John G. J. O'Driscoll

The appellant father appealed an order dismissing his application to terminate spousal support and his application to require the respondent mother to pay child support after their daughter moved to his residence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal regarding spousal support, finding no material change in circumstances to justify termination, as the mother had not yet achieved self-sufficiency.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding child support, ordering the mother to pay the Table amount of $222 per month, as she failed to establish undue hardship under the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The applicants sought judicial review to quash a resolution by the Trent University Board of Governors authorizing a capital development project that could involve closing or relocating two colleges.

The applicants argued the Board lacked jurisdiction without a concurring motion from the University Senate, which had passed a resolution opposing any change of location.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that under the Trent University Act, the Board has plenary and exclusive jurisdiction over the university's property, revenues, and expenditures, while the Senate's jurisdiction is limited to educational policy.

The Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority (MTHA) sought judicial review of an interim order by the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal that allowed 11 tenants to give representative evidence on behalf of 312 tenants in a rent abatement application.

The tenants claimed the MTHA interfered with their reasonable enjoyment during balcony repairs.

The Divisional Court granted leave for judicial review due to urgency and quashed the Tribunal's order.

The Court held that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction under the Tenant Protection Act to permit a representative action, distinguishing it from the former Landlord and Tenant Act which explicitly allowed such proceedings.

The respondents moved to lift the automatic stay of an $84,000 costs award pending appeal and sought an order for security for costs of the appeal.

The court dismissed the motion to lift the stay, finding no demonstrable and unusual hardship to the respondents.

However, the court granted the motion for security for costs, finding the appeal to be frivolous and vexatious and noting the appellant's insufficient assets.

The appellant was ordered to post $14,400 as security for costs.

The appellant challenged a contempt order arising from non-payment of a lump-sum support-related amount ordered in dependant support proceedings under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The Court of Appeal held that rules 60.05 and 60.11(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure permit contempt enforcement only for orders requiring an act other than the payment of money, and that this includes support orders.

The court rejected any purported family law exception and held that the Rules displaced any inherent jurisdiction to use contempt for money judgments in proceedings governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The contempt order was set aside and the motion for contempt was dismissed.

Three employers applied for judicial review of arbitration awards that reinstated employees who had been discharged following criminal convictions for sexual assault in the workplace.

In each case, the arbitrators had allowed the unions to collaterally attack the criminal convictions and had concluded the employees were innocent.

The Divisional Court granted the applications and quashed the arbitration awards, holding that a criminal conviction cannot be collaterally attacked at a subsequent arbitration.

The doctrine of abuse of process prevents an arbitrator from retrying a criminal case and treating a conviction as merely prima facie evidence.

The plaintiffs, police officers, brought an action against two Assistant Crown Attorneys and the Crown for negligence, malicious prosecution, and other claims arising from assault charges laid against them.

The defendants moved to strike the negligence claims and the vicarious liability claims against the Crown.

The motions judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that Crown Attorneys are absolutely immune from suits for negligence, and the Crown is immune from liability for the actions of Crown Attorneys under s. 5(6) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The negligence claims and the action against the Crown (except for Charter claims) were struck out.

The respondents to the motion sought to quash an appeal on the basis that an order transferring a statutory proceeding under the Mining Act to the Superior Court of Justice was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal held that the transfer order finally disposed of the application brought under s. 107 of the Mining Act and was therefore a final order within s. 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Applying the reasoning in Buck Bros. and the Hendrickson line of authority, the court concluded that the real matter in dispute in the court proceeding was whether the statutory proceeding should be transferred.

The motion to quash was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, a corrections officer who was severely injured by an inmate, appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.

The Board had awarded the maximum amount for pain and suffering but deducted a $12,000 Non-Economic Loss (NEL) award received from the Workers' Compensation Board, pursuant to s. 17(3) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act.

The appellant argued this resulted in a double deduction because his long-term disability insurance also deducted the NEL award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board properly exercised its discretion and that any dispute regarding insurance deductions was a matter between the appellant and his insurer.

The appeal concerned whether a pre-1986 marriage contract removed designated property from the equalization regime under the Family Law Act.

The court held that the agreement, read as a whole, clearly provided that the property would remain the wife's alone and would prevail over the Family Law Reform Act or any successor legislation.

The court distinguished prior authorities where contractual wording was materially different.

Applying s. 70(3), the court concluded that the contract deemedly excluded the property from s. 5 equalization.

The appeal was allowed with costs throughout.

In this family property appeal arising from a fact-driven trial, the appellant challenged the trial judge’s findings, particularly concerning ownership of a triplex, and alleged reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that the factual findings were amply supported by the record and disclosed no palpable or overriding error.

It also rejected the bias allegation and dismissed the contingent cross-appeal, including the claim for pre-judgment interest.

A motion to admit fresh evidence was also dismissed, and appeal costs were fixed in favour of the respondent.

The appellant sought to appeal both the dismissal of a civil action and a substantial costs award to the Court of Appeal.

The trial judge had assessed damages at an amount below the Divisional Court monetary threshold while dismissing the action and fixing solicitor and client costs well above $25,000.

The court held that the main appeal lay to the Divisional Court under the Courts of Justice Act, and that the contingent costs appeal had to follow the main appeal rather than create Court of Appeal jurisdiction.

Both appeals were therefore transferred to the Divisional Court, with motion costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant teacher appealed a decision of the Fitness to Practise Committee of the Ontario College of Teachers.

The Committee had found the appellant incapacitated due to a mental condition that led to serious boundary violations with a student.

The Committee rejected a joint submission on penalty and imposed more stringent conditions, including a requirement for therapy and a psychiatric assessment before returning to teaching.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Committee properly followed procedural fairness when rejecting the joint submission and reasonably exercised its statutory duty to protect the public interest.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Board of Inquiry and sought to introduce fresh evidence and claim Charter damages against the Board and the Human Rights Commission for delay.

The Divisional Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to award damages, that the Board is not a suable entity, and that delay does not found a claim under s. 7 of the Charter.

The court also denied the appellant's request for an adjournment to file a companion application for judicial review, ordering the appeal to proceed on its merits.

The appellants appealed a decision certifying a class action regarding the Bre-X gold mine fraud.

The motion judge had restricted the common issues to conspiracy and fraud, declining to certify negligent misrepresentation as a common issue, and limited the class to shareholders who held shares on the date the possible fraud was publicly disclosed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that negligent misrepresentation claims require individual inquiries into reliance and causation, making a class action not the preferable procedure for those claims.

The court also upheld the temporal restriction on the class, as shareholders who sold before the disclosure date could not have suffered losses caused by the misrepresentations.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 21(b) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act to set aside or vary an order of Matlow J. The order required the Ontario Human Rights Commission to deliver documentary evidence in a sealed container to the Registrar, to remain sealed until the panel hearing the application directed otherwise.

The applicant sought to have the container opened immediately for her access.

The Divisional Court found no basis to vary or set aside the order and dismissed the motion.

The appellant material supplier appealed a master's order discharging its construction lien and vacating its certificate of action.

The master had found the lien was registered out of time by applying the 'deemed completion' provision of the Construction Lien Act to the parties' prevenient arrangement.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the 'deemed completion' provision does not apply to a prevenient arrangement.

Instead, the time limit for preserving a lien under a prevenient arrangement begins to run from the date of the last delivery of materials, meaning the appellant's lien was perfected in time.