Jennifer Ruttan

The appellant was convicted of offences arising from a home invasion robbery on the basis of circumstantial evidence of identity, namely DNA found on a cigarette butt in a stolen vehicle and a victim's testimony that he may have heard the appellant's last name spoken during the robbery.

The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada found the verdicts unreasonable, holding that the DNA evidence alone did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial judge misapprehended the victim's testimony and failed to address serious concerns about his reliability.

The majority set aside the convictions and substituted verdicts of acquittal.

Côté and O'Bonsawin JJ. dissented, finding the combined effect of the DNA and identification evidence reasonably supported the inference of guilt.

The appellant and a co-accused were convicted of second degree murder in a stabbing death of a victim who owed a drug debt.

The trial judge expressly refrained from finding that the appellant personally stabbed the victim, and the subjective mens rea for murder under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code was not clearly analyzed.

The Court of Appeal majority erred by making a finding of fact that the trial judge declined to make and by accepting the trial judge's statement of intent as sufficient to support the murder conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal but substituted a verdict of manslaughter, remitting the matter to the trial judge for sentencing.

The accused appealed a sexual assault conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable under s. 686(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

A majority of the provincial court of appeal upheld the conviction, with one dissenting judge finding appellate intervention warranted.

The Supreme Court held there was no illogical or irrational reasoning process by the trial judge and no basis to characterize the verdict as unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction remained in force.

The appellant challenged convictions for impaired driving causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, and driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit, arguing Charter breaches related to detention, counsel rights, and search and seizure required exclusion of breath sample evidence.

A majority held the appeal should be dismissed substantially for the reasons of the intermediate appellate judge.

The majority concluded admission of the breath sample evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Two judges would have allowed the appeal based on the cumulative effect of multiple breaches.

The Court dismissed the appeal from a second degree murder conviction.

The majority held the defence of provocation lacked an air of reality on the subjective element, particularly suddenness, and should not have been left to the jury, but affirmed the conviction.

A concurring judge would have held the defence was properly left to the jury, yet also dismissed the appeal on the Court of Appeal majority’s reasoning.

In a murder appeal, the Court considered whether the trial judge improperly relied on the common sense inference on intent without first assessing all evidence bearing on the accused’s mental state.

The Court held that there was no legal error because the trial judge had reviewed the full evidentiary record relevant to intent, including alcohol consumption and surrounding circumstances, before applying the inference.

The Court also refused fresh psychiatric evidence, finding lack of due diligence and no reasonable possibility that the proposed evidence would have changed the verdict under the Palmer test.

The conviction for second degree murder therefore stood.

A criminal appeal challenged a conviction for possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition under s. 95 of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the trial judge reasonably inferred the required knowledge element from circumstantial evidence.

The Court held the verdict was not unreasonable and agreed with the majority of the intermediate appellate court.

The conviction was affirmed and the appeal was dismissed.