Heather J. Williams

The appellant appealed from an order of an associate judge that prohibited discovery motions without leave, made in the context of a dismissed motion for particulars in a lawyer's negligence action.

The court found the associate judge had jurisdiction to make the order as a term under Rule 37.13 or Rule 1.05, rather than under Rule 37.16 which addresses vexatious litigants.

However, the court concluded the order could not stand due to a lack of procedural fairness, as neither party had been given notice that the order was being contemplated or an opportunity to make submissions.

The appeal was granted and the order was set aside.

No costs were awarded as the appeal was unopposed.

The applicant, the common-law spouse of the deceased, sought dependant's relief from his estate.

The deceased's two sons also brought claims asserting ownership over two properties, arguing they were not estate assets.

The court found that one property was held in trust for one son and was not an estate asset, while the other property belonged to the estate as the other son failed to establish a constructive trust, resulting trust, or valid gift.

Regarding dependant's relief, the court applied the four-part test under the Succession Law Reform Act, balancing the applicant's needs against the beneficiaries' interests.

The court ordered a lump sum for past support and ongoing monthly support to be funded by an annuity with a reversionary interest to the estate.

This costs decision follows the settlement of a real property dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants.

The court addresses the appropriate allocation of costs after the parties settled the action for $14,000, an amount within the Small Claims Court’s jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs sought full indemnity costs, alleging the defendants’ conduct prolonged the litigation, while the defendants sought costs from the plaintiffs, arguing the action should have been brought in Small Claims Court.

The court found neither party’s conduct justified elevated costs, and, applying the relevant legal principles, ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs $2,170.01 in costs, reflecting a partial indemnity basis and the effect of an unaccepted offer to settle.

This costs endorsement follows the granting of anti-SLAPP motions by the three defendants.

The court addresses the scale and quantum of costs, the issue of duplication between legal teams, and the entitlement of a self-represented litigant to costs.

The court awards full indemnity costs to the defendants, finding the requests fair and reasonable, and declines to award compensation to the self-represented defendant for his own time.

This costs endorsement addresses the applicant's request for full indemnity costs following a successful motion for child and spousal support.

The court found the applicant was entitled to full indemnity costs due to the respondent's failure to comply with disclosure orders and other procedural requirements.

The court declined to award an additional penalty amount, finding that costs under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules are limited to reimbursement of legal fees and disbursements.

The respondent was ordered to pay $7,627.50 in costs.

The applicant, Harmur Investments Limited, sought a vesting order declaring that it had acquired, through adverse possession, title to two parcels of land in the Township of Greater Madawaska.

The court found that Harmur had not acquired title to the parcel known as "the Triangle" but had acquired title to the parcel known as "the Boathouse Parcel." The decision provides a detailed analysis of the requirements for adverse possession under Ontario law, including the necessity of actual possession, intention to exclude, and effective exclusion of the true owner.

This costs endorsement follows a trial between family members over a life interest in a home.

The court found that Herminia Bada retained a life interest in the property, despite having signed an Acknowledgment and Direction removing it from title, as she did not understand the implications.

The court considered the conduct of the parties, including Herminia’s dishonesty about signing the document, and fixed costs at $45,000 in fees plus HST and $7,000 in disbursements, rather than the higher amount sought.

The court emphasized the importance of truthfulness and the principles governing costs awards.

This costs endorsement follows the dismissal of a medical malpractice action brought by Frank Papineau against Dr. Pablo Romero-Sierra and Dr. Jonny Brisebois.

The court awards the defendants substantial indemnity costs of $957,893 after a seven-week trial, finding the plaintiff's claim was without foundation and that he made unsubstantiated allegations of dishonesty against Dr. Romero-Sierra.

The court rejects arguments that the action was public interest litigation or that costs should be denied due to the plaintiff's financial circumstances, emphasizing the importance of deterring unmeritorious litigation and sanctioning improper conduct.

The plaintiffs sought compensation for injuries sustained by Sandra Bernier during a cycling event.

The defendants and third party brought summary judgment motions, arguing the action was barred by a signed waiver and voluntary assumption of risk.

The court found the waiver enforceable against the plaintiff, including her children's claims under the Family Law Act, and that it covered the alleged negligence, including negligent organization and road maintenance.

The court also found the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk.

The summary judgment motions were granted, and the action was dismissed.

This is a costs endorsement following a motion where the respondents (moving parties) unsuccessfully sought to remove Paul Kasanda as a party to an assessment application.

The applicants (lawyers) sought partial indemnity costs for successfully defending that motion.

The court awarded the applicants $10,000 in partial indemnity costs, finding them to be the more successful party, and that the amount was fair and reasonable considering the complexity and importance of the motion, despite some issues with document production.

The plaintiff, Leanne Aubin, brought a motion for default judgment against the defendant, James Bowie, her former criminal defence lawyer.

The plaintiff sought damages for breach of fiduciary duty, breaches of the Human Rights Code (sexual harassment), and defamation, as well as punitive damages.

The defendant was noted in default.

