John Mather

The applicant law firm sought to recognize and enforce a New York State judgment against the respondent for unpaid legal fees.

The respondent opposed the application, arguing that the underlying promissory note and guarantee were obtained under economic duress.

The court found that the New York judgment met the test for recognition and enforcement, as it was a final judgment for a definite sum rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.

The court rejected the economic duress defence, finding that the respondent had choices, did not protest, and the negotiation of legal fees did not constitute illegitimate pressure.

The application was granted, and the judgment was recognized and enforced in Ontario.

Following the granting of the applicant's application and dismissal of the respondent's application, the court determined the quantum of costs.

The parties agreed the applicant was entitled to partial indemnity costs.

The court found the applicant's claimed amount of $36,293.96 to be reasonable, noting the complexity of the matter and the general principle that an applicant's costs are often higher than a respondent's.

Costs were awarded to the applicant in the requested amount.

The plaintiffs sought a Mareva injunction against the defendants.

Before the hearing, two defendants were placed into bankruptcy by a separate creditor.

The bankrupt defendants appealed the bankruptcy orders, arguing the appeal automatically stayed the bankruptcy.

The court held that appeals from an Associate Justice's bankruptcy order lie to a Superior Court judge under s. 192(4) of the BIA, which does not trigger an automatic stay under s. 195.

Consequently, the action and Mareva injunction application were stayed against the bankrupt defendants, and a new timetable was set for the remaining defendants.

The applicant tenant sought to enforce a commercial lease against the respondent, the new owner of the property.

The respondent sought a declaration that the proposed use of the property as a recreational facility contravened the zoning by-law and requested an injunction to prevent its operation.

The court held that the lease was binding on the new owner, as it had notice of the lease.

The court rejected the respondent's argument that the lease was frustrated by the zoning by-law, finding no current breach and noting that a rezoning application could be made.

The court granted the applicant's requests for declarations enforcing the lease and dismissed the respondent's application for an injunction as premature.

The applicants sought a declaration that a retaining wall on their property at 41 Indian Grove encroaches onto the respondent's property at 270 Indian Road.

A 21-year encroachment agreement registered on title in 2004 permitted the encroachment to continue until July 29, 2025.

The respondent resisted the declaration on various grounds, including the age of the wall and historical use.

The court found the registered encroachment agreement valid and binding on the successor owners and declared that the retaining wall encroaches on the applicants' lands following the expiry of the agreement.

The defendants, Dentons Canada LLP and Philip Rimer, brought a third-party claim against various individuals and entities, including other lawyers and advisors, seeking contribution and indemnity in a professional negligence action.

The third parties brought Rule 21 motions to strike the third-party claim, arguing that they acted as agents for the plaintiff and therefore any negligence on their part would be attributable to the plaintiff, precluding a third-party claim.

The court struck the claims against one director (Wang) and the escrow agent, finding them doomed to fail based on agency and contractual principles.

However, the court allowed the claims against the other third-party advisors and lawyers to proceed, finding that they fell into a category of non-agency advisory roles where the plaintiff might not be held contributorily responsible for their actions.

Leave to amend was granted to particularize the claims against certain third parties.

The respondents, who were largely successful in defending a shareholder oppression application, sought costs including substantial indemnity costs from the date of an offer to settle.

The court found that the offer to settle did not trigger Rule 49 consequences because it omitted the applicant's statutory right to audited financial statements, an issue on which the applicant was successful.

The court awarded the respondents partial indemnity costs, reduced by 25% to reflect the applicant's partial success, fixing costs at $75,000.

The applicant, a 40% shareholder in a holding company (Pazkaz) that owns shares in a start-up (Rave), brought an oppression application under section 248 of the OBCA.

He alleged improper share dilution and mischaracterization of contributions as equity instead of loans, seeking various remedies including a buyout, conversion of equity to loans, removal of directors, or forced sale/winding up.

The court dismissed most of the applicant's claims, finding no unfair prejudice or oppression regarding share dilution or loan characterization, as the companies issued shares commensurate with investments and there was no evidence of misappropriation.

However, the court granted the applicant's request for audited financial statements for both Pazkaz and Rave, affirming a shareholder's statutory right to such information.

Kristine Jill Hill was found in contempt of a June 28, 2017 order.

This endorsement addresses the sentencing, which included a joint submission, and the quantum of full indemnity costs to be paid by Ms. Hill as part of her sentence.

The court considered principles of reasonableness, indemnity, and factors under Rule 57.01 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found the matter complex, noted unnecessary steps taken by the defendants, and ultimately awarded the plaintiffs the requested costs of $320,899.64.

An insured brought an action against international insurers for breach of an insurance contract.

The insurers moved to stay the action and refer the dispute to arbitration in London, England pursuant to an arbitration clause in the policy.

The motion judge dismissed the stay motion, finding that the "Action Against Insurer" endorsement provided an alternative method of dispute resolution allowing domestic court proceedings.

