Adam J. Huff

The plaintiffs brought motions to set aside Registrar's dismissal orders issued in May 2024 in two related inmate assault and conditions of confinement actions commenced in 2015.

Applying the Piedrahita framework, the court found the delay was adequately explained by consent timetables, pandemic disruptions, and counsel's early-2024 practice upheaval.

The motions were brought promptly after the dismissals became known, and the Crown did not demonstrate significant prejudice precluding a fair trial, particularly given its own participation in setting the litigation pace.

The dismissal orders were set aside and the actions reinstated on a strict enforceable timetable.

The plaintiffs, Christopher Morgis and Jo-Anne Morgis, brought a motion under Rule 48.14(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for an extension of time to set their action down for trial and for a timetable for the completion of remaining steps.

The action arose from a dispute over the removal of personal property and chattels from a property sold under power of sale.

The court reviewed the lengthy procedural history, including duplicative actions, delays, and failures to comply with procedural requirements.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay and that the defendants would suffer non-compensable prejudice if the action were allowed to continue.

The motion was dismissed and the action was dismissed for delay.

The court considered whether an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for a commercial property remained valid after the buyer failed to waive conditions by the deadline.

The buyer argued the seller had waived strict reliance on deadlines and sought specific performance.

The seller moved for summary judgment, asserting the APS had terminated automatically.

The court found the APS terminated on its terms when the buyer failed to provide the waiver, and that the seller had not waived its rights.

The seller’s summary judgment motion was granted, and the buyer’s request for specific performance was dismissed.

This decision addresses a motion by the plaintiff to amend a claim, originally a proposed class proceeding arising from the Westboro bus crash, to continue as an individual action.

The City of Ottawa brought a cross-motion to refuse the amendment and declare four new individual actions statute-barred.

The core issue was whether the proposed individual claims constituted new causes of action or were supported by facts pleaded in the original statement of claim, thus protected by the limitation period suspension under the Class Proceedings Act.

The court found that the original pleading contained sufficient material facts to support claims of operator negligence and vicarious liability, in addition to direct and systemic negligence.

Consequently, these claims were protected from the running of the limitation period by s. 28 of the Class Proceedings Act.

The plaintiff's motion to amend was granted, and the individual claims were allowed to proceed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to extend the time to set the action down for trial and to establish a litigation timetable, while the defendant sought dismissal of the action for delay.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, finding that the plaintiff provided an acceptable explanation for the delay, largely attributable to counsel's personal health issues and professional demands during the COVID-19 pandemic, and that the defendant would suffer no non-compensable prejudice.

The court emphasized that delay caused by counsel, rather than the client, is generally not a basis for dismissal.

A new timetable for pre-trial steps was ordered, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The appellant, Thomas Grieco, appealed a summary judgment order requiring specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a lakefront property.

The issues on appeal concerned the validity of purchaser requisitions (specifically a holdback requisition related to non-resident tax under the Income Tax Act), whether the vendor was ready to close, and the appropriateness of specific performance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings that the holdback requisition was valid, the vendor was not ready, willing, and able to close due to non-compliance with the APS, and specific performance was an appropriate remedy given the property's unique characteristics.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar's order dismissing its professional negligence action for delay.

The action had been case managed and was proceeding in tandem with a related shareholder action.

The court applied the Reid factors and found that the plaintiff provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay, demonstrated inadvertence in missing the deadline, moved promptly to address the dismissal, and that the defendants would not suffer significant prejudice.

The motion was granted and the registrar's order was set aside.

Dian and Aaryn Doyle moved to set aside a registrar's order dismissing their action for delay, stemming from two motor vehicle accidents in 2010.

The court applied the four Reid factors (explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of motion, and non-compensable prejudice).

The court found a reasonable explanation for delay due to personal difficulties, health issues, confusion regarding undertakings, settlement discussions, and a conflict of interest with previous counsel.

The deadline was missed through inadvertence, and the motion was brought promptly.

The court found no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants, as no critical evidence was lost due to delay.

The motion was granted, setting aside the dismissal order for Dian and Aaryn Doyle, but not for Aiden Doyle who did not participate.

No costs were awarded due to counsel's inadvertence.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dated June 18, 2018.

The appeal was allowed on consent, as counsel for the appellants explained that relevant authorities were not brought to the attention of the motion judge.

The order was set aside and replaced with an order as per the consent order filed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their statement of claim to add a snow removal contractor as a defendant in a slip and fall action, after the expiry of the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiffs relied on the doctrine of discoverability, arguing they only learned of the contractor's involvement upon receiving the statement of defence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence that the plaintiffs exercised reasonable diligence to identify the contractor within the limitation period, as they failed to make any inquiries about snow removal services.

The defendant sought summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's slip and fall claim on a municipal sidewalk adjacent to its retail store.

The central issue was whether the defendant was an "occupier" of the sidewalk under the Occupiers' Liability Act or owed a common law duty of care.

The court found no special circumstances to deem the defendant an occupier, nor sufficient objective evidence to establish a common law duty of care arising from conditions on its property affecting the sidewalk.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Isobel Kozey, brought a motion for leave to amend her personal injury claim to add Broadleaf Landscaping & Snow Removal Inc. and Triovest Realty Advisors Inc. as defendants, following a trip-and-fall incident.

Broadleaf opposed the motion, arguing the claim against it was statute-barred due to the expiry of the limitation period.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff provided a reasonable explanation for the delayed discovery of Broadleaf's identity, establishing a triable issue regarding discoverability.

The court also dismissed Broadleaf's arguments of non-compensable prejudice and found it unnecessary to rule on the misnomer principle.