Robin B. Cumine

The plaintiff commenced an action for negligence after a fire on the defendant's railway lands damaged its business.

The action was struck from the trial list due to outstanding undertakings and later administratively dismissed for delay after a motion judge refused to restore it.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in principle by focusing on allocating blame for the delay rather than whether the plaintiff's explanation was reasonable, and by presuming prejudice from the passage of time.

The Court reweighed the evidence, found the plaintiff's explanation acceptable and no non-compensable prejudice to the defendant, and ordered the action restored to the trial list.

Following a boating accident, the appellant faced multiple actions for damages.

He was covered by three insurance policies: a primary boat owner's policy, a home owner's policy, and a personal liability umbrella policy (PLUP).

The application judge ruled that after the primary boat owner's policy was exhausted, the home owner's policy and the PLUP must contribute equally, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Family Insurance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the home owner's policy and the PLUP were not of coordinate obligation.

The PLUP was a true excess policy, while the home owner's policy was primary.

Therefore, the PLUP is not required to respond until the limits of the home owner's policy are exhausted.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision finding that a homeowners policy exclusion for motorized land vehicles did not apply.

The insured accidentally started a fire while removing parts from an inoperable motor vehicle to use in a replica car he was building.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the exclusion did not apply because the assertions of negligence were not related to the ownership or use of the vehicles as motor vehicles.

The appellant financed insurance premiums for the respondent, taking an assignment of the right to receive any unearned premiums as security.

After the respondent defaulted and obtained CCAA protection, the appellant sought to enforce its security.

The motion judge held that the appellant's security interest was not perfected because it was not registered under the PPSA.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the assignment of unearned premiums is a transfer of an interest in or under a policy of insurance, which is exempt from PPSA registration under s. 4(1)(c) of the PPSA and s. 138 of the Insurance Act.

The moving party, CAFO Inc., sought leave to appeal in the Stelco Inc. proceedings.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave to appeal with respect to the questions in paragraphs 23-28 of the moving party's factum, but denied leave for question 29.

Costs of the motion were reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The appellant, TTC Insurance Company Limited, appealed a decision finding that payments made by the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) to fulfill an indemnity obligation to the appellant were 'direct earned premiums' for the purpose of calculating the appellant's share of Facility Association costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the indemnity payments were a direct cost to TTC for obtaining required insurance coverage and fell within the definition of 'premium' under the Insurance Act.

Following a fatal motor vehicle accident caused by an uninsured driver, a dispute arose between two insurers over the priority of their respective policies in funding the settlement.

The motions judge held that the driver's State Farm Fire umbrella policy, which included an uninsured motorist option, had to respond before the passenger's Royal Insurance O.E.F. 44 family protection endorsement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the umbrella policy was not a motor vehicle liability policy under the Insurance Act and was explicitly excess insurance.

Therefore, the passenger's O.E.F. 44 endorsement had to be exhausted before recourse could be made to the umbrella policy.

A visitor was injured when a child lost control of a go-kart on the insureds' property.

The insureds claimed coverage under their homeowner's insurance policy.

The insurer denied coverage, relying on an exclusion for 'motorized land vehicles'.

The motion judge found the go-kart was a toy or 'implement' and thus excepted from the exclusion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the go-kart was a motorized land vehicle and did not fall within the exception for 'implements' such as lawnmowers or snow blowers.

The claim was therefore excluded from coverage.

The applicant union sought a declaration under subsection 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 that Canada Stampings & Dies Ltd. and Stamptech Ltd. are one employer.

The Board found that the two businesses were related or associated, as they served the same general market, employed the same mode of production, and were under the common control and direction of the same principal.

The Board exercised its discretion to issue the declaration, finding that the establishment of the new operation had an adverse effect on the union's existing bargaining rights by transferring work and potential growth away from the original bargaining unit.

The declaration was made retrospective to the date the union filed its grievance.

The applicant Millwrights filed a complaint concerning the assignment of work involving the installation of flumes at a Ford engine plant.

The work was performed exclusively by Ironworkers employed by Victoria Steel, which was bound by a collective agreement with the Ironworkers but not the Millwrights.

The Millwrights sought a declaration and order that 50% of the work be assigned to their members, relying on previous Board decisions regarding material handling systems.

The Board dismissed the complaint, finding it had no jurisdiction to bind a contractor to such an order where the applicant union does not have a collective agreement with the employer.

The union filed an unfair labour practice complaint alleging that the employer violated the replacement worker provisions of the Labour Relations Act during a lawful strike.

The employer had promoted a bargaining unit employee to a newly created management position and used occasional employees to perform work ordinarily done by striking employees.

