Logan Stack

La décision porte sur une demande d’annulation d’une sentence arbitrale concernant l’interprétation et l’exécution d’un contrat verbal relatif à la répartition de lots dans le cadre du Projet Oasis.

La Cour conclut que l’arbitre a commis des erreurs de droit en annulant une ordonnance de la Cour supérieure et en liant une société non partie à l’arbitrage, mais que ces erreurs n’affectent pas le résultat.

La Cour confirme que la détention d’une licence Tarion/HCRA est une condition implicite du contrat et que le droit d’acheter les lots appartient à Maisons Lacroix, non à la requérante.

This costs endorsement follows the granting of anti-SLAPP motions by the three defendants.

The court addresses the scale and quantum of costs, the issue of duplication between legal teams, and the entitlement of a self-represented litigant to costs.

The court awards full indemnity costs to the defendants, finding the requests fair and reasonable, and declines to award compensation to the self-represented defendant for his own time.

The defendants brought motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The plaintiff, a former Complaints and Appeals Officer for a national sports organization, sued the defendants over emails they sent criticizing his handling of complaints and his suitability for the role.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to a matter of public interest regarding athlete safety.

While the defamation claim had substantial merit, the plaintiff failed to show that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as justification and qualified privilege.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence of serious harm caused by the expressions that would outweigh the public interest in protecting them.

The motions were granted and the action was dismissed.

The applicant, Jennifer Carr, President of the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada (PIPSC), brought an oppression application under the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act against the directors (respondents) for placing her on "administrative leave" with pay.

Carr argued this was an effective suspension, contrary to PIPSC's By-laws, Policies, and the CNFPCA, and that she was denied procedural fairness.

The respondents argued it was a non-disciplinary administrative leave to protect investigations into Carr's conduct and that their actions were justified by the business judgment rule.

The court found that the administrative leave was functionally equivalent to a disciplinary suspension, breached Carr's reasonable expectations, and constituted oppressive and unfairly prejudicial conduct.

The court quashed the motion for administrative leave and reinstated Carr to her position.