John G. J. O'Driscoll

The Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation sought judicial review of several Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) decisions.

The OLRB had certified a union for employees at a casino located on the First Nation's reserve.

The First Nation subsequently passed its own Labour Relations Code and argued that it superseded the provincial Labour Relations Act, 1995, based on aboriginal and treaty rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, upholding the OLRB's findings that it had jurisdiction to decide the constitutional question and that the First Nation failed to establish an aboriginal or treaty right to regulate labour relations.

The court also found that the OLRB's procedural rulings were not patently unreasonable.

Following a successful appeal that certified the action as a class proceeding, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The appellants sought $186,293.81 on a partial indemnity basis, while the respondent suggested a range of $30,000 to $60,000.

Applying the principles of fairness and reasonableness, and considering awards in similar actions, the Divisional Court fixed the appellants' costs at $60,000 plus disbursements and GST, payable if the plaintiffs are successful in the pending appeal before the Court of Appeal.

Following a successful appeal regarding the administration of a pension plan, the appellants sought costs for both the Tribunal hearing and the appeals.

The Divisional Court awarded the appellants partial indemnity costs payable by the respondent employer.

Furthermore, recognizing that the appellants brought the proceedings to compel the due administration of the pension fund for the benefit of all members, the Court ordered that the difference between the fixed partial indemnity costs and their full solicitor-and-client costs be paid out of the pension trust fund.

Apotex Inc. sought judicial review of the Respondents' decision to remove the designation of its generic drug, Apo-Flavoxate, as an interchangeable drug product under the Drug Interchangeability and Dispensing Fee Act (DIDFA) and to delist it from the Comparative Drug Index.

The Divisional Court found that the decision to delist the drug under DIDFA was not rationally connected to the decision to delist it as an eligible benefit under the Ontario Drug Benefit Act.

The majority held that the circumstances surrounding the decision constituted a denial of natural justice and quashed the regulation, restoring the drug's interchangeable status.

A dissenting opinion would have upheld the decision as a valid exercise of public interest discretion.

Following an appeal, the parties were unable to agree on costs and provided written submissions.

The successful respondent sought over $50,000 in costs.

Applying the principles of fairness and reasonableness, the court fixed the respondent's costs for the application for leave to appeal at $2,000 and for the appeal at $15,000, plus disbursements of $1,439.36.

The plaintiff was charged with the second-degree murder of her daughter based on an autopsy report by the defendant forensic pathologist, which concluded the cause of death was multiple stab wounds.

After a second autopsy revealed the wounds were likely caused by dog bites, the charges were withdrawn.

The plaintiff sued the pathologist for negligence, bad faith, and misfeasance in public office.

The pathologist appealed a motion judge's refusal to strike the claim.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the witness immunity rule applied to the pathologist's autopsy report and testimony at the preliminary inquiry, rendering him immune from civil suit.

Following the dismissal of their appeals regarding construction lien rights, the appellants and respondents made written submissions on costs.

The Divisional Court fixed the respondent Rumble's costs at $20,515.72 on a partial indemnity basis, payable by Cassidy and R & A. The court found the respondent Dana's claim for $41,024.52 excessive given the lack of novel arguments on appeal, and fixed Dana's costs at $15,800.00, payable by Kennedy.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's appeal in a slip and fall action, the court determined the quantum of costs payable to the successful respondents.

The respondents sought $14,659, while the appellant argued she was impecunious and the claimed fees were excessive due to duplication by senior and junior counsel.

The court held that the appellant's financial circumstances were irrelevant to the costs issue, but agreed that the opposite party should not pay for duplication of counsel on a non-complex appeal.

Costs were fixed at $8,500 all inclusive.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' judicial review application, the court determined the quantum of costs payable to the respondents.

The court fixed the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board's costs at $13,594.16 on consent.

The court declined to award costs for two prior motions that were unrelated to the judicial review application.

The court fixed the co-respondent Kenmar's costs at $8,806.10, noting that the WSIB was the primary respondent.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the parties were unable to agree on costs and filed written submissions.

The respondent College sought costs of $27,039.05, noting the extensive preparation required, including responding to constitutional arguments that were abandoned late.

The appellant argued the appeal was largely a repetition of an earlier interlocutory motion and suggested costs be fixed at $10,000.

The Divisional Court fixed the costs of the appeal payable by the appellant to the respondent at $19,000 in fees plus disbursements.