The Board found that the newly promoted manager and the occasional employees were 'engaged' after the notice to bargain and were therefore prohibited from performing bargaining unit work.

However, the Board dismissed the complaint regarding a newly hired tool and die maker performing driving duties, as driving was not considered bargaining unit work.

The employer was ordered to cease using the prohibited individuals for bargaining unit work and to post a notice to employees.

The respondents brought a motion to stay the human rights proceedings on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias, arguing that the adjudicator was a complainant in another sex discrimination case and had expertise in feminist legal scholarship.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, finding that involvement as a party in an unrelated human rights complaint does not create an apprehension of bias.

Furthermore, the Board held that an adjudicator's background in feminist scholarship and involvement in women's organizations does not constitute bias, as requiring adjudicators to have no prior involvement in human rights issues would hamper fair and knowledgeable adjudication.

The respondents sought to stay a human rights board of inquiry proceeding based on an order issued by the Quebec Superior Court under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA).

The Board of Inquiry held that the CCAA does not bind the Crown, and that the Ontario Human Rights Commission is a Crown agency immune from the stay order.

Furthermore, the Board found that human rights proceedings are quasi-constitutional in nature and do not constitute 'proceedings' within the meaning of section 11 of the CCAA.

The motion to stay the proceedings was dismissed.

The respondents brought preliminary motions to dismiss a human rights complaint alleging sex discrimination and unequal pay.

They argued the matter should be heard under other statutes, that the Commission's overlapping functions created an apprehension of bias, and that the delay in proceedings violated the Charter and constituted an abuse of process.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed all preliminary motions, finding that concurrent jurisdiction does not oust the Code, the Commission's functions are statutorily authorized, and the delay did not render a fair hearing impossible.

A request for further particulars was also denied.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission brought a motion to add Great Atlantic and Pacific Company of Canada Limited (A & P) as a respondent to a human rights complaint originally filed against Miracle Food Mart.

The complainant alleged sex discrimination regarding pay and advancement opportunities.

After the complaint was filed, A & P purchased selected assets of Miracle Food Mart.

The Board of Inquiry granted the motion, finding that the successor company inherited the business operations and was the only entity capable of providing a remedy, particularly since the complaint alleged systemic discrimination.

The applicant union sought leave to withdraw its grievance referral under section 124 of the Labour Relations Act after the matter was adjourned for negotiations.

The respondent employer requested that the grievance be dismissed.

The Board found no compelling reason to prevent the applicant from withdrawing its own grievance and granted leave to withdraw the referral.

The applicant union grieved that the respondent drywall contractor violated the subcontracting provisions of the ICI agreement by allowing a non-union supplier's employees to off-load and stockpile drywall on a construction project.

The Board first determined that the construction of the Home for the Aged fell within the ICI sector rather than the residential sector.

On the merits, the Board found that the delivery and unloading of drywall by the supplier's employees was not construction work covered by the ICI agreement, noting that the union had a separate collective agreement with unionized suppliers covering this exact work.

The grievance was dismissed.

The applicant employers' organization sought accreditation as the exclusive bargaining agent for employers in the sewers and watermains sector.

The Board previously issued certificates of accreditation despite unresolved questions regarding whether two specific employers should be included in the unit, finding that the applicant met the double majority test under s. 127(2) of the Labour Relations Act regardless of the outcome.

The Board issued reasons for this jurisdictional finding, drawing an analogy to certification cases where unresolved employee status issues do not affect the union's right to certification.

The parties subsequently agreed on the status of the two employers, and the Board finalized the lists of employers.

The Board also varied the accreditation orders and certificates on consent to correct an error and clarify potential ambiguity.

The complainant employer filed a complaint under section 91 of the Labour Relations Act regarding a work assignment dispute between two unions over the off-loading and conveying of drywall materials.

The work was actually performed by the employees of the material supplier.

The Board held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under subsection 91(1) because the union had not made a demand on the employer with actual responsibility for assigning the work (the supplier) to assign the work to its members.

The complaint was dismissed.

The Christian Labour Association of Canada (CLAC) applied for certification to displace the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association, Local 562, as the bargaining agent for sheet metal workers employed by Reitzel Heating & Sheet Metal Ltd. The central issue was the appropriate bargaining unit description in a displacement application where the incumbent held province-wide ICI bargaining rights but the applicant was not an affiliated bargaining agent.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board determined that CLAC could not acquire province-wide bargaining rights, nor was it required to take an 'all trades' unit.

The Board held that the appropriate bargaining unit was limited to sheet metal workers and apprentices in the ICI sector in Board Area 6, balancing the statutory scheme of province-wide bargaining with the employees' right to choose their bargaining agent.