Heather J. Williams

The applicant sought a declaration that a retaining wall was on the property line between his property and the respondent's, and an order for the respondent to be partially responsible for its repairs.

The court found that the applicant's cited case law did not support a general principle of equal responsibility for retaining walls on property lines.

The court also rejected the applicant's argument for equitable relief, holding that preventing damage to a lower property from a neighbour's collapsing property is not a "benefit" to the lower property owner that would warrant contribution to the retaining wall's reconstruction.

The application was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

The applicant, a nursing student, sought judicial review of a university tribunal's decision upholding her failing grade in a clinical placement and her subsequent removal from the nursing program.

The applicant argued the decision was unreasonable, illegal, and procedurally unfair, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the exceptions for judicial review.

Applying the reasonableness standard, the court found the tribunal's decision was justified, transparent, and intelligible.

The court also held that the applicant was afforded a high level of procedural fairness throughout the tribunal process.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

This is a costs endorsement following successful motions by the State of California and the Attorney General of Quebec to dismiss claims brought against them by W.O. Stinson & Son Limited.

The court had previously dismissed Stinson's claim against California based on state immunity under the State Immunity Act and against Quebec due to Crown immunity.

Stinson argued for no costs, citing unfair treatment due to the cancellation of Ontario's cap-and-trade program and alleged profit by California and Quebec from Stinson's losses.

The court rejected these arguments, finding no reason to deny costs to the successful parties.

The court then assessed the reasonableness of the requested partial indemnity costs, reducing the amounts sought by both California and Quebec, and specifically reducing Quebec's expert witness disbursement.

The applicant father sought orders for decision-making, medical decision-making, and full-time Montessori pre-school attendance for their two-and-a-half-year-old daughter, Maeve, citing her severe neutropenia and the mother's alleged indifference and communication failures.

The respondent mother argued the motion was premature, pending a report from the Ontario Children’s Lawyer, and that there was insufficient medical evidence to support the father's claims or compel changes to the status quo.

The court dismissed the father's motion, finding he had not met the high onus to vary an interim order, as the evidence did not clearly and unequivocally establish that the current arrangements placed the child's welfare at risk.

The court also ordered case management due to the high conflict between the parties and awarded costs to the mother.

The appellant, a municipal councillor and later mayor, appealed a decision finding he contravened the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by attempting to influence the location of a municipal project near his commercial property.

The application judge ordered his removal from office and a two-year disqualification.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the Integrity Commissioner's jurisdiction, the finding of a pecuniary interest, the admission of expert evidence, the penalty, and the costs award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable errors in the application judge's objective assessment of the conflict, her reliance on the expert valuation report, or her discretionary decisions on penalty and costs.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation appealed a decision granting the Near North Enviro-Education Centre a property tax exemption under s. 3(1)5 of the Assessment Act as an 'educational seminary of learning'.

The appellant argued the application judge erred in interpreting the exemption and applying the 'primary purpose' test by focusing on the institution rather than the actual use of the land, and by ignoring traditional indicia of a seminary of learning.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge correctly applied the primary purpose test and the Keewaydin factors, and reasonably concluded that the institution's primary purpose, as reflected by its use of the land for environmental education in a rural community, qualified for the exemption.

The applicant, a school board trustee, sought judicial review of the school board's decision finding he breached its Code of Conduct and imposing sanctions.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness due to in camera meetings and alleged bias of the Chair, and that the decision unreasonably infringed his freedom of expression.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the applicant was afforded adequate procedural fairness, the in camera meetings were statutorily permitted due to related litigation, and the board reasonably balanced the applicant's Charter rights with its statutory obligations.

Two applications were brought regarding the validity of a $689,000 mortgage registered against two properties owned by the applicant.

The estate of the deceased chargee claimed the mortgage was valid and secured funds allegedly stolen by the applicant's parents, while the applicant claimed she never authorized or knew about the mortgage and that her signature was forged.

The court found that material facts surrounding the execution of the mortgage were in dispute, requiring findings of credibility and potentially expert evidence.

Consequently, the court adjourned the applications and directed that the issues proceed to trial pursuant to Rule 38.10(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The applicant sought judicial review of a school board's decision to stop her presentation at a public meeting.

The applicant had been approved to speak about transparency in a library review process but digressed to critique specific books discussing gender identity.

The chair stopped her presentation on the basis that it could violate human rights legislation and board policies.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the board's decision was reasonable, did not breach procedural fairness, and did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that the board reasonably balanced the applicant's freedom of expression with its statutory objectives and policies regarding equity and inclusion.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and multiple firearms offences following the execution of search warrants at two apartments.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence to prove constructive possession.

The court found the accused not guilty of the drug charges, as there was a reasonable doubt regarding his exclusive access to the stash house where the drugs were found.

However, the court found the accused guilty of possessing over $90,000 in proceeds of crime and a loaded restricted firearm found in the apartment where he was arrested, concluding that his guilt was the only reasonable inference.

The defendant brought a motion under the Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, 2010 to overturn the election of the board of directors of the plaintiff church.

The election took place after a physical altercation broke out at the meeting, causing several members to leave for medical attention.

