Allison J. Klymyshyn

The self-represented plaintiff, Brian Charbonneau, sought an urgent determination for the defendants' motion for summary judgment to proceed, requesting its dismissal and the scheduling of mediation.

The underlying dispute involved an erroneous land conveyance from 2011.

The plaintiff argued urgency due to potential farming business losses of $4,500 for the season.

The court, applying the Provincial Direction's definition of "urgent" (immediate and significant financial repercussions), found that the matter was not urgent, as the issue had been ongoing since 2015 and the potential loss was not deemed "significant." The request for urgency was denied.

The defendant sought costs after the plaintiffs' action was administratively dismissed for delay.

The court addressed whether it had jurisdiction to award costs despite the silence of Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on costs, affirming its inherent jurisdiction under Section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendant, reducing the amount sought due to factors such as the dismissal of the counterclaim and previous cost awards.

The appellant appealed a judgment declaring her to be a vexatious litigant.

The appellant raised over 20 grounds of appeal, arguing that her various actions, proceedings, and appeals against the respondent condominium corporation and related parties were warranted and did not constitute misuse of the court process.

The appellant also alleged systemic bias against self-represented litigants and argued that the application judge should have recused herself.

The Court of Appeal upheld the vexatious litigant designation, finding that the appellant's proceedings were frivolous, vexatious, and constituted collateral attacks on finally determined matters.

The court rejected allegations of bias and found no basis to interfere with the application judge's findings.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion to strike the self-represented plaintiff's statement of claim, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was frivolous.

The plaintiff alleged the defendant delayed scheduling her bail hearing because he was working as a part-time Crown Attorney.

The court found that while much of the claim was improperly drafted and irrelevant, it contained a viable cause of action in negligence or breach of contract regarding the bail hearing delay.

The court struck the offending portions of the claim but allowed the core action to proceed, awarding the defendant $1,000 in costs for partial success.

The respondent, Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 116 (CCC 116), moved to dismiss an application (the "Lien Application") and a Small Claims Court action initiated by Manorama Sennek due to her persistent failure to comply with interlocutory orders, specifically an order for a capacity assessment.

The court granted the dismissal, finding that Sennek, despite her legal background, consciously and deliberately refused to comply with court orders, leading to excessive legal fees for CCC 116.

The court emphasized the importance of complying with court orders for the proper functioning of the civil justice system.

The applicant sought an extension of time to perfect an appeal to the Court of Appeal from an order requiring her to submit to a mental capacity assessment.

The respondent condominium corporation opposed the extension, arguing that the underlying order was interlocutory and therefore the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The court found that the order was indeed interlocutory in nature, as it was procedural and did not finally dispose of the rights of the parties.

The court refused to grant the extension, finding that it would not be proportionate or in the interests of justice to prolong proceedings given the enormous costs incurred relative to the amounts in issue, and that the appeal should have been brought to the Divisional Court.

The plaintiff moved to amend a statement of claim in a professional negligence action to add two former solicitors as defendants for allegedly failing to commence a commercial fire loss action within the applicable limitation period.

The proposed defendants opposed the amendment, arguing there was no evidence of retainer in one case and that the claims were statute‑barred.

The court held that the evidence demonstrated one solicitor had not been retained to pursue the fire loss claim and therefore there was no basis to add him as a defendant.

With respect to the second solicitor, the court concluded that the plaintiff was aware of the missed limitation issue when his subsequent counsel assumed carriage of the file, triggering the two‑year limitation period for a negligence claim.

As the motion to add that solicitor was brought after the limitation period expired, the amendment was refused.

The plaintiff insurer made payments to its insured for property damage and to a third party for bodily injuries following a motorcycle collision.

The insurer then sued its insured to recover both payments, alleging a breach of the insurance policy.

The insured brought a motion to strike the claim regarding the third-party payment.

The court granted the motion, finding that under the Insurance Act, an insurer cannot sue its insured for reimbursement of a third-party settlement without a prior judgment against the insured, an express reimbursement agreement, or an assignment of the third party's cause of action.