The court found the defendant liable for a staggering breach of fiduciary duty due to his repeated sexual propositions, sending an intimate photograph, and suggesting alcohol/drugs/sex when the plaintiff was in distress.

The court also found the defendant liable for sexual harassment under the Human Rights Code and for defamation through a social media chat where he disclosed confidential information and made false allegations.

The court awarded $75,000 for breach of fiduciary duty, $65,000 under the Human Rights Code, $30,000 for defamation, and $25,000 in punitive damages, totaling $195,000, plus $40,000 in costs.

In a medical malpractice action, the defendant physicians brought a motion under Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to declare the self-represented plaintiff a party under a disability and to appoint the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee (OPGT) as his litigation guardian.

The court reviewed the plaintiff's conduct, including his failure to attend a court-ordered capacity assessment, his attempts to manipulate other capacity assessments, his lack of understanding of the civil litigation process, and his communications suggesting delusions.

The court found the plaintiff to be a party under a disability and appointed the OPGT as his litigation guardian.

The defendants brought motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The plaintiff, a former Complaints and Appeals Officer for a national sports organization, sued the defendants over emails they sent criticizing his handling of complaints and his suitability for the role.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to a matter of public interest regarding athlete safety.

While the defamation claim had substantial merit, the plaintiff failed to show that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as justification and qualified privilege.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence of serious harm caused by the expressions that would outweigh the public interest in protecting them.

The motions were granted and the action was dismissed.

The applicant, Lise Cassan, sought dependent's relief from the estate of Jean-Guy Villeneuve, claiming they lived in a conjugal relationship from 2006 until his death in 2022 and that he financially supported her.

The estate disputed the cohabitation and support, arguing she maintained a separate apartment and he had other relationships.

Applying the Molodowich factors, the court found that the applicant was a dependent spouse who had cohabited continuously with the deceased for over three years and received ongoing, systematic financial support.

The court granted interim support of $2,000 per month to the applicant, pending final disposition.

The applicant brought a motion for child and spousal support, seeking to impute income to the respondent due to his failure to comply with disclosure orders and intentional under-employment.

The applicant also sought to prohibit the respondent from further participation in the proceeding and to compel disclosure from a non-party.

The court imputed an income of $100,000 to the respondent, ordered child support of $397 per month and interim spousal support of $344 per month.

The requests to prohibit the respondent's participation and to compel disclosure from a non-party were denied.

The moving parties, respondents to an assessment application, sought an order removing Paul Kasanda as a party to the assessment, arguing he did not retain the applicant lawyers.

The lawyers had represented Paul's wife in estate litigation, but the written retainer was signed by Paul's company.

Applying the indicia of a lawyer-client relationship, the court found that a reasonable person would conclude the lawyers were acting for Paul, given his extensive communications, instructions, receipt of legal advice, and agreement to pay fees.

The motion to remove him as a party was dismissed.

Intact Insurance Company brought a motion to set aside a noting in default and for leave to deliver a statement of defence and counterclaim.

The plaintiffs had noted Intact in default without prior notice, despite Intact's counsel having served a notice of intent to defend and requested an indulgence.

The court found the plaintiffs' conduct inappropriate, the delay (if any) inconsequential, and no prejudice to the plaintiffs.

The motion was granted, the noting in default set aside, and Intact was given 30 days to file its defence.

Costs were awarded against the self-represented plaintiff, James McNair, due to his conduct.

The mother and daughter entered into an agreement where the mother transferred her property to the daughter but retained a life interest.

The daughter later required financing to renovate the property, and the bank required the life interest to be discharged.

The mother signed an acknowledgment and direction discharging her life interest.

Years later, the relationship broke down, and the daughter attempted to evict the mother and sell the property.

The court found that the discharge of the life interest was invalid due to undue influence, as the mother did not fully understand the consequences and did not receive independent legal advice.

The mother's life interest was declared valid, and the daughter was ordered to provide an accounting for funds managed while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

The accused, L.M., was charged with gross indecency under s. 157 of the Criminal Code, involving the complainant J.M. The Crown alleged the acts occurred between March 1979 and August 1983.

The court accepted J.M.'s evidence of a sexual relationship initiated by L.M., but found J.M.'s evidence regarding the precise timing of events unreliable.

The court was satisfied sexual contact occurred when J.M. was around 17.5 years old.

However, the Crown failed to prove the fourth element of the offence: that the acts constituted "a very marked departure from decent conduct expected of the average Canadian in the circumstances which existed at the time and a crime against public morality," due to the lack of expert evidence on public decency standards from the early 1980s.

Consequently, the accused was found not guilty.

The plaintiff sued two physicians for medical malpractice, alleging they negligently failed to diagnose and treat him for Lyme disease following a suspected tick bite in April 2010.

The emergency room physician diagnosed cellulitis and prescribed antibiotics, while the family physician later treated the plaintiff for various ongoing symptoms but did not diagnose Lyme disease.

The court found that neither physician breached the standard of care.

Furthermore, the court concluded the plaintiff failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he was bitten by a tick or that he actually contracted Lyme disease.

The action was dismissed.