Paul D'Angelo

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

The court considered whether the plaintiffs could pursue a negligence action against a lawyer who drafted a will, after a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee with a Will (CAETW) had been granted.

The plaintiffs alleged the will failed to reflect the testator’s intentions, resulting in a partial intestacy.

The court held that the action was a collateral attack on the CAETW, which is conclusive as to the will’s validity and contents, and dismissed the action.

The court also addressed the principles of summary judgment, the legal effect of probate, and awarded costs to the defendants.

This endorsement addresses the costs of an application where Mostofa Miah, operating Mia's Indian Cuisine, successfully obtained injunctive relief and a declaration that his lease and lease extension agreement were valid against his landlord, 1000087635 Ontario Inc. The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to Miah, finding that the landlord's conduct throughout the litigation, including asserting a non-existent lease invalidity, making unfounded accusations, and engaging in dilatory tactics, warranted an elevated costs award.

The applicant, a federal election candidate, sought an extension to file his electoral campaign return under s. 477.68 of the Canada Elections Act, having missed statutory deadlines.

He also sought relief from the consequences of non-compliance under s. 477.7 of the Act.

The court determined it lacked the power to extend the deadline for bringing the s. 477.68 application, aligning with recent jurisprudence that statutory deadlines require express parliamentary discretion for extension.

However, the court granted relief under s. 477.7, finding the applicant was unaware of his official agent's failure to file the return on time and that the agent-designate took reasonable steps to rectify the situation once discovered.

The court directed the Chief Electoral Officer to accept the return as if filed by the deadline, with no costs awarded.

This costs endorsement followed a successful motion by the plaintiff's solicitors, Victor Ages Vallance LLP (VAV), to assert a solicitor's lien and obtain a charging order over a $48,000 costs award owed to their client.

The Conservative Party of Canada (CPC), a judgment creditor, opposed this relief and sought to garnish the funds, and subsequently requested to set off the costs awarded to VAV against an earlier costs award owed by the plaintiff to CPC.

The court awarded VAV partial indemnity costs for their successful motion, albeit reduced from their requested amount due to some over-lawyering.

The court denied CPC's request for set-off, reasoning that it would unfairly penalize the solicitors for asserting a valid right.

The plaintiff's solicitors, Victor Ages Vallance LLP (VAV), sought a declaration of a valid solicitor's lien and a charging order under section 34(1) of the Solicitors Act over $47,886 in costs awarded to the plaintiff.

These funds were held in trust by counsel for Arthur Hamilton and Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP.

The Conservative Party of Canada (CPC), a creditor of the plaintiff, opposed the relief, asserting a garnishment notice and arguing for an equitable set-off.

The court found that the fund came into existence due to VAV's efforts, establishing a solicitor's lien with priority over garnishment.

The court rejected the equitable set-off argument due to a lack of mutuality of debts.

The charging order was granted, directing the funds to be paid to VAV.

The appellant brought motions to review an order denying an extension of time to appeal a stay of proceedings, and appealed a costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motions and the appeal, finding that the underlying stay order was interlocutory and that the costs orders were reasonable exercises of discretion.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's counterclaim in a simplified procedure trial, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff argued for no costs due to divided success, while the defendant sought elevated costs based on a Rule 49 offer.

The court found the defendant was the successful party as the counterclaim was not pursued.

However, elevated costs were denied because the Rule 49 offer was silent on the counterclaim and potentially out of time.

Applying the principle of proportionality for simplified procedure cases, the court awarded the defendant costs fixed at $15,000 on a reduced partial indemnity basis.

The court considered costs following two case conferences convened on the court’s own motion due to the plaintiff’s procedural conduct in related proceedings concerning a political party’s refusal to permit him to seek its nomination as a candidate.

The plaintiff, who was self‑represented, had scheduled multiple motions contrary to court directions and attempted to reinstate a vacated motion date after abandoning an earlier proceeding.

The defendants sought $2,000 in costs, while the plaintiff requested $35,000 for work performed in the proceedings.

The court found the case conferences were necessitated by the plaintiff’s inappropriate conduct and that the defendants’ request was reasonable.

Costs of $2,000 inclusive of HST were awarded to the defendants, payable forthwith by the plaintiff.

The respondents brought a motion to consolidate an application with an action.

