6 total
Eve-of-trial motion for discovery and production in a Rule 76 wrongful dismissal action dismissed.
The plaintiff in a Rule 76 wrongful dismissal action brought a motion on the eve of trial seeking production of documents and answers to questions refused on discovery.
The plaintiff sought payroll records of allegedly related corporations to prove the defendant met the $2.5 million payroll threshold for statutory severance under the Employment Standards Act.
The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, holding that leave is required to bring such a motion after an action is set down for trial.
The court further held that even if leave were not required, the requested production was disproportionate, unnecessary, and pertained to documents not in the defendant's control, making it unjust to adjourn the fixed trial date.
The court partially set aside an arbitral award for jurisdictional errors but upheld the substantive interpretation of a verbal real estate contract.
La décision porte sur une demande d’annulation d’une sentence arbitrale concernant l’interprétation et l’exécution d’un contrat verbal relatif à la répartition de lots dans le cadre du Projet Oasis.
La Cour conclut que l’arbitre a commis des erreurs de droit en annulant une ordonnance de la Cour supérieure et en liant une société non partie à l’arbitrage, mais que ces erreurs n’affectent pas le résultat.
La Cour confirme que la détention d’une licence Tarion/HCRA est une condition implicite du contrat et que le droit d’acheter les lots appartient à Maisons Lacroix, non à la requérante.
The Court of Appeal ordered the appellants to perfect their appeal within 30 days without transcripts.
The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard a motion brought by the respondents to dismiss the appellants' (Bouragbas') appeal for delay, primarily due to the appellants' inability to obtain transcripts from lower court proceedings.
The underlying appeal concerned a motion to amend a statement of claim and lift a stay.
The court determined that transcripts were not necessary for the appeal, as it was essentially an appeal on a paper record concerning pleadings.
While not dismissing the appeal outright, the court ordered the appellants to perfect their appeal within 30 days, failing which it would be administratively dismissed.
The court dismissed a preliminary motion to strike a summary judgment motion, holding that jurisdictional arguments must be heard within the summary judgment motion itself.
The defendants brought a motion seeking to dismiss the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, arguing that the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction and that the motion constituted an abuse of process due to a prior Quebec court order concerning share ownership.
The defendants also sought to add Shawn Gascon as a party.
The court dismissed the defendants' request to dismiss the summary judgment motion, finding that the issues of jurisdiction and abuse of process should be properly addressed within the context of the summary judgment motion itself, and that the cited rules (21.01(3)(a) and (d)) did not grant authority to dismiss a motion, only an action.
However, the court granted the defendants' request to add Shawn Gascon as a defendant, deeming him a necessary party to the action.
Judicial review dismissed; Minister reasonably concluded health planning entity did not provide direct public services.
The applicant, a French-language health planning entity, sought judicial review of the Minister of Health's refusal to recommend it for designation as a 'public service agency' under the French Language Services Act.
The Divisional Court held that while the Minister's refusal to recommend was subject to judicial review, the applicable standard of review was reasonableness.
The Court found the Minister's decision reasonable, as the applicant's mandate involved providing advice and planning services to government agencies rather than direct services to the public.
The application for judicial review was dismissed.
Leave to amend oppression claim partially granted; new causes of action refused due to limitation periods and prejudice.
The plaintiff estate sought leave to amend its statement of claim mid-trial in a long-running family business dispute involving an oppression remedy claim.
The court granted leave for some amendments, finding they merely provided further particulars of the originally pleaded misappropriation of funds (e.g., the Stapledon loan allegations and the Stoke Lacey sale).
However, the court refused leave for other amendments (e.g., failure to pay property taxes and failure to complete audited financial statements), finding they constituted new, statute-barred causes of action that would cause actual and presumed non-compensable prejudice to the incapacitated defendant due to inordinate delay.
The court also refused amendments that amounted to a collateral attack on findings made in the first part of the bifurcated trial.
