Karen Phung

The applicants sought an urgent hearing under the Vendors and Purchasers Act to determine the validity of title requisitions submitted by the purchaser two weeks before the closing date of a real estate transaction.

The requisitions concerned a potential heritage designation, knob and tube wiring, and an underground oil tank.

The court denied the request for an urgent hearing, finding that the urgency was self-induced by the parties agreeing to a late requisition date.

The court held that the matter was not truly urgent and did not justify jumping the queue of backlogged civil cases.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a Mareva injunction and Certificates of Pending Litigation against the defendants, alleging they perpetrated a Ponzi scheme involving mortgage and securities fraud.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud, oppression, and conspiracy, noting that tens of millions of dollars were raised without proper compliance and were unaccounted for.

The court inferred a strong risk of dissipation of assets based on the defendants' conduct, including the listing of a $4 million house and suspicious property transfers.

The motion for the Mareva injunction and CPLs was granted.

The appellant Wi2Wi Corporation appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dated October 25, 2018.

The parties settled the appeal prior to hearing.

The appeal was marked as abandoned and the parties agreed that the judgment below would be set aside.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment enforcing a Consulting Agreement and a Letter of Credit Agreement, and the dismissal of their motion to consolidate two related actions.

The appellants argued the agreements were unenforceable as illegal loans under the Criminal Code and were procured in breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the case was document-driven, appropriate for summary judgment, the agreements were not loans, and no fiduciary duty existed.

The plaintiff sought judgment against the defendants for $419,525.35 and a declaration that the funds constituted a trust fund, which the court granted.

The plaintiff also sought a declaration that the judgment would survive any future bankruptcy of the individual defendant under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court declined to grant the bankruptcy declaration, holding that judicial declarations should not be made in relation to hypothetical future events.

Following a successful summary judgment motion and a related failed consolidation motion across two related civil actions, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

The successful plaintiffs sought substantial costs exceeding $670,000 based on partial indemnity prior to an offer to settle and substantial indemnity thereafter under Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court accepted that the offer to settle triggered substantial indemnity costs but found the overall request disproportionate to the complexity and expectations of the losing party.

The requested amount was reduced by half while still recognizing the Rule 49 consequences.

In the related action, defendants resisting consolidation were awarded substantial indemnity costs due to litigation tactics that unnecessarily increased complexity.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment to recover unpaid fees under a consulting agreement and returns under a letter of credit agreement related to a wind power project.

The defendants resisted, arguing there were credibility issues requiring a trial and challenging the constitutionality of Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found no genuine issues of credibility, as the defendants' assertions contradicted the clear documentary evidence.

The court also dismissed the constitutional challenge, holding that Rule 20 does not violate section 7 of the Charter or unwritten constitutional principles of judicial independence.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiffs.

The appellants, condominium unit owners, appealed the dismissal of their Small Claims Court action against the respondent condominium corporation.

The action challenged a special assessment levied to pay legal fees from an unsuccessful parking dispute.

The deputy judge dismissed the action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, finding the appellants discovered their claim more than two years before commencing the action.

The Divisional Court upheld the dismissal, confirming the cause of action accrued when the board's decision was ratified and the special assessment took immediate legal effect, not when the first installment was due.