Rocco Galati

The applicants, foreign nationals under house arrest due to immigration proceedings, sought a writ of habeas corpus or modification of their release terms.

The Attorney General of Canada opposed and brought a preliminary motion for a stay based on lack of jurisdiction, arguing that house arrest does not constitute "detention" for habeas corpus purposes.

The court dismissed the application, finding that house arrest, while restrictive, does not amount to detention or a deprivation of liberty in the context of habeas corpus, distinguishing it from jail or imprisonment.

The court noted that the applicants had alternative remedies through the Immigration Division and Federal Court for modifying release terms.

The plaintiffs, former employees of an automobile dealership, sued police and others for damages after a criminal investigation led to the dealership's closure and their job loss.

The defendants moved for an order striking out the plaintiffs’ Statements of Claim.

The court dismissed the negligent investigation claim, finding no private law duty of care owed by police to employees of a suspect.

It granted leave to amend for civil conspiracy and misfeasance in public office claims, but struck other intentional tort claims without leave.

The applicant, an OPP officer facing workplace misconduct proceedings, brought an application for judicial review seeking to quash or stay the proceedings.

He argued that the disciplinary process under the Police Services Act violated his rights under sections 7 and 11 of the Charter by failing to provide an independent and unbiased tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that section 11 applies only to criminal matters, not employment discipline, and that section 7 is not engaged because there is no constitutional right to practice a profession unfettered by regulatory rules.

The court also declined to order the police association to fund the applicant's legal counsel.

The applicant, an OPP officer facing disciplinary proceedings under Part V of the Police Services Act, sought a stay of those proceedings pending his application for judicial review.

In his judicial review application, the applicant challenged the constitutionality of the disciplinary process, arguing it violated his rights under section 7 of the Charter and procedural fairness.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant could suffer irreparable reputational harm if the hearing proceeded, and the balance of convenience favoured a short stay given the imminent judicial review hearing.

The motion for a stay was granted.

Following a successful summary judgment motion and a related failed consolidation motion across two related civil actions, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

The successful plaintiffs sought substantial costs exceeding $670,000 based on partial indemnity prior to an offer to settle and substantial indemnity thereafter under Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court accepted that the offer to settle triggered substantial indemnity costs but found the overall request disproportionate to the complexity and expectations of the losing party.

The requested amount was reduced by half while still recognizing the Rule 49 consequences.

In the related action, defendants resisting consolidation were awarded substantial indemnity costs due to litigation tactics that unnecessarily increased complexity.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment to recover unpaid fees under a consulting agreement and returns under a letter of credit agreement related to a wind power project.

The defendants resisted, arguing there were credibility issues requiring a trial and challenging the constitutionality of Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found no genuine issues of credibility, as the defendants' assertions contradicted the clear documentary evidence.

The court also dismissed the constitutional challenge, holding that Rule 20 does not violate section 7 of the Charter or unwritten constitutional principles of judicial independence.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiffs.

On an appeal concerning judicial appointment eligibility under s. 98 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the appellants challenged the interpretation adopted by the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to demonstrate any interpretive error in the lower court's analysis of s. 98.

Arguments relying on the prior reference regarding ss. 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act were rejected as inapplicable because the constitutional and statutory contexts differed.

The appeal was dismissed for essentially the reasons given by the Quebec Court of Appeal.

Following the dismissal of their judicial review application, the applicants argued they should not pay costs because the application was public interest litigation.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding the application was motivated by the practitioner applicants' commercial interests.

The court awarded costs of $30,000 to the Transitional Council and $15,000 to the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care, finding the Transitional Council's initial claim of up to $125,297.56 excessive.

The court ordered all applicants, including patient applicants, to be jointly and severally liable for the costs.

The applicants sought a declaration that Ontario Regulation 27/13 under the Traditional Chinese Medicine Act, 2006 was ultra vires and breached sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

They argued the regulation failed to create a 'doctor' class of practitioners and imposed discriminatory English or French language fluency requirements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the regulation was intra vires, there is no section 7 Charter right to practice a profession unfettered by regulation, and language alone is not a protected ground under section 15.

The plaintiffs sought to continue a Rule 45.01 preservation order obtained ex parte preventing certain defendants from dealing with disputed shares in a start‑up internet gaming company.

The defendants argued that the order should be set aside because the plaintiffs failed to make full and frank disclosure when obtaining the original order.

