André Marin

This is a costs decision following the successful application by the applicants to set aside an arbitral award and associated costs award on grounds of procedural unfairness.

The applicants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $49,636.38 against Dr. Frank Fowlie.

The court awarded the full amount requested, finding the applicants were entirely successful and the quantum was fair and reasonable.

The court rejected Dr. Fowlie's argument that he should not bear costs as he was not responsible for the arbitrator's conduct, noting that he actively opposed the application and did not challenge the procedural ruling during the arbitration.

The court also rejected any suggestion that Wrestling Canada Lutte should share in the costs award.

The applicants sought to set aside an arbitration award under section 46 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, arguing that the arbitrator’s mid-hearing switch from an oral to a written process, and refusal to consider their closing submissions, constituted unequal and unfair treatment.

The Court found that the applicants were denied their statutory rights to an oral hearing and to equal treatment, and set aside the award, remitting the matter for a new hearing before a different arbitration panel.

This costs endorsement follows the granting of anti-SLAPP motions by the three defendants.

The court addresses the scale and quantum of costs, the issue of duplication between legal teams, and the entitlement of a self-represented litigant to costs.

The court awards full indemnity costs to the defendants, finding the requests fair and reasonable, and declines to award compensation to the self-represented defendant for his own time.

The defendants brought motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The plaintiff, a former Complaints and Appeals Officer for a national sports organization, sued the defendants over emails they sent criticizing his handling of complaints and his suitability for the role.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to a matter of public interest regarding athlete safety.

While the defamation claim had substantial merit, the plaintiff failed to show that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as justification and qualified privilege.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence of serious harm caused by the expressions that would outweigh the public interest in protecting them.

The motions were granted and the action was dismissed.

The appellant, Reset Electronics Inc., appealed the dismissal of its action against Hydro One Networks Inc. for alleged negligent misrepresentation and negligent performance of service.

Reset claimed Hydro One's delays in processing incentive payments for energy-efficient products caused its business failure.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld the trial judge's findings that Hydro One owed no duty of care to Reset, did not breach any duty if one existed, and did not cause Reset's alleged losses.

The court affirmed that no undertaking inviting reasonable reliance was established between the parties, and Hydro One's actions were based on legitimate safety concerns.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal costs was refused.

The moving parties, Wrestling Canada Lutte, Tamara Medwidsky, and Lee Mackay, brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of K. A. Jensen J. dated May 2, 2023.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, with costs reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

This decision addresses a motion for summary judgment and to strike portions of a Statement of Claim.

The Plaintiffs, a corporation and its principal, sued for breach of contract after their independent contractor agreement was terminated.

The Defendants sought to strike the claim for wrongful termination and other allegations, arguing compliance with the contract's notice provision and irrelevance of other pleaded facts.

The court found that the termination claim had no reasonable prospect of success as proper notice was given.

It also struck claims against individual defendants due to privity of contract and ordered the removal of scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious allegations, including those related to defamation, the organization's history, and a Ministry of Labour investigation.

However, the court allowed the claim for breach of the contract's dispute resolution clause to proceed, granting leave for the Plaintiffs to amend their pleading to properly articulate this claim and associated aggravated and punitive damages, and to establish the principal's standing as a party.

Following dismissal of a defamation action under the anti-SLAPP regime, the moving parties sought costs of the motion and the action.

The court held the statutory presumption under s. 137.1(7) of the Courts of Justice Act applied, given the collateral purpose for the litigation, the plaintiff's inability to prove harm caused by the impugned expression, and the prior finding that the action met the definition of SLAPP litigation.

Although full indemnity costs were presumptively available, the court made a modest reduction for excessive affidavit-preparation time and delay in bringing the motion.

Costs were fixed at $132,000.00 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff, a federal political party leader, brought a defamation action against the defendants for publishing statements characterizing him as a racist, misogynist, and anti-Semite.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motion, finding that while the statements were prima facie defamatory, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendants had no valid defence of justification or fair comment.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to show that the harm suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting free expression on matters of public interest.

The applicant, a funeral home, sought judicial review of the Bereavement Authority of Ontario's decision to grant a conditional licence to a competing crematorium and visitation centre located on the same property.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss the application for lack of standing.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the applicant lacked private standing as it was not directly affected by the decision and its rights were not infringed.

The court also found the applicant lacked public interest standing, as the case did not raise a serious justiciable issue and the applicant's true motive was to eliminate a competitor.