Mr. Stewart

The court determined costs following a 20-day trial concerning the ownership of a two-chain strip of land adjacent to the Agency One Reserve.

The plaintiffs, a group of First Nations, were largely unsuccessful in their claim for a declaration of ownership but succeeded on a threshold res judicata issue.

The Corporation of the Town of Fort Frances, a defendant, sought partial indemnity costs from the plaintiffs.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they were public interest litigants and that costs should be waived or deferred, finding their claim had significant proprietary and financial interests.

While acknowledging the Crown's role in the historical uncertainty, the court found no compelling policy reason to relieve the plaintiffs of costs in relation to Fort Frances, which was not a Crown authority.

The court fixed costs for Fort Frances, reducing a specific expert disbursement.

The defendant, Renfrew Power Generation Inc. (RPG), brought a motion to decertify a class action alleging trespass due to shoreline erosion caused by a raised lake level.

The original certification was based on the understanding that a 107.5 Contour Line defined all class members' property boundaries.

New survey evidence, obtained after certification, revealed that many class members' boundaries were not defined by this contour line, but by metes and bounds or other methods, and that RPG acquired flooding rights through various means not uniformly affecting all properties.

The court found that the common issue, as certified, was no longer necessary or a substantial ingredient for each class member's claim, as individual property boundary determinations were required.

The motion to decertify was granted.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment granting the respondent possessory title over a portion of his beachfront property by way of adverse possession or, alternatively, a prescriptive easement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the finding of adverse possession because the respondent had not effectively excluded the appellant from the property.

The Court also varied the easement finding, limiting it to non-vehicular traffic on a specific path, as there was no continuous 20-year period of vehicular use.

The trial judge's costs orders, including an order against the appellant's counsel personally, were set aside.

Following a trial concerning a possessory land claim, the successful party sought costs and the court initiated a Rule 57.07 inquiry regarding whether the opposing party’s lawyer should personally bear responsibility for wasted costs.

The court first rejected a recusal motion alleging reasonable apprehension of bias, applying the test from Wewaykum and concluding that prior findings and procedural steps did not create a reasonable apprehension of bias.

On the merits, the court applied the two‑step framework from Galganov v. Russell (Township) to determine whether the lawyer caused unnecessary costs and whether a personal costs order was warranted.

The court found the lawyer knowingly or negligently presented an expert witness whose lack of impartiality was evident, resulting in significant wasted trial time.

Exercising its discretion, the court ordered the lawyer to reimburse the client for 20% of the $490,000 costs award and to pay additional costs for the Rule 57.07 hearing.

Following a successful claim for possessory title, the claimant sought costs for two protracted appeal hearings.

The court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $490,000, citing the claimant's multiple favorable Rule 49 offers to settle and the objector's unreasonable and vexatious conduct throughout the proceedings.

During a property dispute trial, the possessory claimant brought a mid‑trial motion seeking production of email communications and notes exchanged between the objector’s counsel and the objector’s expert surveyor.

The court found that the communications were relevant to assessing whether the expert had abandoned the role of an independent expert and instead acted as an advocate for the retaining party.

Claims of solicitor‑client privilege, litigation privilege, and the lawyer’s work product doctrine were rejected for most communications because the materials were probative of expert bias and formed part of the factual foundation for the expert’s opinions.

The court held that exposing potential expert bias justified disclosure notwithstanding privilege claims.

The motion was granted and the communications were admitted into evidence on a voir dire.

The Township of Tiny appealed a decision of the Deputy Director of Titles under the Boundaries Act, which confirmed the westerly boundary of a beachfront cottage lot to be the water's edge of Lake Huron.

The Divisional Court found the Deputy Director's decision unreasonable, as it ignored the commercial reality of the original subdivision plan, which intended to reserve the beach for the use of back lot owners and the public.

The appeal was allowed, and the boundaries were confirmed as depicted on the original Plan of Subdivision, which set the boundary at a monumented straight line inland from the water's edge.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for prospectus misrepresentation under s. 130(1) of the Securities Act.

The trial judge had held that the appellants had a continuing obligation to disclose poor intra-quarterly financial results before the closing of their initial public offering, and that their failure to do so rendered an implied representation of objective reasonableness in their financial forecast false.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Act distinguishes between material facts and material changes, and imposes no continuing obligation to disclose material facts after a prospectus receipt is issued.

The Court further held that the trial judge erred in implying a representation of objective reasonableness and in failing to apply the business judgment rule to management's assessment of the forecast.

The appellant sued the federal government for sexual battery committed by an employee at a student residence 20 years earlier.

The trial judge awarded pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, finding the abuse caused the appellant's alcoholism and subsequent loss of earnings.

The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal set aside the pecuniary damages, applying a 'rehearing' standard of review to substitute its own view of the facts.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, holding that the standard of review for findings of fact in Saskatchewan is 'palpable and overriding error', consistent with the rest of Canada.

The Court restored the past loss of earnings award but ordered it reduced for time spent in prison and social assistance received, and upheld the dismissal of the future loss of earnings award.