During cross-examinations on affidavits, the applicant refused to answer several questions, leading to this refusals motion.

The Master ordered the applicant to answer questions regarding the merits of the application and his understanding of contractual documents, finding that the parol evidence rule does not preclude such questions at the cross-examination stage.

However, the Master upheld the applicant's claim of solicitor-client privilege over documents in a mediation file, finding no blanket waiver of privilege.

The plaintiff contractor brought an action for damages alleging breach of contract or, alternatively, negligent misrepresentation arising from negotiations to renovate premises for a fitness franchise.

The plaintiff argued that the parties reached a binding agreement through meetings, draft contracts, and text messages indicating work would commence, despite the absence of a signed contract.

The defendant maintained there was never a clear acceptance of the plaintiff’s proposal and that negotiations remained conditional on financing, lease arrangements, and other unresolved terms.

The court held the plaintiff failed to establish a meeting of the minds or acceptance of the offer and found no evidence of misleading representations.

The action and the defendant’s counterclaim were both dismissed.

The appellant, a former federal cabinet minister, sued the prime minister, his staff, and other officials for defamation, conspiracy, and other torts after she was removed from Cabinet and the Conservative Party caucus amid allegations of misconduct.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim, finding the claims non-justiciable due to Crown prerogative and parliamentary privilege, and that the alleged defamatory statements were either not capable of being defamatory or were protected by absolute privilege.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the claims against all defendants except one Member of Parliament, finding her public statements had a possible defamatory meaning that should be determined at trial.

Following the striking of a statement of claim alleging conspiracy, defamation, misfeasance in public office, and related torts against numerous defendants, the court determined the quantum of costs payable on the successful pleadings motion.

Multiple defendant groups sought more than $205,000 in partial indemnity fees and over $20,000 in disbursements.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the fairness principles articulated in Boucher, the court considered duplication of effort among separately represented defendants with similar interests.

The court concluded that substantial overlap existed between certain defendants’ legal work and therefore limited recovery to a single set of costs for those parties.

Reduced costs totalling $108,000 in fees plus $10,560 in disbursements were awarded, subject to HST.

The defendant brought a motion to determine costs after the parties agreed to end the litigation.

The plaintiff had originally sued the defendant, a former employee, for allegedly misappropriating confidential information and company property.

The action was ultimately discontinued as the anticipated damages did not materialize.

The court found that the litigation was not unreasonable when commenced, but since neither party prevailed on the merits, it ordered that each party bear its own costs.

The plaintiff, a former Member of Parliament and cabinet minister, sued the prime minister, his senior advisors, and others for conspiracy, defamation, and other torts following her removal from cabinet and the Conservative Party caucus.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the statement of claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the decisions to remove the plaintiff from cabinet and caucus were protected by Crown prerogative and parliamentary privilege, respectively, and were therefore not justiciable.

The court also held that communications between the prime minister and his advisors were protected by absolute privilege, and that the Conservative Party of Canada, as an unincorporated association, lacked the capacity to be sued.

The plaintiff real estate brokerage brought an action against the vendor, its principal, and the purchaser for an unpaid real estate commission.

The vendor and purchaser had entered into an agreement of purchase and sale during the listing period, which was later revived and closed under a different corporate purchaser name at the vendor's insistence to avoid paying the commission.

The court found that the commission was earned and payable under the listing agreement.

The court also held the vendor's principal and the corporate purchaser liable for intentional interference with contractual relations for their bad faith conduct in attempting to circumvent the commission.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering it to pay a real estate commission to the respondent broker for the sale of a municipal property.

The trial judge found the parties had an oral agreement that a commission was payable, but disagreed on the rate, and applied section 34(2) of the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act to set the rate at the generally prevailing community rate of 3.75 percent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion of an oral agreement and agreeing that section 34(2) was correctly applied to resolve the dispute over the rate.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent regarding a debt.

The motion judge had relied on a partial transcript from a related proceeding where the appellant seemingly admitted the debt.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence, including the full transcript which showed the admission was qualified by a claim that the parties had settled for half the amount.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding exceptional circumstances due to a communication breakdown between counsel and the inadvertently misleading nature of the partial transcript.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment set aside, but the respondent was awarded costs for both the motion and the appeal due to the appellant's failure to adduce the evidence originally.