Corey Willard

The court considered a motion by the Attorney General of Canada to strike the plaintiff’s action, which alleged negligence in the administration of pilot medical certification.

The plaintiff, a commercial pilot, had his medical certificate refused due to a diagnosis of alcohol use disorder, but was later found fit and granted an unrestricted certificate after a successful appeal.

The court found that the regulatory regime’s purpose is public safety, not the protection of individual economic interests, and that no private law duty of care is owed by Transport Canada to pilots in these circumstances.

The action was struck in its entirety.

The court considered two motions for summary judgment in a civil action brought by William Stoddart, a former inmate, against Dr. Diana Silver Wyatt and various Crown defendants.

Stoddart alleged assault and professional negligence against Dr. Wyatt, and negligence, assault, and breach of Charter rights against the Crown defendants, arising from the discontinuation of his prescription for gabapentin following a change in the Correctional Service of Canada’s drug formulary.

The court found that the only evidence on the standard of care was from the defendants, and Stoddart failed to provide any expert evidence in support of his claims.

The court held that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted summary judgment, dismissing all of Stoddart’s claims.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's medical malpractice and informed consent action.

The plaintiff, who was self-represented for most of the litigation, failed to serve any expert medical report to support her claims, despite repeated requests from the defendant's counsel and court orders.

The court found that expert evidence was required for both the negligence and informed consent claims, and that the case did not fall within the "clearest of cases" exception.

Consequently, the court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action.

The plaintiff sued two physicians for medical malpractice, alleging they negligently failed to diagnose and treat him for Lyme disease following a suspected tick bite in April 2010.

The emergency room physician diagnosed cellulitis and prescribed antibiotics, while the family physician later treated the plaintiff for various ongoing symptoms but did not diagnose Lyme disease.

The court found that neither physician breached the standard of care.

Furthermore, the court concluded the plaintiff failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he was bitten by a tick or that he actually contracted Lyme disease.

The action was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an Associate Judge's order requiring them to post $20,000 as security for costs.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Associate Judge's decision.

The Associate Judge correctly applied the two-step test for security for costs under Rule 56.01, concluding there was good reason to believe the action was frivolous and vexatious and that the lead appellant lacked sufficient assets to cover a costs order.

The appellate court also rejected the appellants' attempt to introduce new evidence on appeal.

The defendants brought a motion seeking costs thrown away on a substantial indemnity basis for a late trial adjournment and an order suspending pre-judgment interest.

The trial was adjourned due to the plaintiff's counsel's failure to comply with timetable orders, including providing proper witness statements and an ever-changing witness list, which rendered the original four-week trial estimate unrealistic.

The court found the plaintiff and his counsel responsible for the adjournment, awarded the defendants $100,000 in costs thrown away on a partial indemnity basis, and suspended pre-judgment interest from the original trial date until the new trial date.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's property claim, the respondent parties sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court reviewed the factors under Rule 57.01, noting the applicant's conduct unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings and complicated a simple contractual dispute.

However, the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the settlement offers did not trigger Rule 49.10 consequences.

The court reduced the requested amounts due to duplication of effort, excessive use of senior counsel, and unreasonable refusal of a settlement offer by one respondent, awarding total costs of $47,500 across the three respondents.

Following a successful motion by the defendants to enforce a settlement agreement, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs due to the bad faith conduct of the self-represented plaintiff, who had repudiated the settlement after receiving some of its benefits.

The court found the plaintiff's conduct caused unnecessary delays and costs.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay $10,000 in costs to the defendants and $500 to his former counsel.

The applicants, Andrew Pierre Makoundi (a minor represented by his litigation guardian Bruno Makoundi) and Bruno Makoundi, brought a motion to annul a settlement agreement reached in December 2013.

The respondents, Lycée Claudel and its employees, opposed the annulment and sought court approval (homologation) of the settlement and dismissal of the applicants' actions.

The court dismissed the applicants' motion to annul, finding no evidence of mental incapacity, no applicability of the Charter to the private institution, and that allegations of undue influence were directed at former counsel.

The court granted the respondents' request to homologate the settlement, exercising its discretion under the Rules of Civil Procedure to dispense with certain procedural requirements (Rule 7.08 affidavits) in the interest of justice, given the applicants' conduct.

The court ordered the payment of $5,000 to the applicants' former counsel as per the settlement.

The applicant sought a declaration of ownership over a 13-acre parcel of land, relying on concepts of constructive/resulting trust, unjust enrichment, proprietary estoppel, and adverse possession.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish the legal requirements for these remedies and was barred by the doctrine of laches due to significant delay in asserting his claim after multiple property transfers.