The appellate court reversed, holding that the arbitration clause was mandatory and the sole method of dispute resolution, and that the "Action Against Insurer" clause was a service of suit provision that did not conflict with the arbitration clause.

The court also clarified that the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration applies to agreements providing for arbitration of certain disputes, not only those providing for arbitration as the sole method of dispute resolution.

The plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction requiring the defendants to vacate and cease farming lands transferred by Ontario to a bare trustee for the benefit of the Six Nations community as represented by the elected council.

The responding party asserted a lease from the hereditary governance structure, individual s. 35 rights, procedural impropriety in the eviction decision, and lack of authority in the elected council to control off-reserve lands.

The court held that consultation obligations had been met through years of main table negotiations, that any Aboriginal or treaty rights were collective rather than individually enforceable in this proceeding, and that no lawful leasehold or possessory entitlement had been established.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald framework, the court found a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm from continuing trespass and interference with governance and land use planning, and a balance of convenience favouring the title holders.

The interlocutory injunction was granted.

This decision concerns a costs award following the dismissal of the applicant's constitutional challenge to sections of the Insurance Act.

The court had previously found the applicant lacked standing and that the challenge failed on its merits.

The applicant argued for no costs, citing public interest, or a reduced award based on public sector salaries of Crown counsel.

The court rejected both arguments, stating that the litigation was speculative and without merit, and that costs for Crown lawyers are not reduced due to their salaried status.

The court fixed costs at $50,000, payable by the applicant to the Province of Ontario, which represented approximately one-third of a reasonable claim.

The applicant, a personal injury lawyer, challenged the constitutionality of sections 267.5(1) and 280 of the Insurance Act, which limit pre-trial recovery of lost income and grant sole jurisdiction to the Licence Appeal Tribunal for Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule disputes, respectively.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant lacked both private and public interest standing.

On the merits, the court found no breach of sections 15(1) or 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, nor a violation of section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, as the impugned provisions did not create distinctions based on prohibited grounds, deprive individuals of life, liberty, or security of the person, or usurp superior court jurisdiction for a novel area of law.

The defendants, having been entirely successful, sought partial indemnity costs of $65,981.09.

The court found the plaintiff's claim improper and vexatious, constituting a collateral attack on prior Italian and Ontario enforcement judgments.

The court accepted the defendants' claimed time and hourly rates, finding minor duplication between senior and junior counsel necessary and not warranting a discount.

The court deemed the defendants' overall costs claim reasonable and within the reasonable expectations of the parties, fixing costs at $65,981.09, payable by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, Gregory King, brought claims against Italian lawyers and their firm (the Italian Defendants) alleging conflict of interest and misconduct in prior Italian legal proceedings that resulted in a judgment against King.

The Italian Defendants moved to dismiss King's claims for lack of jurisdiction simpliciter and, alternatively, on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The court found no real and substantial connection between King's claims and Ontario, as the alleged conduct occurred in Italy, the defendants did not carry on business in Ontario, and any related contract was primarily Italian.

The court also determined that Italy was clearly the more convenient forum, given the location of witnesses, applicable Italian law, and the desirability of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting decisions.

Consequently, the court dismissed King's entire action against the Italian Defendants.

The defendants brought a motion to stay the plaintiff's action based on a mandatory arbitration clause in the base trade credit insurance policy.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, relying on a Canadian endorsement that permitted an action against the insurer in Canada and stated that endorsements prevail in the event of a conflict.

The court found that the contract, read as a whole, provided alternative methods for dispute resolution and that the endorsement prevailed over the base policy's arbitration clause.

The motion to stay the action was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal and motion for leave to appeal under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

The court fixed the costs of the appeal and the motion for leave to appeal at $25,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable by the appellant union to the respondent.

The appellant union appealed a decision finding that the CCAA judge had no jurisdiction to apply the American doctrine of equitable subordination to subordinate the claims of the respondent parent company.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the CCAA does not provide express or implied authority to apply equitable subordination, and that the doctrine does not fall within the scheme of the statute, which focuses on the implementation of a plan of arrangement or compromise rather than legislating a scheme of priorities.

In a CCAA restructuring proceeding, stakeholders sought disclosure of a settlement agreement between U.S. Steel, its Canadian subsidiary, and the Attorney General of Canada regarding undertakings under the Investment Canada Act.

The CCAA judge held that the agreement was entirely privileged under s. 36 of the ICA.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while s. 36(5) protects the Crown from being compelled to disclose the agreement, this protection does not extend to the private corporations.

The appeal was allowed, and the issue of whether common law settlement privilege barred disclosure was remitted to the CCAA judge.

The moving party brought a motion to vary a previous order of the Court of Appeal and sought leave to issue a statement of claim for constitutional remedies.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no basis under the Rules of Civil Procedure to vary the order, as there was no evidence of fraud, mistake, or new facts.

The court agreed with the respondents that the motion was an abuse of process, frivolous, and vexatious, noting it was part of a long series of unsuccessful proceedings related to the Presto Card system.

The moving party was prohibited from bringing further proceedings against the respondents without leave of the court.