The court reviewed the evidentiary record and found that the plaintiffs had materially failed to disclose key facts, including prior pleadings, relevant documents, and the full shareholders agreement, and had presented a misleading narrative regarding their knowledge of share allocations.

The omissions were material and undermined the integrity of the ex parte process.

The court exercised its discretion to dissolve the preservation order rather than continue it.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claims against the Crown.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the claims even if they were not statute-barred by the Limitations Act.

The Court noted that the section 15 Charter claim was too vague and lacked evidence to permit meaningful analysis.

Costs of $8,000 were awarded to the respondent, though the Crown undertook not to enforce the order due to the appellant's financial circumstances.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice that struck down the section 38 scheme of the Canada Evidence Act as unconstitutional.

The scheme grants the Federal Court jurisdiction to determine questions of disclosure of information pertaining to international relations, national defence, or national security.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the scheme does not violate section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 or section 7 of the Charter.

The Court found that the scheme preserves the full authority and independence of the judge presiding over the criminal trial to do justice between the parties, including entering a stay of proceedings if necessary to protect the accused's right to a fair trial.

Media organizations challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory publication ban on bail hearing information under s. 517 of the Criminal Code, arguing it unjustifiably infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the provision.

The Court found that while the mandatory ban limits freedom of expression, it is justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The ban's objectives of safeguarding the right to a fair trial and ensuring expeditious bail hearings are pressing and substantial.

The mandatory nature of the ban is rationally connected to these objectives, minimally impairs freedom of expression given its temporary nature and limited scope, and its salutary effects outweigh its deleterious effects.

The Canada Revenue Agency investigated the appellants for tax fraud involving approximately 5,000 tax returns and $15 million.

The CRA sought a further extension to retain seized materials under s. 490(2) of the Criminal Code, which a Justice of the Peace denied, citing the pace of the investigation.

The Superior Court quashed the denial on certiorari, finding the Justice of the Peace failed to apply the correct test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the focus under s. 490(2) must be on the needs of the ongoing investigation rather than usurping investigatorial discretion.

The Crown applied for certiorari to quash two decisions of a justice of the peace that refused to extend the detention of materials seized during a tax evasion investigation and ordered their return.

The justice of the peace had concluded that the nine and a half months the materials had been detained was a reasonable time for the authorities to review them.

The Superior Court granted the application and quashed the decisions, finding that the justice of the peace erred in law and exceeded his jurisdiction by conducting a retrospective review of the investigation's efficiency.

The court held that under s. 490(2) of the Criminal Code, the focus must be prospective, assessing whether the nature of the investigation justifies further detention, rather than second-guessing the pace of the investigation to date.

The applicant's motion for leave to appeal a preliminary issue regarding security for costs under the Libel and Slander Act was dismissed.

The respondent sought costs of $6,270.57 on a partial indemnity basis, while the applicant argued for $1,500 to $2,000.

Having regard to the narrow issue and the factors in Rule 57.01(1), the court fixed costs payable to the respondent at $3,000 all-inclusive.

The appellant consented to the dismissal of the appeal on the basis that there would be no costs in the Court of Appeal or the court below.

The Court of Appeal ordered the dismissal on consent.

The Crown appealed the respondents' acquittals for criminal negligence causing death following a fatal horseback riding accident involving a ten-year-old novice rider.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in excluding evidence of prior incidents involving the horse and expert evidence regarding safe trail ride operations.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in excluding one prior incident and the expert evidence, as the expert evidence met the necessity criterion.

However, the appeal was dismissed because the Crown failed to demonstrate with a reasonable degree of certainty that the verdicts would not necessarily have been the same had the errors not occurred.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a motions judge's decision that allowed the defendants to seek security for costs under s. 12(1) of the Libel and Slander Act, despite the plaintiff being a resident of Ontario.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions on the issue and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's interpretation that the statute permits security for costs against resident plaintiffs.

The appellants, practitioners of Falun Gong, appealed an order striking out their claims for libel, incitement of hatred, crimes against humanity, and negligent research against a newspaper publisher.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the allegedly defamatory article about Falun Gong did not identify the appellants individually, and therefore the words were not published 'of and concerning' them.

The court also upheld the striking of the other claims, finding they were essentially subsidiary torts that could only be addressed under the law of defamation.