The appellants, former employees and beneficiaries of a pension plan, appealed two decisions of the Financial Services Tribunal regarding the employer's handling of the plan.

The Divisional Court held that the employer was not permitted to pay plan administration expenses out of the trust fund, as such amendments constituted an invalid revocation of the trust.

However, the Court upheld the employer's right to take contribution holidays in the defined benefit plan.

The Court also ruled that the employer could not use surplus funds from the defined benefit plan to cross-subsidize its contributions to a newly created defined contribution plan, and that the employer failed to provide proper statutory notice of the plan conversion.

The Tribunal's decision that it lacked jurisdiction to award costs out of the pension fund was upheld.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment declaring that their claims for work done in assembling and installing a massive truck frame assembly line at the respondent's plant were not lienable under the Construction Lien Act.

The trial judge found that the assembly line was manufacturing equipment and not an 'improvement' to the land or building.

The Divisional Court majority upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in his application of the law to the facts.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, finding the assembly line was an improvement given its size, cost, and degree of attachment to the premises.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario finding him guilty of professional misconduct for sexually abusing patients and engaging in boundary violations.

The Committee revoked his certificate of registration and ordered him to pay $30,000 in costs.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of similar fact evidence, the findings of liability, the penalty, and the costs award.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the appeal, finding that the Committee properly admitted the similar fact evidence, reasonably assessed credibility, and imposed an appropriate penalty for grave and predatory sexual misconduct.

The plaintiff sued a doctor and an assessment company for bad faith, intentional interference with economic relations, and negligence arising from an independent medical examination report that led to the termination of her statutory accident benefits.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the report was protected by witness immunity and absolute privilege, and that they owed no duty of care to the plaintiff.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the scope of the duty of care in the context of the statutory scheme and whether immunity applied to allegations of intentional injury.

The Divisional Court dismissed the defendants' appeal, holding that the plaintiff's claims raised important policy issues and genuine issues of fact that required a full trial.

The Assessment Review Board stated a case to the Divisional Court asking whether the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation's use of the income method to value duty free stores at international border crossings violated the Assessment Act by improperly considering the bridge or tunnel structure.

The applicants argued that revenue generated from customers using the bridges or tunnels should not be considered.

The Divisional Court held that the income method relies on the rental income specified in the lease and does not constitute a consideration of the bridge or tunnel structure itself.

The court answered the stated question in the negative.

The mortgagee appealed a final order discharging a mortgage and awarding full indemnity costs to the mortgagors.

The motions judge had found that the mortgagee acted in bad faith by claiming the mortgage was in default due to insufficient insurance and adding improper charges to the discharge statement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motions judge's application of the law to the undisputed facts or in her exercise of discretion regarding costs.

The applicants brought an application for judicial review seeking a declaration and mandamus to compel the Coroners' Council to complete its deliberations on a 1995 complaint.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, noting that the Coroners' Council was abolished in 1998 without grandfathering provisions.

The power to consider the complaint now rests with the Chief Coroner, who had already reviewed and dismissed the complaint in 2000.

The court concluded that the applicants had an adequate alternative remedy which had been exercised, and the requested declaration would have no practical effect.

The applicants sought judicial review of planning applications filed by a land developer for a residential subdivision near proposed airport lands.

The applicants argued the applications were nullities under the Greenbelt Protection Act, 2004, which imposed a development freeze on lands outside urban settlement areas.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the lands were not designated as an urban settlement area when the Act came into effect.

The court declared the applications and subsequent municipal decisions nullities, and prohibited the Ontario Municipal Board from hearing appeals related to the applications, as it lacked jurisdiction.

The solicitor appealed from an order dismissing his motion to oppose the confirmation of an Assessment Officer's report.

The Assessment Officer had disallowed the solicitor's claims for payment regarding 'extras'—opinions on matters handled by other solicitors—because there was no written retainer, no interim billing, and a historical relationship where the client was not billed for such consultations.

The Divisional Court found no error in principle or misapprehension of evidence by the Assessment Officer or the reviewing judge, and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant, a former police officer, sought judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decision not to deal with his discrimination complaint.

The applicant had resigned pursuant to an agreement to withdraw disciplinary charges, but filed a human rights complaint after failing to secure employment with another police force and being denied reinstatement.

The Commission dismissed the complaint as vexatious under s. 34(1)(b) of the Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the Commission's decision was not patently unreasonable given the applicant's extensive disciplinary record and the circumstances surrounding his resignation.