Hans J. Saamen

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a charge for failing to stop at a stop sign under section 136(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The justice of the peace dismissed the charge because the police officer had no independent recollection of the specific events and relied solely on his notes.

The appellate court found this was reversible legal error, as the officer's notes qualified as a record of past recollection recorded and were properly admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Regional Municipality of York appealed three sentencing decisions where a Justice of the Peace rejected joint submissions for $200 fines in traffic offences and imposed the statutory minimum fine of $85.00 instead.

The respondents had their charges reduced from speeding violations to the lesser charge of "disobey sign" contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellate court found that the Justice of the Peace erred in principle by failing to conduct a thoughtful analysis of why the joint submission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, failing to provide counsel with an opportunity to respond, and failing to consider the quid pro quo inherent in the charge reductions and demerit point savings.

The appeals were allowed and sentences were increased to $200.00.

The respondent was charged with speeding 104 km/h in a 60 km/h zone contrary to s. 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

At trial, the respondent entered a guilty plea to the lesser charge of disobeying a sign contrary to s. 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted for a $100 fine.

The trial judge rejected the joint submission and imposed an $85 fine instead, citing concerns about inconsistent sentencing submissions by prosecutors in the region.

The trial judge also made adverse comments toward the Crown prosecutor when he attempted to cite binding provincial offence appeal authority.

The Regional Municipality of York appealed.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside a conviction and ordering a new trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, finding that the trial judge was entitled to rely on evidence that the officer tested the radar device before and after use and was a qualified operator to establish a prima facie case of accuracy.

The court declined to address whether a broader presumption of accuracy should be created for radar guns.

The appellant municipality appealed a sentence imposed by a Justice of the Peace who reduced a statutory minimum fine of $200 for failing to stop at a red light to $100.

The Justice of the Peace had announced in advance that she would never impose the statutory minimum fine and made comments suggesting bias against the prosecution.

The appellate court found that the Justice of the Peace erred by disregarding the statutory minimum penalty without evidence of exceptional circumstances or undue hardship justifying relief under section 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to the statutory minimum of $200 plus costs.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a defendant charged with permitting fill to be placed on property without a permit, contrary to the Town of Whitchurch-Stouffville By-Law No. 2008-016-RE.

The trial justice misdirected himself on the applicable legal issue, focusing on whether the defendant transported new fill rather than whether fill was placed or dumped.

Both parties agreed the decision should be set aside.

The appellate court declined to amend the information to substitute "dumping" for "placing" and enter a conviction, finding that the defendant would be prejudiced by such an amendment at the appellate stage.

The court remitted the matter for retrial and permitted the Crown to amend the information to include the alternative means of committing the offence.

The respondent was charged with speeding and sought a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter on the day of trial.

The justice of the peace refused to hear the motion because the respondent had not served notice on the Attorney General of Ontario.

On appeal, the provincial offences appeal court held that notice was not required because the prosecution was conducted by a municipality, and granted the stay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the term 'Government of Ontario' in s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act includes municipalities, and therefore notice to the Attorney General of Ontario is required when seeking a Charter remedy in a Provincial Offences Act prosecution.

The appellant municipality appealed the dismissal of a charge against the respondent for failing to comply with an order under the Building Code Act.

The lower courts had dismissed the charge on the basis that it was laid outside the one-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the subject matter of the proceeding was the failure to comply with the order, which occurred within the limitation period.

The court clarified that the existence of other remedies under the Act does not preclude prosecution.

The dismissal was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The respondent was acquitted on appeal of failing to drive in a marked lane under s. 154(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act after driving through a 'bull-nose'.

The Crown appealed, arguing the provision creates two separate offences: failing to drive within a single lane, and moving from a lane unsafely.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the unambiguous French version of the statute confirms the provision creates only one offence requiring both elements.

The respondent was charged with speeding.

The police officer clocked him at 30 km/h over the limit but ticketed him for 15 km/h over.

When the respondent requested a trial, the prosecutor sought to amend the certificate of offence to reflect the higher speed.

The justice of the peace refused the amendment and convicted the respondent at the lower speed, which was upheld on appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that the actual rate of speed is not an essential element of the offence but is relevant to the fixed penalty, which courts have no discretion to reduce.

The Court also held that 'amending up' is permissible, provided the requirements of s. 34(4) of the Provincial Offences Act are met.

The appeal was dismissed because the municipality only sought guidance and there was no evidentiary finding of the higher speed.

The respondent was charged with failing to wear a seat belt after a police officer observed him unfastened while stopped at a red light.

The trial justice convicted him, but the provincial offences appeal judge quashed the conviction, finding that the respondent was not 'driving' while the vehicle was in park at the light.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that a purposive interpretation of the Highway Traffic Act requires a driver to wear a seat belt continuously from the time the vehicle is put in motion on the highway until it is parked in a position where it can be left unattended.

The appellant material supplier appealed a master's order discharging its construction lien and vacating its certificate of action.

The master had found the lien was registered out of time by applying the 'deemed completion' provision of the Construction Lien Act to the parties' prevenient arrangement.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the 'deemed completion' provision does not apply to a prevenient arrangement.

Instead, the time limit for preserving a lien under a prevenient arrangement begins to run from the date of the last delivery of materials, meaning the appellant's lien was perfected in time.