachfront land and an isthmus connecting a small island to the mainland in Georgian Bay.

The respondent held paper title to the disputed land, which had ambulatory boundaries that changed with the water level.

The applicant, who owned the island, claimed possessory title or a prescriptive easement over the disputed land, arguing that she and her predecessors had used it continuously for access and recreation under the mistaken belief that they owned it.

The court found that the applicant had established adverse possession, as the possession was open, notorious, and continuous for the requisite statutory period prior to the land's conversion to the Land Titles system.

The court also held that occasional inundation of the land by water did not interrupt the limitation period for adverse possession of riparian property.

The respondent's expert witness evidence was rejected due to bias.

The applicant was declared the owner in fee simple of the disputed land.

During a property dispute trial, the possessory claimant brought a mid‑trial motion seeking production of email communications and notes exchanged between the objector’s counsel and the objector’s expert surveyor.

The court found that the communications were relevant to assessing whether the expert had abandoned the role of an independent expert and instead acted as an advocate for the retaining party.

Claims of solicitor‑client privilege, litigation privilege, and the lawyer’s work product doctrine were rejected for most communications because the materials were probative of expert bias and formed part of the factual foundation for the expert’s opinions.

The court held that exposing potential expert bias justified disclosure notwithstanding privilege claims.

The motion was granted and the communications were admitted into evidence on a voir dire.