Day

The applicant sought judicial review of an Inquiry Officer's decision upholding the proposed expropriation of its property for highway construction.

The applicant argued the hearing should have been adjourned pending the completion of a municipal traffic study.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Inquiry Officer's refusal to adjourn was not demonstrably unfair and did not constitute a denial of natural justice or procedural fairness.

The appellants (defendants) were successful in their appeal, resulting in the plaintiffs' statement of claim being struck out as an abuse of process and the action dismissed.

The parties could not agree on costs, and the court received written submissions.

The appellants sought $42,302.66 on a partial indemnity scale, while the respondents argued for a reduced amount of $12,000 to $14,000.

The Divisional Court found no reason to reduce the amounts claimed, noting the action involved serious allegations of fraud, conspiracy, dishonesty, and malice.

Costs were fixed at $42,302.66, payable by the respondents to the appellants.

The appellants appealed from an order dismissing their motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim and dismiss the action.

The plaintiffs had previously been found to have breached their fiduciary duty in a prior action and subsequently commenced this action alleging fraud and conspiracy against their former adversaries and their lawyers.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the amended statement of claim was an unauthorized abuse of process, the plaintiff lacked capacity to represent the estate, and the action was a collateral attack on the prior judgment barred by res judicata.

The statement of claim was struck without leave to amend and the action was dismissed.

The applicant lawyer sought judicial review to stop the Law Society from proceeding with a disciplinary hearing against him.

He argued that because the Law Society's Compensation Fund had already paid a claim to a former client based on a finding of his 'dishonesty', the disciplinary panel would be institutionally biased.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Law Society Act explicitly authorizes the overlapping functions of compensation and discipline.

Following established jurisprudence, the court found that the exercise of these dual statutory functions does not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias unless the administrative body overextends its authority, which did not occur here.

Following the death of their daughter in a motor vehicle accident, both parents applied for death benefits from the insurer.

The insurer paid the father but denied the mother's claim, arguing the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule only contemplated a single payment.

The motions judge agreed and dismissed the mother's action.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the wording of s. 25(2)5.i. of the Schedule, which provides for payment to 'a person' rather than 'the person', requires the insurer to make separate payments to each person upon whom the deceased was dependent.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellants appealed a decision finding oppressive conduct and breach of fiduciary duty.

The motion judge found that the corporation was represented to the respondent investor as the owner of a specific technology, but the individual appellant deliberately withheld title to the patents for his own purposes.

The Divisional Court upheld the findings, noting that the investor was entitled to rely on the representations made and that the doctrine of reasonable expectations applied.

The court also upheld the remedy, which included declaring the corporation the owner of the process and directing an accounting for profits derived from a related contract.

The appeal was dismissed.