The court found that the defendant was entitled to challenge the election by way of a motion under s. 31(1) of the Act.

The court held that the church failed to prove the election complied with its by-laws, as there was no evidence of the total membership or the number of members present.

The motion was granted, the election was declared invalid, and a new election was ordered.

This endorsement addresses the costs of an application where Mostofa Miah, operating Mia's Indian Cuisine, successfully obtained injunctive relief and a declaration that his lease and lease extension agreement were valid against his landlord, 1000087635 Ontario Inc. The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to Miah, finding that the landlord's conduct throughout the litigation, including asserting a non-existent lease invalidity, making unfounded accusations, and engaging in dilatory tactics, warranted an elevated costs award.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to deliver two supplementary affidavits after cross-examinations had taken place, in the context of a plaintiffs' motion for a certificate of pending litigation.

The court applied the four-part test for granting leave under Rule 39.02(2), considering relevance, responsiveness to cross-examination, potential prejudice, and explanation for delay.

The court found the evidence relevant and responsive, no non-compensable prejudice, and accepted the explanation for delay, noting that some documents were already in the opposing party's possession.

The motion was granted, and the plaintiffs were ordered to pay costs.

The defendants brought a motion seeking to dismiss the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, arguing that the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction and that the motion constituted an abuse of process due to a prior Quebec court order concerning share ownership.

The defendants also sought to add Shawn Gascon as a party.

The court dismissed the defendants' request to dismiss the summary judgment motion, finding that the issues of jurisdiction and abuse of process should be properly addressed within the context of the summary judgment motion itself, and that the cited rules (21.01(3)(a) and (d)) did not grant authority to dismiss a motion, only an action.

However, the court granted the defendants' request to add Shawn Gascon as a defendant, deeming him a necessary party to the action.

The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) brought a motion to pay the net proceeds from a power of sale of a property into court.

The defendant, Guy Lafond, and his former partner, Sherri Van de Hoef, along with the Family Responsibility Office (FRO), claimed entitlement to these funds, primarily for child support arrears.

The court determined the amounts owed to each party and established the priority of claims, with FRO and Ms. Van de Hoef's claims (including costs) taking precedence over RBC's remaining claim.

Due to Mr. Lafond's conduct in disputing the claims and causing adjournments without taking suggested steps, he was ordered to pay the costs of the other parties.

The funds in court were insufficient to fully satisfy all claims, leaving Mr. Lafond personally liable for the deficiency owed to RBC.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a noting of default.

The defendant also sought orders to stay the action pending a criminal proceeding and to seal evidence, but these were not considered as the defendant, being in default, had no right to request such relief without leave.

The court applied the seven-factor test for setting aside default, considering the parties' conduct, the length and reasons for delay (including the defendant's mental health issues), the complexity and value of the claim, and the balance of prejudice.

Despite the defendant's obstructive behaviour during cross-examination, the court emphasized the principle of resolving civil proceedings on their merits.

The motion to set aside the noting of default was granted, with conditions for the defendant to file a compliant statement of defence and pay costs thrown away.

The appellants appealed an Associate Judge's order requiring them to post $20,000 as security for costs.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Associate Judge's decision.

The Associate Judge correctly applied the two-step test for security for costs under Rule 56.01, concluding there was good reason to believe the action was frivolous and vexatious and that the lead appellant lacked sufficient assets to cover a costs order.

The appellate court also rejected the appellants' attempt to introduce new evidence on appeal.

The plaintiff tenant sued her landlord for injuries sustained in a slip and fall on ice on the front step of her leased row house.

The landlord counterclaimed, arguing the tenant was responsible for winter maintenance of the exclusive use area.

Both parties moved for summary judgment on the issue of responsibility for clearing the ice.

The court held that the front step was an exclusive use area, not a common area, and that the lease provision requiring the tenant to remove snow was not void under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The tenant's motion to dismiss the counterclaim was dismissed, and the landlord's motion was granted in part, declaring the tenant responsible for winter maintenance of the area.

This motion sought to enforce two settlements (tort and accident benefits) totaling $2 million, which the plaintiff, Paul-Robert Hipkiss, refused to finalize by signing releases.

The plaintiff asserted the releases were unconstitutional restrictions on his freedom of speech.

The court expressed significant concerns regarding the plaintiff's mental capacity to make decisions in his best interests, noting his unrepresented status despite having a lawyer of record (QTMG LLP) whose interests appeared to conflict with his own.

The motion was adjourned, and the Public Guardian and Trustee was directed to investigate the plaintiff's capacity to manage property due to the serious adverse effects of his refusal to sign, including lack of access to settlement funds and ongoing accident benefits.

The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) decision that had terminated his tenancy and ordered him to pay for damages.

The LTB had previously found the applicant wilfully or negligently caused undue damage.

The applicant's notice of appeal was served within the 30-day period but was not filed in time due to a misunderstanding with the Divisional Court clerk, who incorrectly advised that a motion for leave to appeal was out of time.

Despite the dubious merits of the proposed appeal and the respondent's claims of prejudice from ongoing litigation, the court granted the extension of time to file the notice of appeal, finding no prejudice from the filing delay itself and emphasizing that a party should not be deprived of a right of appeal without real prejudice.