Rocco Galati

The Crown applied for certiorari to quash two decisions of a justice of the peace that refused to extend the detention of materials seized during a tax evasion investigation and ordered their return.

The justice of the peace had concluded that the nine and a half months the materials had been detained was a reasonable time for the authorities to review them.

The Superior Court granted the application and quashed the decisions, finding that the justice of the peace erred in law and exceeded his jurisdiction by conducting a retrospective review of the investigation's efficiency.

The court held that under s. 490(2) of the Criminal Code, the focus must be prospective, assessing whether the nature of the investigation justifies further detention, rather than second-guessing the pace of the investigation to date.

The applicant's motion for leave to appeal a preliminary issue regarding security for costs under the Libel and Slander Act was dismissed.

The respondent sought costs of $6,270.57 on a partial indemnity basis, while the applicant argued for $1,500 to $2,000.

Having regard to the narrow issue and the factors in Rule 57.01(1), the court fixed costs payable to the respondent at $3,000 all-inclusive.

The appellant consented to the dismissal of the appeal on the basis that there would be no costs in the Court of Appeal or the court below.

The Court of Appeal ordered the dismissal on consent.

The Crown appealed the respondents' acquittals for criminal negligence causing death following a fatal horseback riding accident involving a ten-year-old novice rider.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in excluding evidence of prior incidents involving the horse and expert evidence regarding safe trail ride operations.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in excluding one prior incident and the expert evidence, as the expert evidence met the necessity criterion.

However, the appeal was dismissed because the Crown failed to demonstrate with a reasonable degree of certainty that the verdicts would not necessarily have been the same had the errors not occurred.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a motions judge's decision that allowed the defendants to seek security for costs under s. 12(1) of the Libel and Slander Act, despite the plaintiff being a resident of Ontario.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions on the issue and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's interpretation that the statute permits security for costs against resident plaintiffs.

The appellants, practitioners of Falun Gong, appealed an order striking out their claims for libel, incitement of hatred, crimes against humanity, and negligent research against a newspaper publisher.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the allegedly defamatory article about Falun Gong did not identify the appellants individually, and therefore the words were not published 'of and concerning' them.

The court also upheld the striking of the other claims, finding they were essentially subsidiary torts that could only be addressed under the law of defamation.

The court considered written submissions from the parties regarding costs following an appeal.

The court decided to vary its previous reasons to provide that the appellant is entitled to one third of the costs of the appeal, rather than full costs.

The appellant appealed an order of the motions judge, arguing that the judge erred in abridging the time for service of motion materials and refusing a brief adjournment.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that voluminous materials were served less than 24 hours before the hearing and the appellant's counsel had another commitment.

The Court also found no urgency requiring a final determination on that date.

The appeal was allowed, the motions judge's order was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a rehearing.

The appellant, a woman with Canadian-born dependent children, was ordered deported.

She applied for an exemption based on humanitarian and compassionate considerations, which was denied without formal reasons, though she was later provided with the notes of the investigating immigration officer.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the duty of procedural fairness applied and required the provision of reasons, which was satisfied by the officer's notes.

However, the notes demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias and the decision was an unreasonable exercise of discretion because it failed to give serious weight and consideration to the best interests of the appellant's children.